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With a goal of improving the performance of wholesale electricity markets, virtual
financial products have been introduced. Virtual bids are purely financial instruments that may
be used to speculate on the differences between prices in the forward and spot markets in a twosettlement electricity market. While there is evidence that price convergence across these
markets can be induced by virtual bidding, other research has shown that the impacts on the
welfare of market participants are less clear. The problem is that, while virtual bidding may
narrow the price gap, if it does so by inflating the prices, then electricity consumers may not be
better off.
Although some work has been done on the impacts of virtual transactions on welfare for
the electricity market participants, that work provides an incomplete assessment because it
ignores some important aspects of the electricity market system. In particular, the prior work due
to Giraldo (2017) essentially ignores the electricity transmission network as well as the physical
laws governing electricity flows. The objective of this research is to understand the effect of
virtual transactions on electricity market efficiency (i.e. social welfare) using a model that
explicitly includes the network as well as relationships that reflect the physical properties of
electricity flows through a network (i.e. loop flow). The core research question is; what impact

xi
does network congestion have on the welfare shifts caused by the participation of financial
virtual traders?
This study employs models with multiple buses to analyze the welfare changes of
electricity market participants in a network constrained multi-settlement electricity market.
Integrating the network in the model enables a comparison of welfare changes between the
simpler network-free models and a network-based model with the possibilities of line congestion
and an explicit treatment of loop flow.
Using stylized two- and three-bus models, we estimated and compared the differences in
welfare impact due to the introduction of virtual transactions between uncongested and
congested networks as well as its heterogeneous impact on the different buses due to their
location within the network. At the network level, congested lines amplify the welfare change
due to introducing virtual transactions. We also found that the results from the simple models are
broadly consistent in the complex network using the aggregate model of ISO-NE test case.
Results suggest that price convergence occurs with optimal virtual bidding in most cases,
which is consistent with existing literature. The prices throughout the network in both forward and
spot markets are changed, and there are welfare transfers among producers, consumers, and virtual
traders relative to the market equilibrium without virtual bidding. Furthermore, the welfare impacts
on market participants are not homogenous throughout the network. These implications should be
considered in the design of regulations governing virtual transactions in the electricity market.
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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, Independent System Operators (ISO) and Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTO), run the wholesale market that serve the majority of electricity consumers.
The electricity markets administered by ISOs and RTOs commonly have a “two-settlement
format” of forward and spot wholesale energy markets with an auction system for buying and
selling electricity. The forward, or Day-Ahead (DA), market is executed on the day before the
actual day when demand is served by dispatching electricity from generators. The DA market
establishes financially binding commitments to inject and withdraw electricity from the
electricity network. The spot, or Real-Time (RT) market, is a physical market executed on the
day that electricity is dispatched to serve the load. System operators balance physical supply and
demand for electricity in real time. An optimization model called the Optimal Power Flow model
(OPF) determines market-clearing quantities in both the DA and RT markets. A byproduct of the
solution to the OPF is spatially distinct marginal costs of satisfying demand at each node in the
network. These marginal costs are constructed using the Lagrange multipliers from the OPF, and
these marginal costs are called Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs). Quantities cleared in the DA
market are valued at the associated LMPs. The RT market is treated as a “balancing market,” and
deviations from the cleared quantities settled in the DA market are valued at the RT LMPs.
In the interest of improving the performance of wholesale electricity markets, virtual
injection and withdrawal financial products have been introduced. Virtual transactions are
financial products that may be used to speculate on differences between DA and RT prices in a
two-settlement electricity market. Virtual traders do not control generation units or load-serving
entities, although physical market participants can also use virtual bids either for speculative
purposes or in an effort to provide a hedge against RT price volatility. Virtual traders can
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participate in wholesale markets without being obligated to have the capacity of physical
generation or to serve electricity load. Virtual traders have a gross payoff or loss to a cleared,
virtual bid in the DA market equal to the spread between DA and RT prices times the quantity
cleared. Virtual bids are designed for traders to speculate or hedge on the price differences
between DA and RT markets.
In this regard, the Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) market, the
largest RTO in the world, has different types of virtual products including incremental offer,
decremental bid, and up-to-congestion transactions. An incremental offer (INC) is a virtual
supply offer. INCs are hourly and injection node-specific and consists of a price and energy
quantity in MWs of generation to be injected into the network at the specified node. If an INC
has a price that is less than the DA price at the injection node, then the bid will clear and possibly
displace some physical generation commitment. In the RT market, the INC trader is obligated to
purchase power to replace the generation they committed to supplying but do not. A decremental
bid (DEC) is also hourly and withdrawal node-specific, and corresponds to a price and energy
quantity in MWs of generation to be withdrawn from the network at the specified node. When
the virtual bidder expects the DA price will be greater than the RT price, they may bid INC in
order to make a profit from the price difference between DA and RT markets. INC may increase
overall supply in the DA market and hence may decrease the DA prices. Up to congestion
transaction (UTC) is virtual bid on the difference between prices from one node to another
within the network, or in other words, they are virtual transactions focused on the value of the
congestion price spread between two particular points. As with other virtual transactions, UTC is
a bid in the DA market and are settled via the balancing RT market through offsetting
transactions. Profitability occurs when the RT congestion price is greater than the purchased DA
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congestion price. However, UTC is different from other virtual bids because (a) they are
directional – a bid on congestion from node A to node B is distinct from a bid on the congestion
from node B to node A – and (b) UTC does not affect the commitment of generators in the day
ahead market, but rather only their dispatch. The congestion price from node A to node B is
defined as the nodal price at B minus the nodal price at A.
Despite the fact that virtual bids do not deliver or consume physical energy, some
researchers believe that they can have an impact on both the forward and spot market prices. For
example, when more generation units are committed in DA due to virtual, the more expensive
subset of generation units in RT is available to be online when the realized demand in RT is
higher than the forecasted demand in DA.
Opponents have claimed that the virtual transactions can make an expected profit without
improving system performance such as unit commitment (Parsons et al. 2015). When the DA/RT
price spread arises not from a deficiency of supply and demand, but from the electricity market
design, such as the inconsistency in the granularity of time in determining settlement prices
between the DA (hourly) and RT (every 5 minutes) market. Some have argued that virtual bids
may provide unfavorable impacts on the electricity market because they can be used to
manipulate the value of the other financial products such as Financial Transmission Rights
(FTRs) while losing money on the virtual transactions (Ledgerwood and Pfeifenberger 2013;
Celebi, Hajos, and Hanser 2010; Shan et al. 2016).
Proponents have argued that virtual bids increase market efficiency by eliciting price
convergence (reducing the expected price differences) between DA and RT market prices
(Borenstein et al. 2008; Hadsell 2011; Haugom and Ullrich 2012). For instance, Saravia (2003)
studied the New York market and asserted that after the introduction of virtual bidding, the
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average price differences between DA and RT markets significantly decreased due to the
increased level of competition and liquidity of virtual bids. Following the additional study of
virtual products and price convergence in the NYISO by Hadsell and Shawky (2007), Bowden,
Hu, and Payne (2009) found similar results in the MISO, and Jha and Wolak (2013), Li,
Svoboda, and Oren (2015) and Woo et al. (2015) in the CAISO.
In the economics literature, efficiency is typically estimated by the size of the overall net
economic surplus, also known as social welfare, resulting from resource use (Li and Tesfatsion
2011). General market efficiency analysis in the economic literature considers the magnitude of
extracted efficient welfare from market participants. Social welfare is maximized by an
appropriate resource distribution resulting from non-wasted resource usage. However, the
literature on the welfare impact of virtual bids in electricity markets is thin.
The welfare analysis of the electricity market has been used to measure the impact of
features of the electricity market such as demand response and line congestion. Walawalkar et al.
(2008) estimate the welfare impact of demand response in the PJM market on market participants
including producers and consumers. The study suggests that the major economic effect of
demand response is welfare transfers from generators to the consumer having less price
responsiveness. Willems and Küpper (2010) study the welfare change from price discriminating
producers when transmission capacity is limited. They conclude that overall welfare is reduced
as the congested lines bring profitable opportunities that mislead the production decisions of the
monopolistic producer. Additionally, Mansur (2008) measures the welfare shifts due to the
deregulation of the electricity market.
While there is clear evidence that price convergence can be induced by virtual bidding to
address the touted benefits of virtual bids on market efficiency, other research has shown that the
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impacts on the welfare of market participants are less clear. The problem is that, while virtual
bidding may narrow the price gap, if it does so by inflating the prices in both forward and spot
markets, then electricity consumers may not be better off.
Giraldo et al. (2017) used welfare analysis to study the efficiency impact of a financial
trader’s virtual bid on wholesale electricity markets. The results of the study show that the virtual
trading may transfer welfare between consumers and producers while financial traders have
positive expected profits. The study employs a stylized parsimonious two-settlement market
model based on a single node.
While (Giraldo et al. 2017) has been done on the impacts of virtual transactions on the
welfare of the various electricity market participants, that work provides an incomplete
assessment ignoring some important aspects of the electricity market system. In particular,
important features of electricity networks that are eliminated in those models have to do with
transmission lines and physical laws governing electricity flows. Previous studies lack theoretical
models to measure the impact of virtual bids on market efficiency in the electricity network.
The simple models have limitations to applying the welfare results to the models of
multiple buses in the network as the simplistic single bus model cannot accommodate the
network congestion and loop flow. Due to the physical laws governing electricity networks, the
single bus model cannot reflect these features precisely because there is no network. Using a
model with more than a single bus demonstrates that introducing virtual transactions in a multibus network has somewhat different welfare impacts than the single bus case.
A transmission line becomes congested when energy delivered through the line reaches
the thermal/physical limits of the lines and/or transformers. Transmission line congestion can
necessitate changing the operations so as to avoid damaging the electricity network.
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Consequently, the congested line may change the prices on the electricity network and thus
impact the welfare of the market participants. When there is no congestion, LMPs will be
identical throughout the network. If there is congestion, however, it can prevent full utilization of
the lowest cost generation units resulting in a higher cost of satisfying demand.
The physical laws governing electricity flows in a multi-bus network, known as
Kirchhoff’s laws, are such that power flows cannot be directly controlled. This means that the
existence of a path from an injection to a withdrawal node that has excess capacity does not
necessarily mean that increasing the injection and withdrawal simultaneously can be
accommodated by the network. This is because the existence of another path from the injection
to the withdrawal node that is at maximum capacity would violate the line capacity constraint
with the increase. This type of phenomenon cannot be observed in single or two-bus models. The
result is that the physical laws governing electricity flows create distortions to the “ideal”
operation of the network with generators dispatched in economic merit order, with attendant
impacts on LMPs throughout the network. These distortions influence consumer and producer
surplus, and thus have an impact on the welfare impacts due to the introduction of virtual
transactions in the market.
The fundamental objective of this study is to understand how the properties of an
electricity network (i.e. congestion and loop flow) affect the welfare impacts of introducing
virtual transactions in an electricity market. Throughout the systematic examination of the simple
model to multi-bus model, we expect to obtain the answers to the hypothesis following:
H01 : Having congestion in the network creates no differences in optimal bidding strategy

of the financial trader and its welfare impact on market participants

7
H02 : Having optimal virtual bidding in the congested network creates homogeneous

welfare impacts across the network

This study employs multi-bus networks with optimal power flow analysis to assess the
welfare changes for electricity market participants in the network constrained multi-settlement
electricity market. Introducing the network in the analysis enables this study to compare the
results of welfare changes between the results from the simpler theoretical models and congested
multi-bus models with loop flow.
We employ multiple types of the electricity networks and compare the welfare changes
for market participants due to the introduction of virtual transactions. In this study, we analyze
two- and three-bus networks using simulation to estimate the welfare impacts of the introduction
of virtual transactions in a congested network. The two-bus network is the simplest network that
includes transmission. The three-bus network is the simplest network that can incorporate a loop,
and hence where Kirchhoff’s Laws governing loop flows in an electrical network apply.
However, real electricity networks are far more complicated than these simple “sandbox”
models, with more buses, transmission lines, and many possible patterns of congestion. The
optimal bidding strategy in the more complicated network may involve multiple bids at
alternative nodes, and hence, the overall welfare impact will likely be different. We use the 8
nodes ISO-NE Test System developed by Krishnamurthy, Li, and Tesfatsion (2016) as the basis
for our analysis for a more complex electricity network
The market outcomes show that price convergence increases in expectation due to
optimal virtual bidding in most cases, which is consistent with existing literature. The prices
throughout the network in both forward and spot markets are affected, and there are welfare
transfers among producers and consumers due to virtual bidding.
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The results of the welfare analysis indicate that optimal virtual bidding tends to decrease
consumer welfare when the expected spot price is equal to the cleared forward price, and
congested lines in the network can magnify the welfare changes while virtual traders essentially
always benefit. This is an important case because observations of market outcomes over time in
PJM suggest that the forward prices appear to be an unbiased estimator of the spot price.
Furthermore, the welfare impacts are not homogenous throughout the network. The
heterogeneity depends on where an agent is located in the network relative to the congested line.
That is, some generators may benefit while others lose, with the same being true for load-serving
entities.
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we briefly present background on the
wholesale electricity market. In Chapter 3, we address the method employed in the analysis and
present algebraic welfare analysis in the single bus model. In Chapter 4, we present methods and
formulations for welfare analysis in the multi-bus models. We analyze the results of the optimal
bidding strategy and welfare impact with line capacity constraints using simple two- and three-bus
networks in Chapter 5, and observe whether these impacts are consistent to the simple networks
to a more complex network using ISO-NE test network in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, we address the
conclusions and discussions.
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CHAPTER 2.

WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET

The wholesale electricity market is composed of a Day-Ahead market (DA), which is a
planning and financial forward market, and a Real-Time market (RT), which is a spot market.
Participants in the electricity market are generators (suppliers), load-serving entities (consumers),
or LSEs, and virtual bidders. Generators and load-serving entities are linked to physical
resources at particular pricing nodes whereas a virtual bidder is not associated with physical
generating capacity and does not have an obligation to serve load. A generator will only sell
energy and load-serving entities will typically only buy energy at their respective nodes whereas
virtual bidders may sell or buy electricity at any allowable node to bid in the network.

2.1

Multi Settlement Electricity Market
The multi-settlement market system is designed to facilitate the scheduling of generating

resources to meet anticipated load. When the cleared purchases and sales of electricity settled at
the DA price are not physically delivered in the RT market, they are bought or sold back at the
RT price. When the realized electricity demand in the RT market is beyond the settled demand in
the RT market additional generation is required to meet demand in the RT market. This
additional generation is compensated at RT prices. Similarly, if demand is less than what cleared
in the DA market, less generation is needed, and generation units pay for the differences at RT
prices.

2.2

Locational Marginal Pricing
The wholesale electricity market is different from the other commodity markets due to

the unstorable nature of electricity and physical laws governing electricity networks. Electricity
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cannot be practically stored at utility scale. Hence supply must always match the demand from
second to second in real time. Following the physical laws of the electricity network, injected
energy does not flow from the seller to the buyer of that energy on the shortest or most desirable
path. The power flow follows the physical laws that are attributed to Kirchhoff and that are
governed by the physical characteristics of the electricity network and the pattern of injections
and withdrawals in the network.
A system operator controls the energy dispatch (injections into the network) to manage
the power flow on the network within transmission constraints and security limits. The system
operator needs to schedule generators before the actual dispatch moment because some
generation units have start-up time to produce electricity. Unit commitment and economic
dispatch are the major components of generation scheduling in the DA market. Unit commitment
determines the unit start up and shut down schedules of generators in order to obtain least-cost
dispatch. Economic dispatch is the determination of how to serve the loads distributed
throughout the system at least cost.
Transmission line capacities create restrictions on the pattern of injections by generators
and withdrawals by load-serving entities throughout the network in order to prevent damaging
the transmission system. A congested transmission line limits the power flow between two
physically connected nodes in the network, creating differences in the marginal value of power
across the network. For this reason, wholesale electricity markets often use a spatial pricing
mechanism called a locational marginal price. The LMP is the marginal cost of delivering energy
at each node of the electricity network. These prices are defined by the solution to the economic
dispatch problem.
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Electricity buyers and sellers participate in the electricity market auction organized by
market institutions that are variously called regional transmission organizations or independent
systems operators. Generation units submit location specific willingness-to-sell offers with pricequantity pairs that are arranged into increasing step functions by the market institution. Loadserving entities (LSEs) submit location specific willingness-to-purchase bids with price-quantity
pairs that are decreasing step functions, also by the node.

2.3

Optimal Power Flow
The Alternating Current Optimal Power Flow (ACOPF) model is an optimization

problem that models how electricity flows across the electric grid following Kirchhoff’s laws,
and it is used to economically dispatch generation in real time in the least cost manner. The
ACOPF optimization problem is, however, a tough problem to solve because it is a nonlinear,
non-convex optimization problem with constraints that include trigonometric functions. The nonlinearity that these equations significantly complicates the optimization problem (Hedman, Oren,
and O’Neill 2011). Thus, it is common to use a linear approximation of the ACOPF problem.
The most common linear approximation of the ACOPF problem is known as the Direct
Current Optimal Power Flow (DCOPF) problem. The DCOPF problem uses a simplification of
the physical attributes of an electricity network that complicate ACOPF problem. The
linearization is based on the assumption that resistance and line losses are insignificant, the perunit voltage magnitude at each bus is 1 p.u. 1, and uses linear approximations to the sine and
cosine functions about the point where the phase angle, θ, is equal to zero with cos(θ) = 1 and

1

It is a convention to express voltage magnitude in per-unit (p.u.) terms that indicates the local value of specific bus
relative to the nominal value. For example, when we set 100kV equals 1.00 p.u., the voltage magnitude at Bus 1 can
be 1.02 p.u. that is 102kV.
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sin(θ) = θ respectively. With these approximations, the DCOPF problem is a linear program,
resulting in a problem that is much easier to solve than the nonlinear, non-convex ACOPF
problem (L. Tang and Ferris 2015).
Formulations of the DCOPF problem often eliminate the phase angle variables and
express the network constraints following Kirchhoff’s laws regarding Power Transfer
Distribution Factors, or PTDFs (Hedman, Oren, and O’Neill 2011). The PTDF formulation
models flow on lines based on power injections and withdrawals at each bus (L. Tang and Ferris
2015).
The optimal power flow method solves the system operator’s market welfare
maximization problem using the Direct Current Optimal Power Flow (DCOPF) model with the
physical constraints such as Kirchhoff’s laws, line capacity constraints and generation-load
energy balancing. Following the general practice of academia and industry, this study adopts
Direct Current Optimal Power Flow (DCOPF) formulation for modeling the DA and RT
markets.

2.4

Virtual Transactions
Over the last decade, virtual bidding has become a standard feature of wholesale energy

markets in the U.S. Virtual bids are purely financial instruments and can represent a nodespecific injection or withdrawal of electricity in the network in the DA market. Financial traders
submitting virtual bids that are cleared in the DA market must resolve these contracts by buying
or selling back the same number of megawatts of energy at the designated location and hour on
the network in the RT market at the nodal RT price.
In PJM, virtual bids include increment offers (INCs), decrement bids (DECs) and up-tocongestion transactions (UTCs). INCs are submitted to the DA market to sell a given amount of
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energy at a specific node at a specified price. INCs can be considered as virtual supply as virtual
generation offers in the DA Market. INCs are profitable when the DA clearing price exceeds the
RT clearing price.
DECs are the exact opposite of INCs. DECs are submitted to the DA market to purchase
energy at a specified node and price. DECs can be considered as virtual demand or virtual load
bid in the DA market. DECs are profitable when the DA clearing price is lower than the RT
clearing price.
UTCs are submitted to the DA market to hedge price differences between two points due
to congestion. The UTCs designate a precise source (injection) and sink (withdrawal) nodes with
a spread that specifies willingness-to-pay for the price differences between the source and the
sink. The UTCs are cleared in DA market at the DA price of transmission (DA congestion price)
that is the price difference between DA LMP at the sink and at the source when the reservation
price of UTCs are larger than the DA price of transmission. The exact MW of UTCs that are
cleared in DA market settle in the RT market at the RT congestion price.
The way to calculate profit is different based on bid direction. When the UTC bid
specifies sink and source, it becomes prevalent direction if the sink LMP is greater than the
source LMP. In this case, the DA congestion price becomes a cost and a RT congestion price
becomes a revenue to calculate the expected profit: (UTCs in MW) x (RT congestion price– DA
congestion price). If the sink LMP is less than the source LMP, it is counted as a counterflow
direction. In this case, the DA congestion price becomes revenue, and RT congestion price
becomes a cost to calculate the expected profit: UTCs x (DA congestion price– RT congestion
price). It implies that when zero or miniscule DA congestion price is expected while RT
congestion price can be at least higher than zero, UTC traders can reduce the risk by making a
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counter-flow bid with very low reservation cost that can be cleared by a very low DA congestion
price.
UTCs and INCs/DECs have a distinct way to interact with the market. In PJM, they
model INCs/DEC during the unit commitment process (Resource Scheduling Commitment in
PJM) while they model UTCs during the economic dispatch process (Scheduling Pricing and
Dispatch in PJM). In this sense, INCs/DECs can influence the unit commitment process while
UTCs can affect the after unit commitment process, scheduling the dispatch of units that are
already committed.
By nature, INCs/DECs are energy products while UTCs are transmission products. That
means INCs/DECs correspond to energy costs of LMPs while UTCs correspond to congestion
cost. When UTCs are cleared in DA market, they are counted as a pair of equal MW INCs and
DECs at their source and sink nodes respectively. UTCs must be simultaneously cleared at both
source and sink nodes with the same amount of MW while the independent INCs and DECs bid
could be paired together, there is no certainty that they both would be cleared.
Virtual traders are motivated by speculation opportunities arising from expected
discrepancies between prices in the DA and RT markets. The price divergence may occur due to
unscheduled events such as unexpected demand changes, or generator or transmission outages.
The two-settlement system settles all DA transactions at the DA prices and deviations from the
DA cleared supply and demand at the RT prices. Thus, the speculation opportunities arise from
the price differences between the DA and RT markets, providing potentially profitable
opportunities for virtual traders.
If the realized RT price is higher than the DA price, then the trader that cleared a bid to
demand power, which is virtual demand (DECs) has managed to “buy low and sell high”,
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making a profit on the transaction. The expected profit of the cleared virtual demand bid is the
expected price difference (RT – DA) times the MWs of virtual demand, where the expectation is
taken across the distribution of outcomes for the RT market.
As virtual bids compete with physical resources in the DA market, the speculating
behavior of financial traders can affect how physical resources are committed and dispatched,
and hence they influence market prices and system costs in DA and RT markets. For example, a
virtual demand bid buying in DA in the hope of selling at a higher price in the RT market may
result in the DA market clearing with more generation units committed and more generators
dispatched to serve cleared demand bids including virtual demand bids.
The RT market outcomes can be changed by virtual bids (INCs and DECs, but not UTCs) 2
in the DA market because they can change the generation unit commitment plan in the DA
market that is arranged to serve on the RT market. The altered unit commitment can have an
impact on the actual dispatch in the RT market, thereby influencing RT prices.

2.5

Bilevel Programming

Bilevel programming is useful to model the sequential behavior of market participants when they
influence each other’s decisions. In this regard, the Bilevel programming can be of use to
understand the behavior of virtual traders in the electricity market.
In the bilevel programming, two types of decision makers act as a hierarchical game. The
leader optimizes an objective function subject to conditions imposed by optimal decisions of the
follower. The leaders choices may impact the feasible region and the objective function of the
follower’s problem. The follower’s reaction affects the leader’s payoff and the scope of the

2

INCs and DECs are considered the unit commitment process while UTCs are not.
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leader’s initial selection. The leader's decision is perceived by the follower who reacts optimally
regarding the observed action from the leader.
Some economic problems can be interpreted as bilevel programs. For instance, a
Stackelberg leader-follower game can be viewed as a bilevel programming with the leader’s
problem at the upper level and the follower’s problem at the lower level. The leader makes the
first attempt to optimize the objective anticipating the responses of the follower. The follower
selects the optimal strategy conditional on the leader’s behavior. The general structure is an
instance of the bilevel programming setup.
Bilevel programming problems tend to be nonconvex optimization problems by nature. A
common approach to investigate bilevel programming problems is to transform the bilevel
optimization into the single-level optimization problem by replacing the lower level problem by
its associated Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are
treated as a set of, typically nonlinear, constraints on the upper-level problem. The result is that
the bilevel program is converted to a single level optimization problem, which is usually
nonlinear and often nonconvex (Falk and Liu 1995).
Bilevel programming is appropriate for modeling optimization problems in which the top
level optimizer (i.e. the one who moves first and anticipates the responses of the lower level
agents) does not directly control a subset of the decision variables – namely, the ones chosen by
the lower level agents. The problem of determining the profit-maximizing bids of market
participants in a wholesale electricity market fits well in this context since the virtual market
participants want to maximize their expected profit (or some index of the distribution of expected
profit) while the system operator carries out a least-cost dispatch in order to minimize the overall
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system cost. In this context, the bilevel programming can be used to analyze electricity markets
to reflect these conflicting goals (Hu and Ralph 2007; Fampa et al. 2007).
In the stylized electricity network model, the system operator’s problem is the electricity
market welfare maximization, which is the lower level programming problem. The twosettlement system of DA and RT markets can be viewed as optimization problems with recourse
– decisions are made in the DA market, and decisions are subsequently made in the RT market
that are conditional on the outcomes of random demand perturbations. The financial trader can
be viewed as acting as the top-level agent, who places virtual bids with the motivation, assuming
risk neutrality, of maximizing expected profit. At the lower level, the system operator maximizes
electricity market welfare taking into account the bids of the financial trader.
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CHAPTER 3.

WELFARE ANALYSIS IN THE SINGLE BUS MODEL

We start with a simple stylized model with a single bus that permits mathematical
analysis of the impact of INCs/DECs on market efficiency. We focus on a single hour and
assume that the interactions between hours are negligible for the purposes of this stylized
modeling exercise. Consumers are assumed to bid a fixed number of MW for the hour being
modeled.
Giraldo et al. (2017) conducted welfare analysis to study the welfare impact of financial
traders’ virtual bids on wholesale electricity markets using constant elasticity of substitution
electricity supply functions. The numerical results of the study show that, in the vast majority of
case, the virtual transactions decrease electricity consumers’ welfare and increase the producers’
(generators’) welfare while financial traders virtually always profit.
This study uses linear supply functions to develop a closed form solution for the welfare
change of market participants when virtual trading is introduced in the market. The general
results of optimal virtual bidding strategy and its welfare impacts on the market participants are
consistent with the past literature. Certain extreme sets of parameters for DA and RT slope
relative to the DA demand and the range of uncertainty, however, may change the qualitative
welfare impact of market participants due to the different functional form used in this study.

3.1

Multi-Settlement Electricity Market with Virtual Transactions
Demand in the RT market, denoted by d2, is the sum of demand in the DA market,

denoted by d1, plus a random deviation Δ.
d2 = d1 + ∆

We assume that the financial trader knows the distribution of Δ.

(1)
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In the real market, the supply function is a step function corresponding to price/quantity
pairs bid by generators for the specific hour. The supply curve at any bus is an aggregate of
individual step offer functions of generation units located at the specific bus. Here, we
approximate this step function by a continuous, linear supply curve. Abstracting from the
lumpiness of the step functions facilitates analysis of a stylized theoretical model. We assume
that generators bid at their marginal cost without market power. ISO/RTOs have market
monitoring practice to prevent the exercise of market power.
The linear supply function in DA market, denoted by S1, to meet the DA generation and
DA demand, is characterized by the DA supply slope, denoted by b1, DA price, denoted by P1,
and intercept a1.
S1 = g1 = d1 = a1 + b1 ∙ P1

(2)

a1

d1

a1

g1

LMP1(d1) = P1(d1) = − b1 + b1

= P1(g1) = − b1 + b1

In a single bus model, the DA market price LMP1 is determined by the amount of DA
generation, denoted by g1, in inverse DA supply function, denoted by P1 as in (2).
The RT supply curve is a piecewise linear function that is the same as the DA supply
curve up to the DA cleared generation level g1. Beyond g1, the RT supply curve is again linear,
but the slope, denoted by b2, is less steep than b1. The intercept of this portion of the curve, a2,
is set so that the RT supply curve is continuous.
a1

d1

a1

g1

a2 = d1 − b2 · LMP1 = d1 − b2 · �− b1 + b1�
= g1 − b2 · LMP1 = g1 − b2 · �− b1 + b1�

(3)
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In this single node system, the generation in RT must equal the demand in RT which is cleared
demand in DA plus the demand deviation in RT (g2=d2=d1+∆).
The negative demand deviation in RT can be served by committed generation units in
DA, and hence the LMPs for negative deviations are determined based on the DA supply curve.
When generation in RT is greater than in DA, the RT market price, LMP2, is determined by the
amount of RT generation, g2, in inverse RT supply function, P2 in (4).
a2

d1+∆

a2

g2

− + b2 = −
LMP2 = P2(d1 + ∆) = � b2
a1
d1+∆
− b1 + b1
− + =−
= P2(g2) = � b2 b2
a1
g2
− b1 + b1

d1−b2·�−
b2

g1−b2·�−
b2

a1 d1
+ �
b1 b1

a1 g1
+ �
b1 b1

+
g2

d1+∆

+ b2

b2

,∆ ≥ 0

, ∆< 0

(4)

, g2 ≥ g1

, g2 < g1

One thing to be noted is that the supply function in the RT balancing market is not
identical to the one in the DA market due to the differences in the marginal costs of generation
units used in the RT and DA markets.The slope of the DA supply curve is always greater than
the slope of the RT supply curve (b1>b2).
In the DA market, the system operator has a wider availability of generation units to
commit, and they are scheduled to dispatch in a least-cost manner to meet the forecasted
demand. During the DA market clearing process, the system operator commits the units that will
be available in the RT market. If realized demand is less than DA demand the committed
generation units can be dispatched at a lower level than planned in the DA market.
In the RT market, when the realized demand deviates above the forecasted demand, the
system operator has a limited set of the flexible generators to meet the increased demand. When
there is a sudden increase in RT demand, only fast response resources meet the immediate
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positive demand deviation. The fast response resources, such as natural gas combustion turbine
power plants, that can be brought online in a short time, generally have higher marginal costs.
These generators usually have at least as high and usually higher marginal costs than what would
have been available in the DA market. In this sense, the slope of abstracted inverse supply
function in the RT balancing market is steeper than the one in the DA market (Isemonger 2006).
In the stylized model, all virtual bids are represented by the variable V. A positive V
corresponds to an INC bid, and a negative V corresponds to a DEC bid. The virtual supply offer
and demand bids influence the DA market price, LMP1, as if they bid supply and demand as in
(5). While LMP1 represents a DA price without virtual, LMP1′ represents the DA price with

virtual bidding. The ′ notation indicates the cases where virtual bids are used.
a1

LMP1′ (d1 − V) = P1(d1 − V) = − b1 +
a1

= P1(g1′ ) = − b1 +

d1−V

(5)

b1

g1′
b1

The supply curves are still continuous because the altered outcome of the DA market
adjusts the a2 parameter as represented by (6), and the RT price with INC/DEC bids.
a1

a2′ = d1 − V − b2 · LMP1′ = d1 − V − b2 · (− b1 +

d1−V
b1

g1′

a1

= g1′ − b2 · LMP1′ = g1′ − b2 · (− b1 + b1 )

LMP2′ , maintains continuity with a steeper slope as represented by (7).
′

′

LMP2 = P2 (d1 + ∆) = �
= P2′ (g2)

a2′

− b2 +
a1

− b1 +

=�

d1+∆

b2
d1+∆

a2′

b1

=−

g2

− b2 + b2 = −
a1

g2

− b1 + b1

a1 d1−V
+
�
b1
b1

(d1−V)−b2·�−
b2

a1 g1′
+ �
b1 b1

g1′ −b2·�−
b2

+

g2

+ b2

(6)

)

d1+∆
b2

, ∆ ≥ −V
, ∆< −V

, g2 ≥ g1′

, g2 < g1′

(7)
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3.2

Welfare of Market Participants: Formulations
This section provides equations for calculating expected economic surplus of market

participants taking into account surplus in the DA market and distribution of adjustments to that
surplus in the RT market. The consumer surplus calculation is the consumer payment in DayAhead (DA) plus balancing payments for the consumer in RT plus consumer value. The
consumer value is calculated as d2 times reservation price (RP). The producer surplus calculation
is equal to the payments to the generator in DA less the costs of generation minus balancing
payments by the producer minus (plus) increases (decreases) in generation cost. The financial
trader surplus calculation is payment to/by the financial trader in DA plus balancing payment by
the financial trader in RT, depending on whether it is INC or DEC. Because the financial trader
can always opt out, the expected surplus of the financial trader will always be positive, assuming
risk neutrality. The expected change in social welfare due to the introduction of virtual trading is
simply the difference in the market participants’ welfare with and without virtual trading. The
social welfare is a sum of consumer welfare and producer welfare. The virtual trader welfare is
not counted in social welfare calculation since virtual bids are interrupter of the market rather
than being a supplier or consumer of the electricity.
Consumer welfare without virtual trading
−DA Payment by Consumer + RT Balance Payment to Consumer + Consumer Value
= −d1 ∙ LMP1(d1) + (d1 − d2) ∙ LMP2(d2) + d2 ∙ RP

= −d1 ∙ LMP1(d1) + �d1 − (d1 + ∆)� ∙ LMP2(d1 + ∆) + d2 ∙ RP
= −d1 ∙ LMP1(d1) − ∆ ∙ LMP2(d1 + ∆) + d2 ∙ RP
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Consumer welfare with virtual trading
−DA Payment by Consumer + RT Balance Payment to Consumer + Consumer Value
= −d1 ∙ LMP1′ (d1 − V) + (d1 − d2) ∙ LMP2′ (d2) + d2 ∙ RP

= −d1 ∙ LMP1′ (d1 − V) + �d1 − (d1 + ∆)� ∙ LMP2′ (d1 + ∆) + d2 ∙ RP
= −d1 ∙ LMP1′ (d1 − V) − ∆ ∙ LMP2′ (d1 + ∆) + d2 ∙ RP

∆Consumer welfare due to the introduction of optimal virtual trading

∆DA payment by consumer + ∆ RT balance payment by the consumer

= −d1 ∙ (LMP1′ (d1 − V) − LMP1(d1)) + (d1 − d2) ∙ (LMP2′ (d2) − LMP2(d2))
= −d1 ∙ (LMP1′ (d1 − V) − LMP1(d1)) − ∆ ∙ (LMP2′ (d2) − LMP2(d2))

Producer welfare without virtual trading

DA Payment to Producer −RT Balance Payment to Producer – Generation Cost
= g1 ∙ LMP1(d1) − (g1 − g2) ∙ LMP2(d2)
min(g1,g2)

−(∫0

max(g1,g2)

P1(g) dg + ∫g1

P2(g) dg )

= d1 ∙ LMP1(d1) − �d1 − (d1 + ∆)� ∙ LMP2(d2)
min(d1,d1+∆)

−(∫0

max(d1,d1+∆)

P1(g) dg + ∫d1

= d1 ∙ LMP1(d1) + ∆LMP2(d2)
min(d1,d1+∆)

−(∫0

P2(g) dg )

max(d1,d1+∆)

P1(g) dg + ∫d1

Producer welfare with virtual trading

P2(g) dg )

DA Payment to Producer −RT Balance Payment to Producer – Generation Cost
= g1′ ∙ LMP1′ (d1 − V) − (g1′ − g2) ∙ LMP2′ (d2)
min�g1′ ,g2�

−(∫0

max�g1′ ,g2�

P1(g) dg + ∫g1′

P2′ (g) dg )
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= (d1 − V) ∙ LMP1′ (d1 − V) − �(d1 − V) − (d1 + ∆)� ∙ LMP2′ (d2)
min(d1−V,d1+∆)

−(∫0

max(d1−V,d1+∆)

P1(g) dg + ∫d1−V

= d1 ∙ LMP1′ (d1 − V) + (∆ + V) ∙ LMP2′ (d2)
min(d1−V,d1+∆)

−(∫0

P2′ (g) dg )

max(d1−V,d1+∆)

P1(g) dg + ∫d1−V

P2′ (g) dg )

∆Producer welfare due to the introduction of optimal virtual trading

∆ DA payment to producer + ∆ RT balance payment to producer +

∆ generation cost

= (g1′ ∙ LMP1′ (d1 − V) − g1 ∙ LMP1(d1)) + {(g2 − g1′ ) · LMP2′ (d2) − (g2 − g1) ·
min�g1′ ,g2�

LMP2(d2)} + �− �∫0
min(g1,g2)

�∫0

max�g1′ ,g2�

P1(g) dg + ∫g1

max(g1,g2)

P1(g) dg + ∫g1

P2(g) dg ��

P2′ (g) dg � +

= ((d1 − V) ∙ LMP1′ (d1 − V) − d1 ∙ LMP1(d1)) + ��(d1 + ∆) − (d1 − V)� ·
min(𝑑𝑑1−𝑉𝑉,d2)

LMP2′ (d2) − �(d1 + ∆) − d1� · LMP2(d2)� + �− �∫0
max(𝑑𝑑1−𝑉𝑉,d2)

∫𝑑𝑑1−𝑉𝑉

min(𝑑𝑑1,d2)

P2′ (g) dg � + �∫0

max(d1,d2)

P1(g) dg + ∫d1

P1(g) dg +

P2(g) dg ��

= ((d1 − V) ∙ LMP1′ (d1 − V) − d1 ∙ LMP1(d1)) + {(∆ − V) · LMP2′ (d2) − ∆ ·
min(𝑑𝑑1−𝑉𝑉,d2)

LMP2(d2)} + �− �∫0
min(𝑑𝑑1,d2)

�∫0

max(d1,d2)

P1(g) dg + ∫d1

Financial Trader welfare

max(𝑑𝑑1−𝑉𝑉,d2)

P1(g) dg + ∫𝑑𝑑1−𝑉𝑉
P2(g) dg ��

P2′ (g) dg � +

DA Payment to Financial Trader - RT Payment by Financial trader
= V ∙ LMP1′ (d1 − V) − V ∙ LMP2′ (d2)
= V ∙ (LMP1′ (d1 − V) − LMP2′ (d2))
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3.3

Price Change by Optimal Virtual Bid with Zero Expected Demand Deviation
Giraldo (2017) shows that the optimal virtual bid, when the expectation of demand

deviations between the day ahead (DA) and real-time (RT) markets is zero, is a decrement
(DEC) bid. This has the effect of shifting the equilibrium quantity in the DA market to the right
and shifts the equilibrium DA price up relative to the case of no virtual bidding. This shifts the
point at which the RT supply becomes steeper to the right as is illustrated in figure 3.1. Thus,
with a zero expected demand deviation, the RT supply with virtual bidding will lie above (at
quantities less than or equal to the DA demand without virtual bids) or below (above the DA
demand without virtual bids).
Because the support and probability distribution of the RT demand is unchanged and
price as a function of RT demand is on or below the price function without virtual bids, the
expected RT price will be lower in the presence of virtual bids. Thus, price convergence always
occurs when the optimal bidding strategy id DEC and the expected RT demand deviation is zero
– DA price increases, and expected RT price decreases.

Without Virtual Bid

With Virtual Bid

Quantity
<":-----------------·
d RT = d oA+ ~

>

(E[~]=O)

Figure 3.1 RT Supply (Price as a Function of Demand) with and without a Virtual DEC Bid
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3.4

Welfare of Market Participants: Graphical Representations
A graphical representation helps illustrate the welfare calculation. We will demonstrate

the three cases of RT demand realization relative to DA demand: 1) RT demand is identical to
DA demand, 2) RT demand is less than DA demand, 3) RT demand is greater than DA demand.
Chapter 3.4.1 shows all three cases without virtual bids. Chapter 3.4.2 shows the
deterministic case when RT demand is identical to DA demand with different bidding strategies.
Chapter 3.4.3 shows the stochastic case when RT demand is less than DA demand different
bidding strategies and Chapter 3.4.4 shows the stochastic case when RT demand is greater than
DA demand with different bidding strategies. Some cases are not profitable bidding strategy,
however, we will investigate them as well for the sake of completeness.
3.4.1

Graphical Representations: Without Virtual Bids
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Figure 3.2 Welfare calculation when RT demand is the same as DA demand

Figure 3.2 displays the case where there is no demand deviation and no financial trader.
Identical demands in Day-Ahead (DA) and Real-Time (RT) markets make DA generation (g1)
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and RT generation (g2) identical. The prices are the same as they are set along with the equal
supply curve in DA and RT market.
For consumer surplus, DA payment by the consumer is d1∙LMP1, the area of B+C, and
consumer value is d2∙RP, the area of A+B+C. The total consumer surplus is the area of A, or –
(B+C)+(A+B+C). For producer surplus, DA payment to the producer is g1∙LMP1, the area of
B+C, and the generation cost is the area under the inverse supply curve up to d2, C. Thus, the
total producer surplus is the area of B, or (B+C)-(C). The calculations have no significant
dissimilarity from standard economic welfare textbooks.
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Figure 3.3 Welfare calculation when RT demand is less than DA demand

Figure 3.3 shows the case when cleared demand in DA is larger than realized demand in
RT. Determined generation in DA must be equivalent to the cleared demand in DA and
dispatched generation in RT must be equal to the realized demand in RT in this single bus
environment.
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For consumer surplus, the DA payment by the consumer is d1∙LMP1, the area of
B+E+C+D+F, RT balance payment to the consumer is (d1-d2)∙LMP2, the area of F and
consumer value is d2∙(Reservation Price), the area of A+B+C+D. The total consumer surplus is
the area of A-E, or –(B+E+C+D+F)+(F)+(A+B+C+D).
For producer surplus, DA payment to the producer is g1∙LMP1, the area of B+C+D+E+F,
the RT balancing payment to the producer is -(g1-g2)∙LMP2, the area of F and the generation
cost is the area under the inverse supply curve up to d2, D. The total producer surplus is the area
of B+C+E, or (B+C+D+E+F)-(F)-(D).
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Figure 3.4 Welfare calculation when RT demand is greater than DA demand

Figure 3.4 shows the case when cleared demand in DA is lower than realized demand in
RT. For consumer surplus, the DA payment by the consumer is d1 ∙ LMP1, the area of C+D, RT

balance payment to the consumer is (d1 − d2) ∙ LMP2, the area of E+F and consumer value is
d2 ∙ RP, the area of A+B+C+D+E+F+G. The total consumer surplus is the area of A+B+G, (C+D)-(E+F)+A+B+C+D+E+F+G.
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For producer surplus, the DA payment to the producer is g1 ∙ LMP1, the area of C+D, RT

balancing payment to the producer is −(g1 − g2) ∙ LMP2, the area of E+F and the generation

cost is the area under the inverse supply curve up to d2, D+F. The total producer surplus is the
area of C+E, or C+D+E+F–(D+F).
Supply and demand elasticity differences and balancing payment rules are the sources of
surplus transfer between the case of the single market and the case of the two-settlement market
with demand deviation.
3.4.2

Graphical Representations: With Virtual Bids, RT demand is identical to DA
demand
The represented cases above have no virtual transactions. Virtual transactions in the two-

settlement electricity market influence the cleared generation and demand bids in the DA market
and hence influence the prices in DA and RT markets. The changes in the volume of cleared bids
and prices alter the welfare of market participants, including consumer, producer, and financial
trader.
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Figure 3.5 Welfare calculation when RT demand is identical to DA demand with a DEC
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Figure 3.5 is the case where DA demand is identical to RT demand with a virtual DEC
bid. Without the financial trader, the electricity market settles as single spot market where
d1=d2=g1=g2. Hence the consumer surplus is A+B, and the producer surplus is C. With the
financial trader, the consumer surplus is A, the producer surplus is B+C+F+G+H and financial
trader’s loss is F+G+H. When DA demand and RT demand are identical with a virtual DEC bid,
consumer surplus decreases, producer surplus increases and financial trader surplus becomes
negative. In this type of deterministic case, the virtual trader would not participate in the real
world. However, we cover this case for the sake of completeness.
Calculating economic surplus without DECs, the DA payment by the consumer is
d1∙LMP1 or the area of C+D. There is no RT balancing payment by the consumer because d2 is
equal to d1, and consumer value is d2∙RP, is the area of A+B+C+D. The total consumer surplus
is the area of A+B, or -(C+D)+(A+B+C+D). The DA payment to the producer is g1∙LMP1 or the
area of C+D. There is again no RT balance payment to the producer, since g2 is equal to g1, and
the generation cost is the area under the inverse supply curve up to d2, or D. The total producer
surplus is the area of C, or (C+D)-(D).
Now consider the case where virtual transactions are introduced. In this case, the changes
in generation and price due to DECs have an impact on the welfare calculations. The DA
payment by the consumer is d1∙LMP1´, the area of B+C+D. There are no RT balancing
payments by the consumer because RT demand, d2, is equal to DA demand, d1, and consumer
value is d2∙RP, the area of A+B+C+D. The total consumer surplus is the area of A, or (B+C+D)+(A+B+C+D). DA payments to the producer is g1´∙LMP1´, the area of
B+C+D+F+G+H+I, RT balance payment to the producer is -(g1´-g2)∙LMP2, the area of H,
which is negative when g2 is less than g1´, and the generation cost is the area under the inverse
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RT supply curve up to d2, D. The total producer surplus is the area of B+C+F+G+H, or
(B+C+D+F+G+H+I)-(I)-(D).
The financial trader surplus is –(F+G). DA payment to the financial trader is
V∙LMP1´, the area of F+G+H. RT payment by the financial trader is INCs∙LMP2, the area of H.
DECs are settled as virtual demand bids. The total financial trader surplus is the area of –
(F+G+H), or -(F+G+H+I)+(I) which is negative. Consequently, the strategy of bidding a DEC
would not be favored by financial trader expecting RT demand is identical to DA demand.
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Figure 3.6 Welfare calculation when RT demand is identical to DA demand with an INC

Figure 3.6 is the case when DA demand is identical to RT demand with INC. Without the
financial trader, the electricity market settles as a single spot market where d1=d2=g1=g2. The
consumer surplus is A+B+F+G+I, and the producer surplus is C+D+H+J. With the financial
trader, the consumer surplus is A+B+C+F+G+H+I+J+K, the producer surplus is D+G+H and
financial trader loss is G+H+I+J+K. When DA demand and RT demand are identical and the
virtual trader bids INCs, consumer surplus increases, producer surplus decreases, and financial
trader surplus becomes negative. Again, we cover this case for the sake of completeness.
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Calculating economic surplus without INCs, the DA payment by the consumer is
d1∙LMP1, the area of C+D+E+H+J+K+L, and there is no RT balancing payment by the
consumer since d2 is equal to d1. Total consumer value is d2∙RP, the area of
A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L. So total consumer surplus is the area of A+B+F+G+I, or
-(C+D+E+H+J+K+L)+(A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L).
The DA payment to the producer is g1∙LMP1, the area of C+D+E+H+J+K+L, and there
is no RT balancing payment to the producer, since g2 is equal to g1, and the generation cost is
the area under the inverse supply curve up to d2, E+K+L. The total producer surplus is the area
of C+D+H+J, (C+D+E+H+J+K+L)-(E+K+L).
The introduction of INC bids changes a generation and price in the DA and RT markets.
The DA payment by the consumer is d1∙LMP1´, the area of D+E+L There are no RT balancing
payments by the consumer is (d1-d2)∙LMP2´ because the d2 is equal to d1, and consumer value
is d2∙RP, the area of A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L. The total consumer surplus is the area of
A+B+C+F+G+H+I+J+K, or -(D+E+L)+(A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L).
The DA payment to the producer is g1´∙LMP1´, the area of D+E. The RT balancing
payment to the producer is -(g1´-g2)∙LMP2´, the area of G+H+I+J+K+L, which is positive when
g2 is larger than g1´, and the generation cost is the area under the inverse supply curve up to d2,
E+I+J+K+L. The total producer surplus is the area of D+G+H, or (D+E)+(G+H+I+J+K+L)(E+I+J+K+L).
The financial trader surplus is -(H+J), which is negative in this case. DA payment to the
financial trader is V∙LMP1´, the area of L. RT payment by the financial trader is V∙LMP2´, the
area of G+H+I+J+K+L. The total financial trader surplus is the area of –(G+H+I+J+K), or (L)(G+H+I+J+K+L) which is negative. Consequently, bidding INCs would not be favored by the
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financial trader when RT demand is identical to DA demand. Thus, the optimal bidding strategy
for a financial trader with unbiased deviation is to avoid bidding. Therefore, with zero expected
demand deviation, the presence of uncertainty of realized demand is essential to make profitable
virtual bidding.
3.4.3

Graphical Representations: With Virtual Bids, RT demand is less than DA demand
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Figure 3.7 Welfare calculation when RT demand is less than DA demand with an INC
Figure 3.7 is the case when DA demand is larger than RT demand with INCs making the
committed generation in DA less than realized demand in RT. Without the financial trader, the
consumer surplus is A+G-(N+O+P+Q+R), and the producer surplus is
B+C+D+E+G+H+I+J+K+N+O+P+Q+R+U. With the financial trader, the consumer surplus is
A+B+C+D+G+H+I+J+K+L+Q+R+S, the producer surplus is F+J-U and financial trader surplus
is –(I+U+J+K+L+Q+R+S). When DA demand is larger than RT demand with INCs setting
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committed DA generation less than RT demand, consumer surplus increases, producer surplus
decreases, and financial trader surplus is negative.
Calculating economic surplus without INCs, the DA payment by the consumer is
d1∙LMP1, the area of B+C+D+E+F+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q+R+S+T+U. The RT balancing
payment by the consumer is (d1-d2)∙LMP2, the area of S+T, which is positive when d2 is less
than d1, and consumer value is d2∙RP, the area of A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+U. The
total consumer surplus is the area of A+G-(N+O+P+Q+R),
-(B+C+D+E+F+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q+R+S+T+U)
+(S+T)+(A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+U).
The DA payment to the producer is g1∙LMP1, the area of
B+C+D+E+F+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q+R+S+T+U, RT balance payment to the producer is (g1-g2)∙LMP2, -(S+T), which is negative when g2 is less than g1, and the generation cost is the
area under the inverse supply curve up to d2, F+L+M. The total producer surplus is the area of
B+C+D+E+G+H+I+J+K+N+O+P+Q+R+U, or
(B+C+D+E+F+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q+R+S+T+U)-(S+T)-(F+L+M).
With INCs, the cleared generation in DA (g1´) must meet the overall (real plus virtual)
demand in the DA market, the physical demand bid minus the virtual bid V (g1´=d1-INC). That
makes the overall demand less than physical demand bids in DA requiring less generation
relative to without INCs, virtual supply. Cleared generation in DA with INCs (g1´) set the newly
cleared DA market price (LMP1´), lower than cleared DA market price without INCs (LMP1).
Based on the changed DA generation and price by INCs, the DA payment by the
consumer is d1 ∙ LMP1´, the area of E+F+M+T, and the RT balancing payment to the consumer
is (d1 − d2) ∙ LMP2´, the area of Q+R+S+T, which is positive when d2 is less than d1, and the
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consumer value is d2 ∙ RP or the area of A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M. The total
consumer surplus is the area of A+B+C+D+G+H+I+J+K+L+Q+R+S+U, or
–(E+F+M+T)+(Q+R+S+T)+ (A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+U).
The DA payment to producer is g1´ ∙ LMP1´, is the area of E+F, and the RT balancing

payment to the producer is −(g1´ − g2) ∙ LMP2´, or the area of J+K+L+M, which is positive
when g2 is greater than g1´, and the generation cost is the area under the RT inverse supply
curve up to d2, F+U+K+L+M. Thus, total producer surplus is the area of E+J-U, or
(E+F)+(J+K+L+M)-(F+U+K+L+M).

The financial trader surplus (loss) is –(I+J+K+O), which is negative in this case.
DA payment to the financial trader is V∙LMP1´, the area of M+T. The RT payment by the
financial trader is V∙LMP2´, or the area of I+U+J+K+L+M+Q+R+S+T. The supply offers
including the financial trader’s virtual supply offer need to be paid in DA market and need to pay
balance payment in RT market. The total financial trader surplus is the area of –
(I+U+J+K+L+Q+R+S) which is negative. Consequently, bidding an INC that results in
committed generation less than RT generation when RT demand is less than DA demand is not
leveraged for financial trader expecting RT demand is less than DA demand.
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Figure 3.8 Welfare calculation when RT demand is less than DA demand with an INC

Figure 3.8 displays the case when DA demand is larger than RT demand with an INC bid
by the financial trader, making the committed generation in DA greater than realized demand in
RT and less than cleared demand in DA. Without the financial trader, consumer surplus is A(G+H+I+K+L+M), and the producer surplus is B+C+D+G+H+I+K+L+M+N. With the financial
trader, the consumer surplus is A+B-(H+I+N), the producer surplus is C+D+H+I and financial
trader surplus is N. When DA demand is larger than RT demand with INCs, consumer surplus
increases, producer surplus decreases, and financial trader surplus is positive.
Calculating the consumer surplus without INCs, the DA payment by the consumer is
d1∙LMP1 or the area of B+C+D+E+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O and the RT balancing payment by
the consumer is (d1-d2)∙LMP2 or the area of J+O when d2 is less than d1. Since the consumer
value is d2∙RP, the area of A+B+C+D+E, the total consumer surplus is the area of A(G+H+I+K+L+M), or -(B+C+D+E+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O)+(J+O)+(A+B+C+D+E).
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The DA payment to the producer is g1∙LMP1 or the area of
B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O and the RT balancing payment to the producer is -(g1g2)∙LMP2, or –(J+O) when g2 is less than g1. The generation cost is the area under RT inverse
supply curve up to d2, or E. The total producer surplus is the area of
B+C+D+G+H+I+K+L+M+N, or (B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O)-(J+O)-E.
DA generation and clearing price are changed by an INC bid, and the DA payment by the
consumer is d1 ∙ LMP1´, or the area of C+D+E+ H+I+J+N+O. The RT balancing payment to the
consumer is (d1 − d2) ∙ LMP2, or the area of J+O, when d2 is less than d1. The consumer value
is d2 ∙ RP or the area of A+B+C+D+E. Thus, the total consumer surplus is the area of A+B-

(H+I+N), or –(C+D+E+ H+I+J+N+O)+(J+O)+(A+B+C+D+E).

The DA payment to the producer is g1´ ∙ LMP1´ or the area of C+D+E+H+I+J, and the

RT balancing payment to the producer is −(g1´ − g2) ∙ LMP2, or the area of –J when g2 is less

than g1´. The generation cost is the area under the inverse supply curve up to d2, or E. Thus, the
total producer surplus is the area of C+D+H+I, or (C+D+E+H+I+J)-(J)-(E).
The financial trader surplus is N, which is positive in this case. The DA payment to the
financial trader is V∙LMP1´, or the area of N+O. RT payment by the financial trader is V∙LMP2
or the area of –O. The supply offers including the financial trader’s virtual supply offer need to
be paid in DA market and need to pay balance payment in RT market as if supplying energy. The
total financial trader surplus is the area of N, (N+O)-O. Bidding an INC makes the committed
generation in DA greater than realized demand in RT and less than cleared demand in DA would
generate positive returns to the financial trader.
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Figure 3.9 Welfare calculation when RT demand is less than DA demand with a DEC

Figure 3.9 is the case when DA demand is larger than RT demand with a DEC offer.
Without the financial trader, consumer surplus is A+B-(H+I), and the producer surplus is
C+D+H+I. With the financial trader, the consumer surplus is A-(G+H+I), the producer surplus is
B+C+D+G+H+I+K+L+M+N and financial trader surplus is -(K+L+M+N).
Calculating economic surplus without DECs, DA payment by the consumer is d1∙LMP1,
the area of C+D+E+H+I+J, RT balance payment by the consumer is (d1-d2)∙LMP2, the area of J,
which is positive when d2 is less than d1, and consumer value is d2∙RP, the area of
A+B+C+D+E. The total consumer surplus is the area of A+B-(H+I), or –(C+D+E+H+I+J)+
(J)+(A+B+C+D+E).
The DA payment to the producer is g1∙LMP1, the area of C+D+E+H+I+J and the RT
balancing payment to the producer is -(g1-g2)∙LMP2, the area of –J when g2 is less than g1. The
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generation cost is the area under the inverse supply curve up to d2, or E. The total producer
surplus is the area of C+D+H+I, or (C+D+E+H+I+J)-(J)-(E).
Offering a DEC makes the overall demand larger than physical bids, so that requires
more generation relative to the case without DECs. Cleared generation in DA with a DEC bid
(g1´) sets the new DA market price (LMP1´), which is higher than DA market price without
DEC bid (LMP1).
Based on the changed DA generation and price due to the DECs, the DA payment by the
consumer is d1 ∙ LMP1´, or the area of B+C+D+E+G+H+I+J, and the RT balancing payment to

the consumer is (d1 − d2) ∙ LMP2, or the area J when d2 is less than d1. The consumer value is
d2 ∙ RP or the area of A+B+C+D+E. Thus the total consumer surplus is the area of A-(G+H+I),

or –(B+C+D+E+G+H+I+J)+(J)+(A+B+C+D+E).

DA payment to producer is g1´ ∙ LMP1´ or the area of

B+C+D+E+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O, and the RT balancing payment to the producer is −(g1´ −

g2) ∙ LMP2, the area of –(J+O) when g2 is less than g1´, and the generation cost is the area under

the inverse supply curve up to d2, or E. The total producer surplus is the area of

B+C+D+G+H+I+K+L+M+N, or (B+C+D+E+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O)-(J+O)-(E).
The financial trader surplus is –(K+L+M+N). DA payment to the financial trader
is -V∙LMP1´, or –(K+L+M+N+O). The RT balancing payment by the financial trader is
V∙LMP2´, the area of O. As in Figure 4, DEC are settled as they bid demand. The demand
bidders including the financial trader’s virtual demand bid pay for energy in the DA market and
are paid a balancing payment in the RT market when RT demand is less than DA demand. The
total financial trader surplus is the area of –(K+L+M+N), or –(K+L+M+N+O)+O which is
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negative. Consequently, with the negative RT demand, bidding a DEC would not profit the
financial trader in this case.
3.4.4

Graphical Representations: With Virtual Bids, RT demand is greater than DA
demand
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Figure 3.10 Welfare calculation when RT demand is greater than DA demand with an INC

Figure 3.10 is the case when DA demand is lower than RT demand with INC. Without
the financial trader, the consumer surplus is A+B+C+G+H+J+M+N, and the producer surplus is
D+E+I+K+O+P. With the financial trader, the consumer surplus is A+B+C+D+G+H+I+J+K+R,
the producer surplus is E+G+H+I+M+O and financial trader surplus is –(G+H+I+J+K+R).
Calculating economic surplus without INC, the DA payment by the consumer is
d1∙LMP1 or the area of D+E+F+I+K+R+L and the RT balancing payment by the consumer is
(d1-d2)∙LMP2 or the area of –(O+P+Q) when d2 is larger than d1. The consumer value is d2∙RP
or the area of A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q. Thus, the total consumer
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surplus is the area of A+B+C+G+H+J+M+N, or -(D+E+F+I+K+R+L)-(O+P+Q)
+(A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q+R).
DA payment to the producer is g1∙LMP1 or the area of D+E+F+I+K+R+L. The RT
balancing payment to the producer is -(g1-g2)∙LMP2, the area of O+P+Q when g2 is larger than
g1, and the generation cost is the area under the inverse supply curve up to d2, F+R+L+Q. The
total producer surplus is the area of D+E+I+K+O+P, or (D+E+F+I+K+R+L) +(O+P+Q) (F+R+L+Q).
With the INC, the cleared generation in DA (g1´) must equal the overall bid demand in
DA (g1´ = d1 – INC), which is the physical demand bid less the virtual supply offer (INC).
Bidding virtual supply makes the overall generation requirement smaller than physical demand
bid. Cleared generation in DA with an INC bid (g1´) sets the new DA market price (LMP1´),
lower than DA market price without the INC (LMP1).
When RT generation is greater than the cleared generation in the DA market, the price is
set based on the steeper portion of the RT inverse supply curve. Both DA and RT inverse supply
curves intersect at the cleared generation and price in DA, and the RT inverse supply curve is
steeper than DA inverse supply curve. Hence the level of cleared generation in the DA market is
influenced by the INC, changing the RT market price. As demonstrated in figure 3.10, without
the INC, the kink of the supply curve occurs at g1 so the LMP2 would be set along the lower RT
supply curve to the right of g1.
Given the changes in DA generation and clearing price due to the INC, the DA payment
by the consumer is d1∙LMP1´, or the area of E+F+L, and the RT balancing payment by the
consumer is (d1-d2)∙LMP2´, or –(M +N+O+P+Q) when d2 is larger than d1. The consumer
value is d2∙RP or the area of A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q+R, and thus, the
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total consumer surplus is the area of A+B+C+D+G+H+I+J+K+R, or -(E+F+L)(M+N+O+P+Q)+(A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q+R).
The DA payment to the producer is g1´∙LMP1´ or the area of E+F, and the RT balancing
payment to the producer is -(g1´-g2)∙LMP2´, or the area of G+H+I+J+K+R+L+M+N+O+P+Q
when g2 is less than g1´. The generation cost is the area under the inverse RT supply curve up to
d2 or F+J+K+R+L+N+P+Q. Total producer surplus is the area of E+G+H+I+M+O, or
(E+F)+(G+H+I+J+K+R+L+M+N+O+P+Q)-(F+J+K+R+L+N+P+Q).
The financial trader surplus is –(G+H+I+J+K+R), which is negative in this case. The DA
payment to the financial trader is V∙LMP1´, or the area of L. The RT balancing payment by the
financial trader is V∙LMP2´, or the area of G+H+I+J+K+R+L. The supply offers including the
financial trader’s virtual supply offer need to be paid in DA market and power must be purchased
in the RT market. The total financial trader surplus is the area of -(G+H+I+J+K+R), or (L)(G+H+I+J+K+R+L) which is negative. Consequently, bidding an INC would not be profitable
for the financial trader in this situation.
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Figure 3.11 Welfare calculation when RT demand is greater than DA demand with a DEC

43
Figure 3.11 is the case when DA demand is lower than RT demand with a DEC making
the committed generation in DA greater than DA demand and less than RT demand. Without the
financial trader, the consumer surplus is A+B+C+D, and the producer surplus is
E+G+H+I+M+O. With the financial trader, the consumer surplus is A+B+C+G+M+N, the
producer surplus is D+E+I+K+O+P, and the financial trader surplus is H+J.
Calculating economic surplus without the DEC, the DA payment by the consumer is
d1∙LMP1, the area of E+F and the RT balancing payment by the consumer is (d1-d2)∙LMP2 or
the area of –(G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q) when d2 is larger than d1. The consumer value is
d2∙RP or the area of A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q. Thus, the total consumer
surplus is the area of A+B+C+D, or –(E+F)-(G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q)
+(A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q).
The DA payment to the producer is g1∙LMP1 or the area of E+F and the RT balancing
payment to the producer is –(g1-g2)∙LMP2, or the area of G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q when
g2 is larger than g1, and the generation cost is the area under the inverse supply curve up to d2 or
F+J+K+L+N+P+Q. Thus, total producer surplus is the area of E+G+H+I+M+O, or
(E+F)+(G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q)-(F+J+K+L+N+P+Q).
With the DEC bid, the DA payment by the consumer is d1∙LMP1´, or the area D+E+F,
and the RT balancing payment to the consumer is (d1-d2)∙LMP2´, or the area of –
(H+I+J+K+L+O+P+Q) when d2 is larger than d1. Since the consumer value is d2∙RP, or the area
A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q+R, total consumer surplus is the area of
A+B+C+G+M+N, or -(D+E+F)-(H+I+J+K+L+O+P+Q)
+(A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q+R).
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Again with the DEC, the DA payment to the producer is g1´∙LMP1´ or the area of
D+E+F+I+K+L, and the RT balancing payment to the producer is -(g1´-g2)∙LMP2´, or the area
of O+P+Q when g2 is greater than g1´. The generation cost is the area under the RT inverse
supply curve up to d2 or F+L+Q. Thus, the total producer surplus is the area of D+E+I+K+O+P,
or (D+E+F+I+K+L)-(O+P+Q)-(F+L+Q).
The financial trader surplus is H+J. The DA payment to the financial trader is
V∙LMP1´, the area of I+K+L. RT payment by the financial trader is V∙LMP2´, the area of
H+I+J+K+L. The demand bids including the financial trader’s virtual demand bid pay into the
DA market and have balancing payments in the RT market. The total financial trader surplus is
the area of H+J, or –(I+K+L)+(H+I+J+K+L) which is positive. Consequently, bidding a DEC
and making the committed generation in DA greater than DA demand and less than RT demand
would be profitable for the financial trader.
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Figure 3.12 Welfare calculation when RT demand is greater than DA demand with a DEC

Figure 3.12 is the case when DA demand is lower than RT demand with a DEC making
the committed generation in the DA market greater than RT demand. Without the financial
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trader, the consumer surplus is A+B+C+D+G+H, and the producer surplus is E+I. With the
financial trader, the consumer surplus is A+G the producer surplus is
B+C+D+E+G+H+I+J+L+M and the financial trader loss is G+L+M.
Calculating economic surplus without the DEC, the DA payment by the consumer is
d1∙LMP1 or the area of E+F and the RT balancing payment by the consumer is (d1-d2)∙LMP2 or
the area of –(I+J+K) when d2 is larger than d1. The consumer value is d2∙RP or the area of
A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K. Thus, the total consumer surplus is the area of A+B+C+D+G+H,
or -(E+F)-(I+J+K)+(A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K). The DA payment to the producer is
g1∙LMP1 or the area of E+F and the RT balancing payment to the producer is -(g1-g2)∙LMP2 or
the area of I+J+K when g2 is larger than g1. The generation cost is the area under the inverse
supply curve up to d2 or F+J+K. Thus, the total producer surplus is the area of E+I, or
(E+F)+(I+J+K)-(F+J+K).
Based on the changed generation and price by the DEC, the DA payment by the
consumer is d1∙LMP1´, or the area of B+C+D+E+F, and the RT balancing payment to the
consumer is (d1-d2)∙LMP2´, or the area of –(H+I+J+K) when d2 is larger than d1. Since the
consumer value is d2∙RP or the area of A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K, the total consumer
surplus is the area of A+G, or -(B+C+D+E+F)-(H+I+J+K)+(A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K).
DA payment to the producer is g1´∙LMP1´ or the area of
B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P, and the RT balancing payment to the producer is
-(g1´-g2)∙LMP2´, or the area of –(N+O+P) when g2 is less than g1´. The generation cost is the
area under the RT inverse supply curve up to d2 or F+K. Thus the total producer surplus is the
area of B+C+D+E+G+H+I+J+L+M, or (B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P)-(N+O+P)(F+K).
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The financial trader surplus is –(G+L+M) in this case. The DA payment to the financial
trader is V∙LMP1´, or the area of G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P. The RT balancing payment by
the financial trader is V∙LMP2´, or the area of H+I+J+K+N+O+P. The total financial trader
surplus is the area of –(G+L+M), or
-(G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P) +( +I+J+K+N+O+P) which is negative. Consequently, with
positive RT demand deviation, the financial trader would not profit from bidding a DEC.
Each graph presented above indicates the welfare calculations with and without virtual
bidding for various market situations that include: RT demand greater or less then DA demand,
the virtual bid being an INC or DEC, and the magnitude of the virtual bid being greater or less
than the change in demand between the RT and DA markets.
The financial trader would like to employ an optimal bidding strategy, that is one that
maximizes the expected profit based on the distribution of the demand deviation and other
market parameters. Because the virtual transactions shift the supply curve due to the differences
in the slopes of the supply curves in the DA and RT markets, financial traders can achieve a
positive expected profit.

3.5

Expected Welfare Change of Market Participants due to Virtual Transactions
The RT demand, d2, is the sum of DA demand, d1, and demand deviation Δ which has

probability distribution function f(Δ). Here we assume the distribution of Δ is uniform with
support [-α+µ, α+µ] where ‘α’ represents the range of uncertainty and ‘µ’ represents the mean of
the uniform distribution.
The probabilistic nature of RT demand influences the RT generation and RT price as a
consequence. The expected RT price without virtual bids, E[P2(d1 + ∆)], is the sum of the
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integral of the DA inverse supply curve(P1) up to ∆=0 plus the integral of the RT inverse supply
curve(P2) over the range of positive ∆.

With virtual bid case, the expected RT price is:
1

−V

α+µ

E[P2′ (d1 + ∆))] = 2α �∫−α+µ P1(d1 + ∆)d∆ + ∫−V P2′ (d1 + ∆)d∆�

Without a virtual bid, the expected RT price is:
1

0

α+µ

E[P2(d1 + ∆))] = 2α �∫−α+µ P1(d1 + ∆)d∆ + ∫0

P2(d1 + ∆)d∆�

The first integral represents payments for a negative deviation, and thus the RT price is
set by the DA inverse supply curve. The second integral represents payments for the positive
deviations, and thus the RT price is set by the RT inverse supply curve. The amount of virtual
bid (note that V is positive for an INC and negative for a DEC) shifts the intersection of the DA
supply and the RT supply curve thus the boundaries where the RT price is determined.
3.5.1

Financial Trader Welfare with the Optimal Virtual Bid
The expected financial trader surplus is,
F(V) = E[V(LMP1′ − LMP2′ )] = V(P1(d1 − V) − E[P2′ (d1 + ∆)])
a1

= V �− b1 +

d1−V
b1

1

−V

1 −(α+µ+V)2 b1+b2(−α+µ+V)2

= V �4

α+µ

− 2α �∫−α+µ P1(d1 + ∆)d∆ + ∫−V P2′ (d1 + ∆)d∆��
b2

�

Differentiating the expected profit for financial trader w.r.t V yields the following:
F′(V) =

α µ
3 3

α µ
3 3

3b2(− + +V)(−α+µ+V)−3b1( + +V)(α+µ+V)
4αb1b2

The optimal bidding strategy (V ∗ ) for the financial trader is found by setting this derivative to
zero and solving for the bid. This derivative has two roots:
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1

V= 3(b1−b2) (−2b1α − 2b2α − 2µb1 + 2µb2 +

�α2 b12 + 14α2 b1b2 + α2 b22 + 2αb12 µ − 2αb22 µ + b12 µ2 − 2b1b2µ2 + b22 µ2 )

and

1

V= − 3(b1−b2) (2b1α + 2b2α + 2µb1 − 2µb2 +

�α2 b12 + 14α2 b1b2 + α2 b22 + 2αb12 µ − 2αb22 µ + b12 µ2 − 2b1b2µ2 + b22 µ2 )

The former is the optimal bidding strategy because the latter is always negative as shown in
Lemma 4. Hence, the optimal bidding strategy V* is:
1

V ∗ = 3(b1−b2) (−2b1α − 2b2α − 2µb1 + 2µb2 +

�α2 b12 + 14α2 b1b2 + α2 b22 + 2αb12 µ − 2αb22 µ + b12 µ2 − 2b1b2µ2 + b22 µ2 )

There are two distinct strategies for the virtual trader. If µ is below a critical value (δ∗ ),

then bidding a positive V (an INC) is optimal while µ is above a critical value, bidding negative
V (a DEC) is optimal. The critical value, δ∗ , is a function of α, b1, and b2 that is −α

√b1−√b2
√b1+√b2

,

which is negative. The welfare impacts on the consumer and producer are based on these two
types of virtual bidding strategy.
1. If µ < δ∗ , V ∗ > 0 (an INC) is optimal bidding strategy
2. If µ > δ∗ , V ∗ < 0 (a DEC) is optimal bidding strategy

If the expected demand deviation is zero, µ is greater than δ∗ (µ = 0 > δ∗ ), hence bidding DECs
(V ∗ < 0) is the optimal strategy for the financial trader. The optimal bidding strategy when µ =

0 is:

α

V ∗ = 3(b1−b2) (−2b1 − 2b2 + √b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 )

Lemma 1. −2(b1 + b2) + √b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 <0 when b1, b2, and α > 0, and b1 > b2.
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Proof.
Clearly if b1 ≠ b2, then 3(b1 − b2)2 > 0. Expanding this expression yields 3b12 − 6b1b2 +

3b22 > 0, and adding the positive expression b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 on both sides yields 4b12 +
8b1b2 + 4b22 > b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 . Taking the square root of both sides yields

2(b1 + b2) > √b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 , and rearranging that we get −2(b1 + b2) +
√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 < 0.

Lemma 2. If µ is below a critical value (δ∗ = −α

√b1−√b2

), bidding a positive V (an INC) is

√b1+√b2

optimal, and when µ is above the critical value, and bidding a negative V (a DEC) is optimal.
Proof.

Assume – α

√b1−√b2
√b1+√b2

= δ∗ < µ. Rearranging it yields – α√b1 + α√b2 < µ√b1 + µ√b2,

√b1(−α − µ) < √b2(−α + µ), and √b1(α + µ) > √b2(α − µ). Squaring both sides yields

b1(α + µ)2 > b2(α − µ)2 , and b1(α + µ)2 − b2(α − µ)2 > 0. Multiplying 3(b1 − b2) yields

3(b1 − b2)(−b2(α − µ)2 + b1(α + µ)2 ) > 0
Expanding the previous inequality yields

3α2 b12 − 6α2 b1b2 + 3α2 b22 + 6αb12 µ − 6αb22 µ + 3b12 µ2 − 6b1b2µ2 + 3b22 µ2

= (4α2 b12 + 8α2 b1b2 + 4α2 b22 + 8αb12 µ − 8αb22 µ + 4b12 µ2 − 8b1b2µ2 + 4b22 µ2 ) −
(α2 b12 + 14α2 b1b2 + α2 b22 + 2αb12 µ − 2αb22 µ + b12 µ2 − 2b1b2µ2 + b22 µ2 )

= (2α(b1 + b2) + 2µ(b1 − b2))2 −

2

��α2 b12 + 14α2 b1b2 + α2 b22 + 2αb12 µ − 2αb22 µ + b12 µ2 − 2b1b2µ2 + b22 µ2 � > 0.

Moving the squared root term to the other side and rearranging it yields
−(−2b1α − 2b2α − 2µb1 + 2µb2) >

�α2 b12 + 14α2 b1b2 + α2 b22 + 2αb12 µ − 2αb22 µ + b12 µ2 − 2b1b2µ2 + b22 µ2 ),
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which can be rearranged as
−2b1α − 2b2α − 2µb1 + 2µb2 +

�α2 b12 + 14α2 b1b2 + α2 b22 + 2αb12 µ − 2αb22 µ + b12 µ2 − 2b1b2µ2 + b22 µ2 < 0.
1

Multiplying both sides by 3(b1−b2) > 0 yields

−2b1α−2b2α−2µb1+2µb2+�α2 b12 +14α2 b1b2+α2 b22 +2αb12 µ−2αb22 µ+b12 µ2 −2b1b2µ2 +b22 µ2
3(b1−b2)

Hence, when µ is above the critical value (δ∗ = −α

√b1−√b2

= V ∗ < 0.

), bidding negative V (a DEC) is the

√b1+√b2

optimal strategy. Bidding positive V (an INC) is, analogously the optimal bidding strategy when
µ is above the critical value δ∗ .

Lemma 3. The critical value (δ∗ = −α

√b1−√b2

), is getting smaller when the uncertainty, α, is

√b1+√b2

getting larger. Also, the critical value is getting smaller when relative steepness is greater.
Proof.
Clearly if b1 > b2, then

√b1−√b2
√b1+√b2

> 0. Since α>0, the critical value −α

getting smaller when α is getting greater.

The critical value −α

√b1−√b2

, becomes −α(

√b1+√b2

√b1−√b2

√b1+√b2

is negative and

b1+b2−2√b1b2
𝑏𝑏1−𝑏𝑏2

) by multiplying √b1 − √b2 to the
b2

numerator and denominator. Assume that steepness of RT slope, s = 𝑏𝑏1, rearranging the critical
b2(s+1)−2b2√s
�
𝑏𝑏2(𝑠𝑠−1)

value yields −α �

s+1−2√s
�.
𝑠𝑠−1

= −αb2 �

Fixing α and b2, when the relative

steepness, s, is getting greater, the critical value is getting smaller.

1

Lemma 4. The optimal bidding strategy (V ∗ ) for the financial trader is V ∗ = 3(b1−b2) (−2b1α −
2b2α − 2µb1 + 2µb2 +

�α2 b12 + 14α2 b1b2 + α2 b22 + 2αb12 µ − 2αb22 µ + b12 µ2 − 2b1b2µ2 + b22 µ2 )
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1

since V ∗∗ = 3(b1−b2) (−2b1α − 2b2α − 2µb1 + 2µb2 +

�α2 b12 + 14α2 b1b2 + α2 b22 + 2αb12 µ − 2αb22 µ + b12 µ2 − 2b1b2µ2 + b22 µ2 )
is always negative when b1, b2, and α > 0.
Proof.

Differentiating the expected profit for financial trader w.r.t V yields F′(V) =
α µ
3 3

α µ
3 3

3b2(− + +V)(−α+µ+V)−3b1( + +V)(α+µ+V)
4αb1b2

Plug in V ∗ to F ′′ (V), F ′′ (V ∗ ) yields −
Plug in V ∗∗ to F ′′ (V), F ′′ (V ∗∗ ) yields

and F ′′ (V) =

(−3V−2α−2µ )b1+3b2(V−
2αb1b2

�(α+µ)2 b12 +(14α2 −2µ2 )𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2+(α−µ)2 b22
2α𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2

�(α+µ)2 b12 +(14α2 −2µ2 )𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2+(α−µ)2 b22
2α𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2

Hence, V ∗∗ is always negative.

2α 2µ
+ )
3
3

.

which is negative.
which is positive.

Theorem 1. The optimal virtual bid is negative (a DEC) with zero expected demand deviation.
Proof.
1

V ∗ = 3(b1−b2) �−2b1α − 2b2α + √α2 b12 + 14α2 b1b2 + α2 b22 �.
Factoring out α from the terms in the parenthesis yields
1

3(b1−b2)
1

�−2α(b1 + b2) + α√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 �

= 3(b1−b2) α(√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 − 2(b1 + b2)).

From Lemma 1, √b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 < 2(b1 + b2), and so the term in the

parenthesis in the equation is negative, (√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 − 2(b1 + b2)) < 0. Since α>0
1

1

and b1 > b2 > 0, 3(b1−b2) > 0, V ∗ = 3(b1−b2) α(−2b1 − 2b2 + √b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 ) is
negative. Hence, V ∗ is negative (a DEC is optimal) when µ = 0.
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3.5.2

Consumer Welfare Change with the Optimal Virtual Bid
The difference in the DA payment by the consumer is the negative of DA demand times

DA price differences due to virtual bids.
∆ DA Payment by the consumer
= −d1 ∙ (LMP1′ − LMP1)

= −d1 ∙ (P1(d1 − V ∗ ) − P1(d1))
a1

= −d1 ∙ �− b1 +

d1−V∗

V∗

= −d1 ∙ �− b1�

b1

a1

d1

− �− b1 + b1��

The differences in expected RT balance payment by the consumer with V ∗ are the following:
∆ RT balance payment by the consumer

= E[−∆ ∙ P2′(d1 + ∆)] − E[−∆ ∙ P2(d1 + ∆)]
1

−V

α+µ

1

0

= 2α �∫−α+µ −∆ ∙ P1(d1 + ∆)d∆ + ∫−V −∆ ∙ P2′ (d1 + ∆)d∆� − 2α �∫−α+µ −∆ ∙
α+µ

P1(d1 + ∆)d∆ + ∫0
=

−∆ ∙ P2(d1 + ∆)d∆�
2

V∗ (b1−b2)�−3(α+µ)2 +V∗ �
12αb1b2

The expected overall consumer welfare difference is the sum of differences in DA payment by
the consumer and RT balancing payments by the consumer.
∆ Consumer welfare
V∗

= −d1 ∙ �− b1� +

2

V∗ (b1−b2)(−3(α+µ)2 +V∗ )
12αb1b2

When the expected demand deviation is zero, µ=0, the overall consumer welfare difference
becomes:

V∗

= −d1 ∙ �− b1� +

2

V∗ (b1−b2)(−3α2 +V∗ )
12αb1b2
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1

= 36αb1b2 (−2αb1 − 2αb2 + √α2 b12 + 14α2 b1b2 + α2 b22 )(−3α2 +
(−2αb1−2αb2+√α2 b12 +14α2 b1b2+α2 b22 )2
9(b1−b2)2

)+

(−2αb1−2αb2+√α2 b12 +14α2 b1b2+α2 b22 )d1
3b1(b1−b2)

.

Theorem 2. Optimal virtual bid generally decreases consumer welfare with zero expected
demand deviation when the slope in RT is not substantially steeper than the slope in DA,
b1−b2
b2

<

18d1
5α

b2

5𝑥𝑥

, rearranged as b1 > 1800+5𝑥𝑥 , 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 α = x% of d1. For example, the consumer

welfare decreases when the slope in RT is not greater than 37 times steeper than the slope in DA
when the range of uncertainty is 10% of DA demand.
Proof.
V∗

The expected consumer welfare change is −d1 �− b1� +

2

V∗ (b1−b2)�−3α2 +V∗ �
12αb1b2

. Factor out V ∗ and

12αb2d1 yields V ∗ 12αb2d1�(b1 − b2)�−3α2 + V ∗ 2 � + 12αb2d1�. Replacing V ∗ in the
bracket to the expansion form yields V ∗ 12αb2d1 �(b1 − b2) �−3α2 +
�−2αb1−2αb2+√α2 b12 +14α2 b1b2+α2 b22 �
9(b1−b2)2

2

α

� + 12αb2d1�. Expanding the terms in the square bracket
2

yields V ∗ 12αb2d1 �− 9(𝑏𝑏1−𝑏𝑏2) 22 �αb12 + 11 α(b1 + b2)√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 −
38

b1b2 �α +
11

27d1

38

27d1

19

� + b22 �α +

54d1
11

��� .

2

The terms in the curly bracket, 22 �αb12 + 11 α(b1 + b2)√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 −
11

b1b2 �α +

19

� + b22 �α +

54d1
11

�� can be rearranged to 22αb12 + 4𝑎𝑎(b1 +

b2)√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 + 22b22 �α +

54d1
11

� − 2b1b2(38α +

54d1), and rearranged again as 4α(𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏2)√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 + 22αb12 − 76αb1b2 +

22αb22 − 108b1b2d1 + 108b22 d1 , which makes
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α

V ∗ 12αb2d1 �− 9(𝑏𝑏1−𝑏𝑏2) �4α(𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏2)√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 + 22αb12 − 76αb1b2 +
22αb22 − 108b1b2d1 + 108b22 d1��.

From Lemma 1, the term in the curly bracket, 4α(𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏2)√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 + 22αb12 −
76αb1b2 + 22αb22 − 108b1b2d1 + 108b22 d1, is less than,

4α(𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏2)2(𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏2) + 22αb12 − 76αb1b2 + 22αb22 − 108b1b2d1 + 108b22 d1

= 8α(b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 ) + 22αb12 − 76αb1b2 + 22αb22 − 108b1b2d1 +

108b22 d18αb12 + 16αb1b2 + 8αb22 + 22αb12 − 76αb1b2 + 22αb22 − 108b1b2d1 +

108b22 d1

= 30αb12 − 60αb1b2 + 30αb22 − 108b1b2d1 + 108b22 d1, which can be rearranged as
30(b1 − b2) �αb1 + b2 �−α −

18d1
5

��.

The term in the square bracket αb1 + b2 �−α −
b1−b2
b2

<

18d1
5α

18d1
5

� is negative based on the assumption

, making an inequality relationship that �4α(𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏2)√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 +

22αb12 − 76αb1b2 + 22αb22 − 108b1b2d1 + 108b22 d1� < 30(b1 − b2) �αb1 +
b2 �−α −

18d1
5

�� < 0.

α

From Theorem 2, V ∗ <0, and V ∗ 12αb2d1 �− 9(𝑏𝑏1−𝑏𝑏2) �4α(𝑏𝑏1 +

𝑏𝑏2)√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 + 22αb12 − 76αb1b2 + 22αb22 − 108b1b2d1 +

108b22 d1�� becomes negative. Hence, the consumer welfare change is negative then the optimal
virtual bid with zero expected demand deviation when the slope of RT is not substantially
steeper than the slope in DA,

b1−b2
b2

<

18d1
5α

.
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3.5.3

Producer Welfare Change with the Optimal Virtual Bid
Producer surplus differences are from DA payment, RT balance payment, and generation

cost. The differences in the DA payment to the producer is:
∆ DA Payment to the producer
= g1′ ∙ LMP1′ − g1 ∙ LMP1

= (d1 − V ∗ ) ∙ P1(d1 − V ∗ ) − d1 ∙ P1(d1)
=

V∗ (V∗ +a1−2d1)
b1

The expected differences in the RT balancing payments to the producer are the changes in the
differences between RT and DA generation times RT prices by virtual bid.
∆ RT Payment to the producer

= (∆ + V ∗ )LMP2′ − ∆ · LMP2

= E[(∆ + V ∗ ) · P2′ (d1 + ∆)] − E[∆ · P2(d1 + ∆)]
−V∗

1

α+µ

= 2α �∫−α+µ(∆ + V ∗ ) · P1(d1 + ∆)d∆ + ∫−V∗ (∆ + V ∗ ) · P2′ (d1 + ∆)d∆� −
1

2α

=

0

α+µ

�∫−α+µ ∆ · P1(d1 + ∆)d∆ + ∫0

∆ · P2(d1 + ∆)d∆�
2

2

V∗ �b2�−3α2 −3µ2 +α(−6a1+6d1−3V∗ )−3µV∗ −V∗ �+b1�3α2 +3µ2 +3µV∗ +V∗ +α(6µ+3V∗ )��
6αb1b2

The expected difference in generation cost is the change in the area under the DA and RT supply
curves.
∆ Generation cost
1

−V∗

0

d1

d1+∆

= − 2α �∫µ−α �∫0
1

2α

µ+α

µ+α

�∫µ−α �∫0 P1(g)dg� d∆ + ∫0

d1

αb1b2

d1+∆

P1(g) dg + ∫d1−V∗ P2′ (g) dg� d∆� +
d1+∆

�∫0 P1(g) dg + ∫d1

∗ ∗2
∗
2
1 (b1−b2)V �V +(3α+3µ)V +3(α+µ) �

= − 12

d1−V∗

P1(g)dg� d∆ + ∫−V∗ �∫0

P2(g) dg� d∆�
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The expected producer welfare difference is the sum of DA payment to the producer, RT balance
payment to the producer and generation cost.
∆ Producer welfare
=

V∗ (V∗ +a1−2d1)
b1

+

2

2

V∗ �b2�−3α2 −3µ2 +α(−6a1+6d1−3V∗ )−3mV∗ −V∗ �+b1�3α2 +3µ2 +3µV∗ +V∗ +α(6µ+3V∗ )��
6αb1b2

−

∗ ∗2
∗
2
1 (b1−b2)V �V +(3α+3µ)V +3(α+µ) �

12

αb1b2

When the expected demand deviation is zero, µ =0, the expected producer welfare is:
1

= 12α𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2 �12α𝑏𝑏2𝑉𝑉 ∗ (𝑎𝑎1 − 2𝑑𝑑1 + 𝑉𝑉 ∗ ) + 𝑉𝑉 ∗ (−𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏2)(3α2 + 3α𝑉𝑉 ∗ + 𝑉𝑉 ∗ 2 ) +
2𝑉𝑉 ∗ �𝑏𝑏2(−3α(α + 2𝑎𝑎1 − 2𝑑𝑑1) − 3α𝑉𝑉 ∗ − 𝑉𝑉 ∗ 2 ) + 𝑏𝑏1(3α2 + 3α𝑉𝑉 + 𝑉𝑉 2 )��
1

1

5

= − 81𝑏𝑏1(𝑏𝑏1−𝑏𝑏2)2 𝑏𝑏2 7α(𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏2 − 2 √𝑏𝑏12 + 14𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2 + 𝑏𝑏22 ) �α𝑏𝑏12 + 14 𝑎𝑎(𝑏𝑏1 +

23𝑏𝑏2
5

)√𝑏𝑏12 + 14𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2 + 𝑏𝑏22 −

52
7

𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2(𝑎𝑎 +

27𝑑𝑑1
26

) + 𝑏𝑏22 (−

11𝑎𝑎
7

+

54𝑑𝑑1
7

)�

Theorem 3. Optimal virtual bid increases producer welfare with zero expected demand deviation
when the slope in RT is not substantially steeper than the slope in DA,
b2

2𝑥𝑥

b1−b2
b2

<

9d1
2α

rearranged as

> 900+2𝑥𝑥 , 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 α = x% of d1. For example, the producer welfare increases when the slope in
b1
RT is not greater than 45 times steeper than the slope in DA when the range of uncertainty is
10% of DA demand. This condition is relatively weaker than the one in Theorem 2.
Proof.
1

The expected producer welfare change is 12α𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2 �12α𝑏𝑏2𝑉𝑉 ∗ (a1 − 2𝑑𝑑1 + 𝑉𝑉 ∗ ) + 𝑉𝑉 ∗ (−𝑏𝑏1 +

𝑏𝑏2)(3α2 + 3α𝑉𝑉 ∗ + 𝑉𝑉 ∗ 2 ) + 2𝑉𝑉 ∗ �𝑏𝑏2(−3α(α + 2𝑎𝑎1 − 2𝑑𝑑1) − 3α𝑉𝑉 ∗ − 𝑉𝑉 ∗ 2 ) + 𝑏𝑏1(3α2 + 3α𝑉𝑉 +
V∗

𝑉𝑉 2 )�� and the 𝑉𝑉 ∗ in the square bracket can be factored out as 12αb1b2 �12αb2(a1 − 2d1 + V ∗ ) +
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(−b1 + b2)�3α2 + 3αV ∗ + V ∗ 2 � + 2�b2�−3α(α + 2a1 − 2d1) − 3αV ∗ − V ∗ 2 � +
b1�3α2 + 3αV ∗ + V ∗ 2 ��� .

The term in the square bracket can be rearranged as the following:
V∗

12αb1b2

�12αb2(−2d1 + V ∗ ) + 2b2�−3α(α − 2d1) − 3α𝑉𝑉 − V ∗ 2 � + 2b1�3α2 + 3αV ∗ +

V ∗ 2 � + (−b1 + b2)�3α2 + 3αV ∗ + V ∗ 2 ��
V∗

= 12αb1b2 �6α2 b1 + 3α2 (−b1 + b2) − 6αb2(α − 2d1) − 24αb2d1 + �6αb1 + 6αb2 +
3α(−b1 + b2)�V ∗ + (b1 − b2)V ∗ 2 �
V∗

= 12αb1b2 �3α2 b1 − 3α2 b2 − 12αb2d1 + 3αb1V ∗ + 9αb2V ∗ + b1V ∗ 2 − b2V ∗ 2 �
V∗

= 12αb1b2 �3α2 b1 − 3α2 b2 − 12αb2d1 + 3αV ∗ (𝑏𝑏1 + 3𝑏𝑏2) + (b1 − b2)V ∗ 2 �
V∗

= 12αb1b2 [{(b1 − b2)V ∗ + 3α(𝑏𝑏1 + 3𝑏𝑏2)}V ∗ + 3α2 b1 − 3α2 b2 − 12αb2d1] .

Replacing the V ∗ in the square bracket with the extended form and rearranging the terms yields
V∗

�
12αb1b2

3�−2αb1−2αb2+9α(b1+3b2)+√α2 b12 +14α2 b1b2+α2 b22 ��−2αb1−2αb2+√α2 b12 +14α2 b1b2+α2 b22 �
9(b1−b2)

3α2 b1 − 3α2 b2 − 12αb2d1�
V∗

= 12αb1b2 �
12αb2d1�
V∗

= 12αb1b2 �

α2 �−2b1−2b2+√b12 +14b1b2+b22 ��7b1+25b2+√b12 +14b1b2+b22 �
9(b1−b2)

α2 �−2b1−2b2+√b12 +14b1b2+b22 ��7b1+25b2+√b12 +14b1b2+b22 �

(b1−b2)�27α2 b1−27α2 b2−108αb2d1�
V∗

9(b1−b2)

9(b1−b2)

�

+ 3α2 b1 − 3α2 b2 −

+

α�14αb12 −104αb1b2−22αb22 +α√b12 +14b1b2+b22 (5b1+23b2)−108d1b2(b1−b2)�

= 12αb1b2 �

9(b1−b2)

�.

+
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V∗

α

α

Factoring out the term 9(b1−b2) in the square bracket yields 12αb1b2 �9(b1−b2) (14αb12 −

104αb1b2 − 22αb22 + α√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 (5b1 + 23b2) − 108d1b2(b1 − b2))�. From
Lemma 1, the term in the square bracket 14αb12 − 104αb1b2 − 22αb22 +

α√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 (5b1 + 23b2) − 108d1b2(b1 − b2) < 14αb12 − 104αb1b2 −

22αb22 + 2α(b1 + b2)(5b1 + 23b2) − 108d1b2(b1 − b2)
Rearranging the latter term yields

14αb12 − 104αb1b2 − 22αb22 + 2α(b1 + b2)(5b1 + 23b2) − 108d1b2(b1 − b2)

= 14αb12 − 104αb1b2 − 22αb22 + 10αb12 + 56αb1b2 + 46αb22 − 108d1b2(b1 − b2)

= 24αb12 − 48αb1b2 + 24αb22 − 108d1b2(b1 − b2)

= 24𝛼𝛼(b1 − b2)2 − 108d1b2(b1 − b2)
= 12(b1 − b2){2𝛼𝛼(b1 − b2) − 9d1b2}

From

b1−b2
b2

<

9d1
2α

, the term in the curly bracket becomes negative and it suggests the inequality

relationship that 14αb12 − 104αb1b2 − 22αb22 + α√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 (5b1 + 23b2) −
108d1b2(b1 − b2) < 14αb12 − 104αb1b2 − 22αb22 + 2α(b1 + b2)(5b1 + 23b2) −
108d1b2(b1 − b2) = 12(b1 − b2){2𝛼𝛼(b1 − b2) − 9d1b2} < 0.
V∗

α

From Theorem 1, 12αb1b2 �9(b1−b2) (14αb12 − 104αb1b2 − 22αb22 +

α√b12 + 14b1b2 + b22 (5b1 + 23b2) − 108d1b2(b1 − b2))� is positive. Hence, the producer
welfare change is positive if the optimal virtual bid is chosen when there is zero expected
demand deviation when the slope in RT is not substantially steeper than the slope in DA,
b1−b2
b2

<

9d1
2α

.
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3.5.4

Welfare Change by Virtual Bid with Graph
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Figure 3.13 Welfare calculation when RT demand is greater than DA demand with a DEC

Figure 3.13 is the case when DA demand is lower than RT demand with a DEC making
the committed generation in DA greater than DA demand and less than RT demand.
The consumer welfare change is a sum of ∆ DA Payment by the consumer, and ∆ RT

balance payment by the consumer. The DA payment by the consumer without DEC is

d1∙ P1(d1), the area of E+F and with DEC is d1∙ P1(d1 − V ∗ ), or the area D+E+F with DEC.

Thus, ∆ DA Payment by the consumer, −d1 ∙ (P1(d1 − V ∗ ) − P1(d1), is −D. The RT balancing
payment by the consumer without DEC is E[−∆ ∙ P2(d1 + ∆)] or the area of

–(G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q) and with DEC is E[−∆ ∙ P2′(d1 + ∆)], or the area of
–(H+I+J+K+L+O+P+Q). Thus, ∆ RT balance payment by the consumer,

E[−∆ ∙ P2′(d1 + ∆)] − E[−∆ ∙ P2(d1 + ∆)] is G+M+N. The overall welfare change on

consumer due to virtual transaction is –D+G+M+N.
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The consumer welfare change is a sum of ∆ DA Payment to the producer, ∆ RT

Balancing Payment to the producer, and ∆ Generation cost. The DA Payment to the producer

without DEC is d1 ∙ P1(d1) or the area of E+F and with DEC is (d1 − V ∗ ) ∙ P1(d1 − V ∗ ) or the
area of D+E+F+I+K+L. Hence, ∆ DA Payment to the producer is (d1 − V ∗ ) ∙ P1(d1 − V ∗ )

−d1 ∙ P1(d1), D+I+K+L. The RT Balancing Payment to the producer without DEC is E[∆ ·

P2(d1 + ∆), or the area of G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N+O+P+Q and with DEC is E[(∆ + V ∗ ) ·

P2′ (d1 + ∆)], or the area of O+P+Q. Thus, ∆ RT Balancing Payment to the producer is

− (G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N). The Generation cost without DEC is the area under the inverse
1

0

d1

µ+α

supply curve up to d2, − 2α �∫µ−α �∫0 P1(g)dg� d∆ + ∫0
d1+∆

∫d1

1

d1

�∫0 P1(g) dg +

P2(g) dg� d∆�, or −(F+J+K+L+N+P+Q) and with DEC is
−V∗

d1+∆

− 2α �∫µ−α �∫0

µ+α

d1−V∗

P1(g)dg� d∆ + ∫−V∗ �∫0

d1+∆

P1(g) dg + ∫d1−V∗ P2′ (g) dg� d∆�, or

−(F+L+Q). Thus, ∆ Generation cost is J+K+N+P. The overall welfare change on producer due
to the virtual transaction is D-G-H+K-M+P.

The financial trader surplus is E[V(LMP1′ − LMP2′ )] = V(P1(d1 − V) −

E[P2′ (d1 + ∆)]), which is H+J. With DEC bid, V is negative and the virtual demand bid pays in

the DA market and have balancing payments in the RT market. The DA payment to the financial
trader is V(P1(d1 − V) = V∙LMP1´, the area of I+K+L. RT payment by the financial trader is

E[P2′ (d1 + ∆)]) =V∙LMP2´, the area of H+I+J+K+L. The total financial trader surplus is

E[V(LMP1′ − LMP2′ )], the area of H+J, or V(P1(d1 − V) − E[P2′ (d1 + ∆)]), the area of

–(I+K+L)+(H+I+J+K+L) which is positive.
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3.6

Summary of Expected Welfare Changes by Virtual Bid
Table 3.1 Welfare changes with expected demand deviation and optimal bidding
Economic Welfare

E[Δ]=0
DEC

E[Δ]>δ∗
DEC

E[Δ]<δ∗
INC

Virtual

Positive

Positive

Positive

Consumer

Decrease

Decrease

Increase

Producer

Increase

Increase

Decrease

The mathematical analysis helps us to understand the expected change of the welfare of
market participants due to the introduction of optimal virtual bids. If the expectation of demand
deviations is zero, a DEC is preferred. With a DEC, the expected consumer welfare is generally
decreased by the inflated DA payment by the consumer due to the increased DA price, while the
balancing payment by the consumer in RT is decreased. The expected producer welfare is
generally increased by the inflated DA payment to the producer due to the increased DA price
and reduced generation cost while the balance payment to the producer in RT is decreased.
Certain extreme sets of parameters for DA and RT slope relative to the DA demand and
the range of uncertainty, however, may change the qualitative welfare impact of market
participants due to the different functional form. When the range of uncertainty is 10% of DA
demand, the consumer welfare decreases when the slope in RT is not greater than 37 times
steeper than the slope in DA and the producer welfare increases when the slope in RT is not
greater than 45 times steeper than the slope in DA.
When the expected demand deviation is more negative than the critical threshold derived
above, an INC is preferred. With an INC, the expected consumer welfare is increased by the
decreased DA payment and RT balance payment by the consumer due to the decreased DA price
and the increased balancing payment to the consumer in the RT market. The expected producer
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welfare is decreased by the decreased DA payment to the producer due to the decreased DA
price and increased balance payment by the producer in RT.
With sufficiently large negative expected demand deviations, INCs yield expected
profits, while with relatively minor negative or zero expected demand deviation, DECs are
profitable. The magnitude of the expected demand deviation relative to parameters such as the
range of uncertainty, α, the slope of supply function in DA and RT markets qualify the
characterization of the qualitative optimal bidding strategies.
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CHAPTER 4.
ELECTRICITY NETWORK AND MULTISETTLEMENT WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET

The electricity network is a set of lines connecting different locations. The intersections
of these power lines are called network buses. At each network bus, there might be generators
and loads. Positive and negative net power inflow and outflow at different buses cause power
flows throughout the network. In analyzing electricity networks, we adopt the standard DC
approximation assumption. We assume zero transmission losses. This is a standard assumption
adopted in the academic literature and industry practice in order to simplify computational
outcomes.

4.1

Loop Flow in the Electricity Network
To understand the nature of the electricity system, it is important to introduce some basic

physical properties of the electricity network. When power moves between buses of the
electricity network, they follow an inverse reactance rule and loop flow. The rule of inverse
reactance is that the share of power that flows along each path is inversely proportional to the
relative reactance of such a path (Kristiansen 2004). The lower the reactance of a line, the larger
share of power flows on that path.
In addition, these laws explain flows in cases where there are “loops” in the network –
that is a minimum of three buses that are all interconnected directly. Thus, if the buses are
labeled 1, 2, and 3, there would be lines directly connecting 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and 1 to 3. This
defines a loop of connections from 1 to 2 to 3 and back to 1. Loop flow addressed by the
Kirchhoff’s laws reflects the fact that power flow takes the “path of the least reactance” rather
than taking the shortest delivery path. That is, if there is an injection of power at bus 1 and a
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withdrawal at bus 3, the flow will occur not only on the line from 1 to 3 but also on 1 to 2 and 2
to 3, with the amount of power flowing on each line related to the reactance of the line. Thus,
while the desired flow may be from 1 to 3, the actual flow throughout the network obeys
Kirchhoff’s laws. Of course, loops cannot occur in a single bus or two bus network – three is a
minimum number of buses before a loop can occur. Nevertheless, noting that simply having
three buses does not necessarily create a loop. If the network topology is such that two of the
buses are not directly connected, then the network is “radial” and no loops occur. Networks that
include loops are the focus of this study.

4.2

Illustrative Example of Loop Flow

3

LL
MW

Figure 4.1 Generation unit and load

Assuming that we have a network composed of three buses and we have a generation unit
(GenCo) at bus 1 (injection) and load (100 MW) at bus 3 (withdrawal). These three buses are
connected by three lines are line 1-2, line 1-3 and line 2-3. Suppose that all the lines have the
same reactance.
In order to assess the power flow caused by the injection at a specific bus, we need to
designate a reference bus in the network. The choice of reference bus is arbitrary and, we take
bus 3 for this illustrative example.
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Because of loop flow, power flows on every path from bus 1 to bus 3. Due to the power
injection in bus 1, the power flow from bus 1 to bus 3 moves along the two possible paths – line
1-3 or the other path, over line 1-2 and line 2-3. Since all the lines have the same reactance, the
reactance of a path depends on the number of lines in the path. So, the reactance associated with
the direct path of line 1-3 is half of the reactance of the indirect paths that are line 1-2 and line 23.
4.2.1

GenCo and Load with Unlimited Line Capacity
Assume that there is no limit on available transmission capacity on any of the three lines.

Following the rule of inverse reactance, we can calculate the share of power injected in bus 1 that
flows along each of the two possible paths. The share of power that flows along each path is
inversely proportional to the relative reactance of such a path. This share is called the Power
Transmission Distribution Factor (PTDF) and it can be calculated as
PTDF1-3 = (R1-2+ R2-3) / (R1-2+ R2-3+ R1-3) = 2R/3R= 2/3
PTDF1-2,2-3 = (R1-3) / (R1-2+ R2-3+ R1-3) = 1R/3R= 1/3
Hence, we can conclude that one-third of the power injected at bus 1 will move along line
1-2 and 2-3 and two-thirds of that power will move along line 1-3.
Since we know the generation unit at bus 1 will produce energy to meet 100 MW of load
(demand) at bus 3, we can calculate the amount of power flows in each of the two paths. Power
flow along the line 1-2 and 2-3 are 1/3 of 100 MW, 33.3 MW and along the line, 1-3 is 2/3 of
100MW, 66.7 MW.
4.2.2

GenCo and Load with Limited Line Capacity under Loop Flow
We can adjust the assumption of unlimited line capacity by introducing a line capacity

constraint of 50 MW on line 1-3. The introduction of such a constraint has an impact on the
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maximum amount of power that can be moved from bus 1 to bus 2, even if the capacity of the
other lines are unlimited.
When there is a single generation unit in the network and the load is located on a
different bus than the generation unit, having a congested line due to the line capacity constraint
can limit the generated electricity. In this example, even though the generation unit at bus 1 can
generate 100 MW to meet the load of 100 MW at bus 3, the loop flow does not allow them to
deliver it. The net injection of 100 MW at bus 1 causes the power flow of 66.7 MW that must
move along the line 1-3. However, the capacity constraint of 50 MW does not allow them to
move along.
4.2.3

Two GenCos and Load with Unlimited Line Capacity and Symmetric Line
Reactance

Figure 4.2 Two GenCos and load

In order to further determine the implications of the loop flow and PTDF, we consider a
three-bus network with two buses with generation units (bus 1 and bus 2) having identical
attributes and one bus with a load of 100 MW (bus 3). This means that bus 1 and bus 2 are net
injection buses and bus 3 is net withdrawal bus of 100 MW. We assume that the three
transmission lines have equal reactance and unlimited transmission capacity for the time being
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and these conditions will be relaxed later. Both generators have the same linear cost function and
the magnitude of the slope is one. It costs $100 to generate 100 MW. Hence, in the unlimited line
capacity case, each generates half of the load of 100 MW, which is 50 MW.
To identify the implications of the loop flow, first, we consider the power injection of 50
MW in bus 1. As addressed, due to loop flow, the power flow from bus 1 to bus 3 can move
along two possible paths: the direct path, (1-3), or the indirect path (1-2 and 2-3). The PTDF of
line 1-3 is 2/3 and PTDFs of line 1-2 and line 2-3 are 1/3 due to the identical line reactance
(symmetric PTDF). The power flow on line 1-3 is 2/3 of 50 MW, 33.3 MW and the power flow
in line 1-2 and 2-3 is 1/3 of 50 MW, 16.6 MW.
Second, we consider the power injection of 50 MW at bus 2. Two possible paths for
power flow from bus 2 to bus 3 are line 2-3 and line 1-2, line 1-3. Following the demonstrated
computation in the case of injection at bus 1, PTDF of line 2-3 is 2/3, PTDF of line 1-2 is -1/3
and PTDF of line 1-3 are 1/3. The direction of power flow by injection in specific lines refers to
the reference bus (bus 3).
PTDF2-3 = (R1-2+ R1-3) / (R1-2+ R2-3+ R1-3) = 2R/3R= 2/3
PTDF1-2 = -(R2-3) / (R1-2+ R2-3+ R1-3) = -1R/3R= -1/3
PTDF1-3 = (R2-3) / (R1-2+ R2-3+ R1-3) = 1R/3R= 1/3
The power flow on line 2-3 is 2/3 of 50 MW, 33.3 MW, the power flow in line 1-2 is 1/3
of 50 MW in counter-flow direction, -16.6 MW and the power flow in line 1-3 is 1/3 of 50 MW,
16.6 MW.
We can determine the overall power flow over the transmission lines in the network by
adding the calculated share of flows by injections at each bus. With injections of 50 MW in both
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bus 1 and bus 2, the overall power flow in line 1-2 is 16.6-16.6, 0 MW, in line 1-3 is 33.3+16.6,
50 MW and in line 2-3 is 16.6+33.3, 50 MW.
4.2.4

Two GenCos and Load with Unlimited Line Capacity and Asymmetric Line
Reactance
To identify the influence of the line reactance on the power flow of the network, we can

change the topology of line reactance. Instead of having identical reactance, assume line 1-3 has
a reactance of R, which is half of the reactance of lines 1-2 and 2-3, or 2R. For the injection at
bus 1, the calculation of PTDFs is
PTDF1-3 = (R1-2+ R2-3) / (R1-2+ R2-3+ R1-3) = 4R/5R= 4/5
PTDF1-2,2-3 = (R1-3) / (R1-2+ R2-3+ R1-3) = 1R/5R= 1/5
A 50 MW injection at bus 1 results in power flow on line 1-3 of 4/5 of 50 MW, or 40
MW, and the power flow on line 1-2 and 2-3 is 1/5 of 50 MW or 10 MW.
For the injection at bus 2, the calculation of PTDFs is
PTDF2-3 = (R1-2+ R1-3) / (R1-2+ R2-3+ R1-3) = 3R/5R= 3/5
PTDF1-2 = -(R2-3) / (R1-2+ R2-3+ R1-3) = -2R/5R= -2/5
PTDF1-3 = (R2-3) / (R1-2+ R2-3+ R1-3) = 2R/5R= 2/5
A 50 MW injection at bus 2 creates power flow on line 2-3 is 3/5 of 50 MW, 30 MW, the
power flow on line 1-2 is 2/5 of 50 MW in counter-flow direction, or -20 MW, and the power
flow in line 1-3 is 2/5 of 50 MW, or 20 MW.
In this asymmetric PTDF case, the injections of 50 MW at both bus 1 and bus 2 result in
an overall power flow on line 1-2 of 10 minus 20, or -10 MW, on line 1-3 the flow is 40 plus 20,
or 60 MW, and on line 2-3 it is 10 plus 30, or 40 MW.
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4.2.5

Two GenCos and Load with Limited Line Capacity and Symmetric Line Reactance
The introduction of the line capacity constraint in the network with two generators has an

impact on the decision of MW of generation. We assume that the capacity of line 1-3 is 45MW,
5 MW less than the power flow in the unlimited capacity case. In the symmetric PTDF case with
identical line reactance, the power flow on line 1-3 by the injection at bus 1 is 2/3 of generation
in bus 1 and by the injection at bus 2 is 1/3 of generation in bus 2, while the sum of generations
must meet the load of 100 MW. Solving these equations, the generation at bus 1 is 35 MW and
generation at bus 2 is 65 MW. Under the symmetric reactance case, due to the line capacity
constraint:
Power flow on line 1-3 = Generation at bus 1 x 2/3 + Generation at bus 2 x 1/3 < 45 MW
Load at bus 3 = Generation at bus 1 + Generation at bus 2 = 100 MW
4.2.6

Two GenCos and Load with Limited Line Capacity and Asymmetric Line
Reactance
Assume asymmetric line reactance with the line 1-3 having half of the reactance of lines

1-2 and 2-3. This causes a different set of generation decisions, although the other components in
the network (line capacity, generation units, and load) are identical to the symmetric case.
Assume a capacity limit on line 1-3 is 55 MW in the asymmetric case, 5 MW less than its
MW of power flow in the unlimited capacity case of 60 MW. The power flow on line 1-3 due to
the injection at bus 1 is 4/5 of generation at bus 1 and due to the injection at bus 2 is 2/5 of
generation at bus 2 while the sum of generations must meet the load of 100 MW. Solving these
equations, the generation at bus 1 is 37.5 MW and generation at bus 2 is 62.5 MW.
Under the asymmetric reactance case:
Power flow on line 1-3 = Generation at bus 1 x 4/5 + Generation at bus 2 x 2/5 < 55 MW
Load at bus 3 = Generation at bus 1 + Generation at bus 2 = 100 MW
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4.3

Bilevel Programming for Numerical Welfare Analysis
The problem of identifying the optimal bidding strategy for the virtual trader over a

network-constrained two-settlement market can be numerically analyzed by bilevel
programming. The proposed bilevel programming model contains an upper-level problem and a
lower-level one that constrains the upper-level problem. The upper-level problem characterizes
the profit maximization of the strategic virtual trader whose net revenues depend on the market
clearing prices obtained in the lower-level problem. The lower-level problems represent the
clearing of DA and RT markets with the target of maximizing expected social welfare subject to
the producer, consumer, and electricity network constraints following DCOPF. The lower-level
problems are replaced by its Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions to convert the bilevel
problem into a non-convex single-level optimization problem.
The multi-bus model, in contrast to the single bus model, generally has many suppliers
and consumers located across the electricity network. The system operators manage the lower
level electricity market consistently with the solution to an optimization model that focuses on
delivering electricity to load at least cost and that also considers both economic and technical
factors inherent to the system. The objective function is an expected social welfare maximization
problem with the goal to maximize the surplus for the market participants such as consumers and
producers. This is done by running an optimal power flow model constrained by different
technical parameters such as generation capacities, transmission capabilities, and loads.
4.3.1

Upper-Level Problem: Financial Trader
The purpose of the upper-level problem is to find the optimal virtual product

(INCs/DECs) bidding strategy for the financial trader in the network. This is done by
maximizing the expected profit of the virtual bidding. The optimal virtual bidding problem is
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complicated by the fact that the calculation of the expected profit depends on the DA and RT
market clearing prices at all buses. The clearing prices are determined by the generation dispatch
of the system operator, for both the DA and RT markets. Note that the realized demand
deviations are not known to the market operator or virtual trader at the time when the virtual
trader must issue her/his bid in the DA market. Therefore, the optimal bidding strategy has to
take into account the demand uncertainty in RT market. In the model presented here, this
uncertainty is integrated into the model by multiple scenarios of lower-level problems indexed
by ‘s’, and with associated probabilities Prob(s). Each scenario represents a realization of the
demand deviation, which following a uniform distribution with exogenous probabilities of
scenarios. That is,
max

∑s ∑b Prob(s) ∙ Vb (LMP1b − LMP2bs )

where Vb is the INC/DEC bid at bus b (positive Vb corresponds to an INC and negative

Vb corresponds to a DEC), LMP1b is the DA price at bus b, LMP2bs is the RT price at bus b in

scenario s and Prob(s) is the probability of the scenario s. The LMP1b and LMP2bs , determined

by lower-level DA and RT market problems, will be explained further in the lower level problem
section below.
4.3.2

Lower-Level Problem: Day-Ahead Market
The upper-level and lower-level problems are interrelated since the upper-level problem

of the virtual trader determines the optimal volume of virtual bids submitted to the DA market
based on expected DA and RT prices, while the solution to the lower-level problems of the
system operator determines the DA and RT prices have a direct influence on the virtual trader
profit. The strategic virtual bids (Vb ) are the upper-level decision variables treated as parameters
in the lower-level problem. The virtual bids may alter the commitment of generation units and
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the MW of generation. The virtual demand bids, or DECs, are represented by V<0 and the virtual
supply offers, or INCs, are represented by V>0 in the stylized DA market model.
The DA market in the lower level problem is to determine the market clearing pattern of
generation and prices, which is based on economic social welfare maximization and optimal
power flow formulations incorporating the INCs and DECs represented by Vb . That is,
g1b

∑b RPb · d1b − ∑b ∫0

max

(−

a1b

b1b

g

+ b1 ) dg
b

where RPb is the consumer reservation price at bus b, d1b is consumer demand at bus b, g1b is

the MW of cleared generation at bus b, a1b is a parameter of the DA supply function at bus b

and b1b is a slope of the DA supply function at bus b. The consumer economic welfare summed
g1b

across all nodes is ∑b RPb · d1b and ∑b ∫0

−

a1b

b1b

g

+ b1 dg is generation cost (area under
b

inverse supply function at node b) summed across all nodes. As RPb and d1b are given in this

problem, the system operator selects optimal generation level (g1b ) to maximize social welfare

under the technical constraints.

The power balance constraint requires that total generation meets total demand in the
network taking into account the virtual bids,
∑b(g1b − (d1b − Vb ))= 0,

λ1 ≥ 0

The Lagrange multipliers for these constraints are denoted by λ1. Power flow limits at each
transmission line are as follows:

∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) ≤ Fijmax ,

π1ij+ ≥ 0,

− ∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) ≤Fijmax , π1ij− ≥ 0,

∀ij
∀ij

where Fijmax is the transmission line capacity and π1ij+ , π1ij− are Lagrange multipliers.

∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) is the power flow on path ij reflecting all injections and
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withdrawals in the network, which must be between Fijmax and −Fijmax. PTDFijb is incremental

power flow on the line from i to j with respect to power injection at bus b and withdrawals at the
reference bus integrating the physical laws of loop flow. All of the generation quantities must be
non-negative values (g1b ≥ 0).

The FOCs w.r.t. g1b for the above DA PTDF problem are the following:
−

a1b

b1b

g1

+ b1b − λ1+ ∑i ∑j π1ij+ PTDFijb − ∑i ∑j π1ij− PTDFijb ≥ 0 ∀b
b

With rearranged terms, this becomes −

a1b

b1b

g1

−
+ b1b = λ1 − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π1+
ij − π1ij �.
b

Interpreting this economically, the incremental marginal cost of generation equals the definition
of marginal value to consumers (price) at each node b. These marginal values to consumers
define the locational marginal prices in the DA market (LMP1b):
−
LMP1b = λ1 − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π1+
ij − π1ij �

where λ1, π1ij+ and π1ij− are Lagrangian multipliers. LMP represents the cost to the

system of a unit increase in the load at the bus. In the absence of line capacity constraints and
losses, all locational prices will be equal across all nodes b. With limiting transmission capacity
−
constraints, the multipliers, π1+
ij and π1ij , will adjust the optimal solutions to the problem. At

changes in the constraints such as the available capacity, the multipliers would change the

equilibrium solution, which leads to a price change. If the change does not reach a constraint
limit, the multiplier will be zero, and there will be no change in the price. The energy price is λ1

−
and − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π1+
ij − π1ij � is congestion price.

4.3.3

Lower-Level Problem: Real-Time Market
The Real-Time (RT) market in the lower-level problem is also an economic social

welfare maximization problem with optimal power flow. However, it is different from the DA
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market problem. The generation dispatch decision in the RT market is based on committed
generation units determined in the DA market. Particularly when there is a need to dispatch
additional MW of energy in the RT market due to the positive deviation of the realized demand,
the system operator has to have fast ramping high-cost peaker units to meet demand in a short
time that are following the RT supply curve. The RT market does not consider virtual bids in the
optimization problem since the system operator makes dispatch decisions based on physical
demands. While the demands in the DA market are fixed at the planning stage, the demands in
the RT market are uncertain with known distribution. As discussed above, the probabilistic
nature of the RT demands is implemented via a set of scenarios that consider expected possible
realizations of the uncertain demand, which occur with exogenous probabilities.
The economic social welfare maximizing objective function in the RT market is a
following:
max

∑s ∑b Prob(s) · RPb · d1b
min(g1b ,g2bs )

− ∑s ∑b Prob(s) · �∫0

�−

a1b

b1b

g

max(g1b ,g2bs )
b

b

a2

g

(− b2b + b2 )dg �

+ b1 � dg + ∫g1

b

b

where g2b is the MW of cleared generation at bus b in scenario ‘s’, a2b is a parameter of RT
supply function at bus b and b2b is the slope of RT supply function at bus b. In this case,
min(g1b ,g2bs )

∑s ∑b Prob(s) · �∫0

�−

a1b

b1b

g

max(g1b ,g2bs )

+ b1 � dg + ∫g1
b

b

a2

g

(− b2b + b2 )dg � represents
b

b

the total generation cost in scenario ‘s’ according to the realized demands in RT market. For
negative deviations of generation, the second integral vanishes because the lower and upper

limits of integration are the same. For positive deviations of generation, the marginal cost is set
by the RT supply curve.
The power balance constraint, which λ2s is the Lagrange multiplier for the following

constraint:
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∑b(g2bs − d2bs )= 0,

λ2s ≥ 0,

∀s

where generation in every state at every node must be non-negative (g2bs ≥ 0). In each scenario,

the sum of generations in the network ( ∑b g2bs ) must meet the sum of deviations in realized
demands in the network (∑b g2bs = ∑b ∆bs ).

Demand in the RT market in scenario ‘s’, d2bs , is the realization of the uniform

distribution of demand deviation plus demand in DA market (d1b +∆bs ). The known distributions

of the demand uncertainty (∆bs ) are assumed to be uniform for purposes of analysis within the

range of (µb − ab , µb + ab ), and deviations are assumed to be independent across nodes.
Power flow limits at each transmission lines are a follows:
∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) ≤ Fijmax ,

− ∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) ≤Fijmax ,

+
−
where π2ijs
and π2ijs
are Lagrange multipliers.

+
π2ijs
≥ 0,
−
π2ijs
≥ 0,

The FOC w.r.t. g2bs for the above RT PTDF problem is a follows:

max(−

a1b

b1b

+

g2bs
b1b

,−

a2b

b2b

+

g2bs
b2b

a1b

b1b

+

g2bs
b1b

a2

, − b2b +
b

g2bs
b2b

∀ijs

+
−
)−λ2s +∑i ∑j π2ijs
PTDFijb − ∑i ∑j πijs
PTDFijb ≥ 0

which can be rearranged in the case when g2bs > 0 as:
max(−

∀ijs

∀bs

−
) = λ2s − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π2+
ijs − π2ijs �.

This yields that the incremental marginal cost of generation equals the marginal value of power
to consumers (price). The cleared locational marginal prices in the RT market in scenario s
(LMP2bs) is stated as follows:
−
LMP2bs = λ2s − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π2+
ijs − π2ijs �

+
−
where λ2s , π2ijs
and π2ijs
are Lagrangian multipliers. The energy price is λ2s and

+
− ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π2ijs
− π2−
ijs � is the congestion price.
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4.3.4

Bilevel Formulation and KKT Reformulation
The bilevel formulation for the stylized two-settlement electricity market with multi-bus

network integrating loop flow is stated as following:
Upper-level: Virtual trader
max
s.t.

∑s ∑b Prob(s) ∙ Vb (LMP1b − LMP2bs )

(4.1a)

−
LMP1b = λ1 − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π1+
ij − π1ij �

∀b

−
LMP2bs = λ2s − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π2+
ijs − π2ijs �

∀bs

Lower-level: Day-Ahead market
g1b

max ∑b RPb · d1b − ∑b ∫0
s.t

−

a1b

b1b

g

+ b1 dg

(4.2a)

b

∑b(g1b − (d1b − Vb )) ≥ 0

λ1 ≥ 0

− ∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) ≤Fijmax

π1ij− ≥ 0

π1ij+ ≥ 0

∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) ≤ Fijmax
Lower-level: Real-Time market
max ∑s ∑b Prob(s) · RPb · d1b

min(g1b ,g2bs )

− ∑s ∑b Prob(s) · (∫0
s.t

�−

a1b

b1b

g

(4.2b)

max(g1b ,g2bs )

+ b1 � dg + ∫g1
b

(−

a2b

b2b

∀ij
∀ij

g

(4.2c)
(4.2d)

+ b2 )dg ) (4.3a)
b

∑b(g2bs − d2bs ) ≥ 0

λ2s ≥ 0

∀s

(4.3b)

− ∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) ≤Fijmax

−
π2ijs
≥0

∀ijs

(4.3d)

∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) ≤ Fijmax

+
π2ijs
≥0

∀ijs

(4.3c)
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The upper-level problem (4.1a) represents the objective function of the virtual trader
maximization of trading profit. The lower-level problem (4.2a)–(4.2f) represents the DA market
clearing process and (4.3a)–(4.3f) represents the RT market clearing process in order to
maximize the social welfare as expressed by (4.2a) and (4.3a). Constraints on lower-level
problems are system balance constraints (4.2b) and (4.3b), and power flow limits (4.2c)-(4.2d)
and (4.3c)-(4.3d). The LMP of each bus is determined endogenously within the lower-level
problem incorporating the volume of virtual bids from the upper-level problem.
The bilevel problem is non-convex even with the simple linear program formulation. In
order to transform this bilevel problem into a single-level problem, the lower-level problem is
replaced by its Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions. The complementary slackness
conditions between the constraints and their Lagrange multipliers makes the constraint set makes
this single-level non-convex problem. For the purposes of this study, the stylized model
represents a single hour market while the model can be extended to a multi-hour (one day)
formulation. The KKT reformulation of the bilevel program has the computational advantage
that is as a single level problem. The equations of KKT reformulation are presented as follows:
Upper-level: Virtual trader
max

∑s ∑b Prob(s) ∙ Vb (LMP1b − LMP2bs )

−
LMP1b = λ1 − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π1+
ij − π1ij �

+
−
LMP2bs = λ2s − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π2ijs
− π2ijs
�

s.t

∀b

∀bs

Lower-level: Day-Ahead market
−

a1b

b1b

g1

−
+ b1b − λ1+ π1+
ij ∑i ∑j PTDFijb − π1ij ∑i ∑j PTDFijb =0
b

− ∑b(g1b − (d1b − Vb )) + S_λ1 = 0

∀b
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∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) – Fijmax +S_π1ij+ = 0

− ∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) – Fijmax +S_π1−
ij = 0
0 ≤ S_λ1 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0

0 ≤ S_π1ij+ ⊥ π1+
ij ≥ 0

Lower-level: Real-Time market
a1

b

g2bs
b1b

a2

∀ij
∀ij

0 ≤ S_π1ij− ⊥ π1−
ij ≥ 0
max(− b1b +

∀ij

, − b2b +
b

g2bs
b2b

∀ij

)

+
−
∑i ∑j PTDFijb − πijs
∑i ∑j PTDFijb = 0
−λ2s + π2ijs

∀bs

+
∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) – Fijmax +S_π2ijs
=0

∀ijs

− ∑b(g2bs − d2bs ) + S_λ2s = 0

−
− ∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) – Fijmax +S_π2ijs
=0

0 ≤ S_λ2s ⊥ λ2s ≥ 0

+
0 ≤ S_π2ijs
⊥ π2+
ijs ≥ 0
−
0 ≤ S_π2ijs
⊥ π2−
ijs ≥ 0

4.4

∀s

∀ijs
∀s

∀ijs
∀ijs

Welfare of Market Participants in Multi-Bus Model
The basic principles to calculate the welfare of market participants in the multi-bus model

are identical to the ones in the single-bus model. The consumer welfare calculation is the
negative of the consumer payment in Day-Ahead (DA) plus balancing payments for the
consumer in the RT market plus consumer value. The producer welfare calculation is payment to
the generator in the DA market plus net balancing payments to the producer minus generation
cost. Social welfare is the sum of consumer and producer welfare. The financial trader welfare
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surplus calculation is net payments to the financial trader in the DA market plus net balancing
payments to the financial trader in the RT market.
For the consumer surplus at bus b, the DA payment by the consumer is the cleared
quantity of physical demand in DA (d1b ) times the market price, or d1b ∙LMP1b . The RT

balancing payment to the consumer is a financial settlement for the demand deviation in RT
market from cleared demand in DA market. The calculation of RT net balancing payment to the
consumer at bus b is the difference between DA demand and RT demand times RT price, (d1b −
d2b ) ∙ LMP2b .

When the realized demand in RT is less than cleared demand in DA, the balance payment to the

consumer is positive as the system operator pays back for the unused energy at the RT price.
When the realized demand in the RT market is larger than DA demand, the balancing payment to
the consumer is negative as the consumer must pay for the additional energy use at the RT price.
The perceived value of electricity to consumers can be presented as a reservation price, RP, that
always has a greater fixed value than the electricity price. Consumer value is the realized demand
in the RT market times the reservation price, d2bs ∙RP. Overall, the consumer surplus calculation
for bus b is -d1b ∙LMP1b +(d1b -d2b )∙ LMP2b +d2b ∙RP.

Total consumer surplus is the sum of consumer surpluses at each bus across the network, or
∑𝑏𝑏[−d1b ∙ LMP1b + (d1b − d2b ) ∙ LMP2b + d2b ∙ RP].

For the producer surplus at bus b, the DA payment to the producer is the cleared quantity

of physical generation times the market price in DA, or g1b ∙LMP1b . The RT balancing payment

to the producer at bus b is the difference between RT generation and DA generation times the RT
price, −(g1b − g2b ) ∙ LMP2b . When realized generation in the RT market is greater than the

cleared generation in the DA market, the balancing payment to the producer is positive as system
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operator pays for the additional generation at the RT price. When realized generation in the RT
market is less than the cleared generation in the DA, the balancing payment to the producer is
negative as the producer needs to return payments for electricity not supplied at the RT price.
Generation cost at bus b is equivalent to the area under the supply curve to the realized
min(g1b ,g2b )

generation in the RT market, or ∫0

max(g1b ,g2b )

P1(g) dg + ∫g1

b

producer surplus calculation is g1b ∙ LMP1b − (g1b − g2b ) ∙ LMP2b −
min(g1b ,g2b )

�∫0

max(g1b ,g2b )

P1(g) dg + ∫g1

b

P2(g) dg. Overall, the

P2(g) dg �.

Producer Surplus in the network is the sum of producer surpluses at each bus
min(g1b ,g2b )

= ∑𝑏𝑏 �g1b ∙ LMP1b − (g1b − g2b ) ∙ LMP2b − �∫0
max(g1b ,g2b )

∫g1

b

P2(g) dg ��

P1(g) dg +

Based on the welfare formulations, the consumer welfare differences come from DA
payments by the consumer and net RT balancing payments by the consumer. Producer welfare
differences are from the DA payment to the producer, RT balancing payments to the producer
and realized generation cost.
For the financial trader surplus, the DA payment to the financial trader is a cleared bid
times the DA price or V∙LMP1. RT payment by the financial trader is a spontaneous settlement
at RT market price by the system operator. Thus, the financial trader bids an INC, the positive
quantity of V in the model, in the hope that the DA price will be larger than the realized RT
price. Analogously, the financial trader bids a DEC, a negative value of V in the model, in the
hope that the DA price will be lower than the realized RT price. Overall, the financial trader
surplus calculation at bus b is the expected profit earned at that bus, Vb (LMP1′b − LMP2′bs ). The

total financial trader surplus across the network is ∑𝑏𝑏 Vb (LMP1b − LMP2bs ).
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4.5

Welfare of Market Participants in Multi-Bus Model: Uncongested Network
In the single bus model, the DA and RT market prices (LMP1 and LMP2) are determined

by the characteristics of the generation unit and load represented by the supply function
parameters and demand uncertainty distribution.
In an uncongested network, the system operator can dispatch the generators in merit order
without transmission line constraints as the generated energy can be delivered to the load(s) in
the network without limitations. Having demand uncertainty with a known distribution, the
system operator can plan and dispatch generators accordingly in merit order regardless of their
location. Hence, when the aggregated physical characteristics of the generator(s) and load(s) are
identical, the market outcomes are identical regardless of the location of the generator(s) and
load(s) as well as the type of PTDF.
When the aggregated physical characteristics of the generation unit(s) and load(s) in the
single bus model and the uncongested multi-bus model are identical, the clearing prices are
identical between the single bus and the uncongested multi-bus models for both the DA and RT
markets. When the virtual bids in the single bus model and the sum of virtual bids in the multibus model are identical, the realized prices in DA and RT markets are identical.
LMP1 = LMP11 = LMP12 = LMP13 … = LMP1b

LMP2 = LMP21 = LMP22 = LMP23 … = LMP2b

If V ∗ = ∑b Vb∗ = V1∗ + V2∗ + V3∗ … + Vb∗

LMP1′ = LMP11′ = LMP12′ = LMP13′ … = LMP1b′
LMP2′ = LMP21′ = LMP22′ = LMP23′ … = LMP2b′

While the expected prices in DA and RT markets are identical in the single bus and the
uncongested multi-bus models, the optimal bidding strategy must be identical. The overall
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optimal bidding volume in the multi-bus model is the same as the volume in the single bus
model.
V ∗ = ∑b Vb∗

The sum of optimal virtual bids in the network is identical to the single bus case and the
identical optimal bidding strategy generates identical market outcomes that give identical welfare
impact to the market participants.
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CHAPTERS.

WELFARE ANALYSIS IN THE SIMPLIFIED
NETWORKS

The fundamental goal of this study is to understand the impact of line congestion and
loop flow on the changes in expected welfare of market participants due to the introduction of
virtual transactions. We will use different types of networks to determine whether having line
congestion and loop flow in the network amplify or dampen the expected welfare impacts
determined in the absence of congestion and loop flow.
In the absence of active line capacity limits and without line losses, results of the optimal
power flow model will result in a single price that clears markets throughout the network. That
is, the laws of power flow that govern the movement of energy in the network do not affect the
market outcomes.
Line congestion can alter the central dispatch decisions regarding power generation, the
pattern of power flow in the network and as a consequence, the prices of electricity at the bus
level. In this regard, having a congested line may reshape the optimal virtual bidding strategy
relative to the uncongested case. The initial analysis will start with small, simple networks to
assess the impacts of virtual transactions on agent welfare for uncongested and congested cases.
The next step in the analysis will augment the initial model to introduce loops in the
network topology. In the presence of loops and congestion, the electricity flows in the network
are governed by Kirchoff’s Laws. When the associated loop flow exists, the shares of power
flow along the lines are determined by the relative magnitudes of the line reactance in the
electricity network. The shares are called the Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs) and
the different combinations of line reactance result in different PTDFs. The configuration of line
reactance and the existence of line congestion can change the impact of the inflow and outflow
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of energy and hence change the market results, including nodal prices, and the optimal bidding
strategy for virtual market participants. In turn, this may have impacts on the expected welfare
changes associated with the introduction of virtual bids.
In the stylized model, the virtual transaction may be bid at any bus in the network,
reflecting the electricity market practice that virtual supply and virtual demand bids are permitted
at most locations in the network. We assume a single financial trader unilaterally optimizes
profits from virtual bids throughout the network. This is not a rare case in real electricity market
operation where some areas of the network have very few virtual bidders. The most interesting
range of expected demand deviation is near zero. It is the ideal case for system operator where
forecasted DA demand and realized RT demand are identical, yet virtual trader still makes a
profit in the stylized model. Based on data from PJM, this also appears to be a reasonable
assumption.
This section focuses on estimating the expected differential welfare impact due to the
introduction of virtual transactions in the case where there is congestion in the power network. In
the interest of parsimony, the models addressed here have two buses (labeled 1 and 2) with a
single line connecting them and three buses (labeled 1, 2 and 3) with all pairs of buses connected
by single lines. In both cases, the line capacity is adjusted to generate different levels of
congestion on the line from bus 1 to bus 2 to assess the expected welfare impact on market
participants while all the other physical characteristics are fixed.
In the two settlement market, there is the possibility of congestion in the day ahead
market, and there is also the possibility of congestion in the real-time market, given the realized
real-time demand. Line capacity is varied across three cases: A) always uncongested, B) always
congested, and C) occasionally congested. When the line capacity is unlimited, the network is
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always uncongested in DA and RT markets. When the line capacity is low, the network is always
congested in DA and RT markets. When the line capacity is near the MW of power flow on that
line without a virtual transaction, the line may be occasionally congested considering the demand
uncertainty in RT. For example, the line can be uncongested in DA but congested or uncongested
in RT depending on the realization of RT demand, or it may be congested in DA but congested
or uncongested in RT depending on the realization of RT demand.

5.1

Two-Bus and Three-Bus Models
In this section, we introduce two- and three-bus models to identify the impact of the

virtual transaction in the electricity network with congestion and loop flow. Two-bus model is
the simplest form of a network having transmission line that can be congested due to line
capacity constraint. Three-bus model is the simplest network to integrate loop flow in the
network that can apply Kirchhoff’s law.
5.1.1

Two-Bus Model Configuration
For simplicity, we begin with a two-bus model where each bus has a generator and load,

and the buses are connected by a transmission line. While a single bus model obviously cannot
exhibit congestion, a two-bus model with a line connecting buses could be congested. The goal
of this section is to estimate the changes in expected welfare impact due to the introduction of
the virtual transaction in the congested network relative to the uncongested network representing
the single-bus case.
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Figure 5.1 Two-bus network

This study uses a linear supply function that could be viewed as an abstraction of the true
step supply functions of the generation units. The parameters of supply curves are chosen so that
the generation supply curve at bus one has lower marginal cost relative to the generation supply
curve at bus two. In the DA market, the cleared volume of the load at bus one and bus two are
chosen to be identical in order to make them comparable. In RT market, the RT demand is the
sum of the determined loads in the DA market and the realized demand deviation in RT. The
distributions of RT demand are assumed to be uniform on the interval (µb − αb , µb + αb ) where

the αb represents the range of uncertainty at bus b and the µb represents the mean of the

distribution at bus b. In this test case, we assume that the realizations of the demand deviations
are independent of each other and µb . In line with typical deviations between DA and RT

demand, the range of demand uncertainty is assumed to be ±10% of the load. In this regard, the
direction of power flow over the line is generally from bus 1 to bus 2 according to the merit
order dispatch by the system operator.
Table 5.1 Two-bus model: Load data
Bus

DA Load (MW)

Distribution of load deviation*

1
200
[-10,10]
2
200
[-10,10]
* Uniform distribution represents the uncertainty of the load deviations.
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Table 5.2 Two-bus model: Generation unit data
Bus

DA supply curve
parameter (a1)
0
0

1
2

DA supply curve
slope (b1)
1
0.4

RT supply curve
slope (b2)
0.5
0.2

Table 5.3 Two-bus model: Line data
Type

Reactance

Loss

Capacity

Uncongested

0.1

0

95 MW

Congested
0.1
0
75 MW
* The power flow over the line from bus 1 to 2 without virtual transactions is 86 MW in DA.

5.1.2

Three-Bus Models Configuration
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Figure 5.2 Three-bus networks

In aggregate, the three-bus network models have identical physical characters with twobus network except having one more bus that is connected to the other buses with the load. We
create two different types of three-bus network that maintain the same physical characteristics of
the two-bus model.
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The one is called load divide. The load located in bus one in the two-bus model is
separated into bus one and bus three so the sum of the realized load in bus one and bus three in
the three-bus model is identical to the realized load in bus one in the two-bus model.
The other one is called generation unit divide. The supply function in bus one in the twobus model is separated into bus one and bus three so the vertical sum of the supply functions in
bus one and bus three of the three-bus model is identical to the supply function in bus one of the
two-bus model. The attributes of loads and generation units are identical, hence the power tends
to flow from bus one to bus two.
The bold differences in power flow in the three-bus network are the power flows not
directly via line 1-2 exclusively, but through parallel lines that are line 1-2, line 1-3 to line 3-2
due to loop flow in the closed network. The reactance of the lines is adjusted to have identical
power flow in line 1-2, in two-bus and three-bus models. The heterogeneous line reactance is not
an uncommon case in the electricity network.
Table 5.4 Three-bus model (Load divide): Load data
Bus

Load (MW)

Distribution of deviation*

1

200 × 0.8

[-10,10] × 0.8

2

200

[-10,10]

3

200 × 0.2

[-10,10] × 0.2

* Uniform distribution represents the uncertainty of the load deviations.
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Table 5.5 Three-bus model (Load divide): Generation unit data
Bus

DA supply curve
parameter (a1)

DA supply curve
slope (b1)

RT supply curve slope
(b2)

1

0

1

0.5

2

0

0.4

0.2

3

N/A

N/A

N/A

Table 5.6 Three-bus model (Load divide): Line data
From Bus

To Bus

Reactance

Loss

Capacity*

1

2

0.1

0

Uncongested: 95 MW
Congested: 75 MW

1

3

0.0465

0

Unlimited

2

3

0.1

0

Unlimited

* The power flow over line 1-2 without virtual transaction is 86 MW

Table 5.7 Three-bus model (Generation unit divide): Load data
Bus

Load (MW)

Distribution of deviation*

1
2
3

200
200
N/A

[-10,10]
[-10,10]
N/A

* Uniform distribution represents the uncertainty of the load deviations.

Table 5.8 Three-bus model (Generation unit divide): Generation unit data
Bus

DA supply curve
parameter (a1)

DA supply curve
slope (b1)

RT supply curve slope
(b2)

1

0

0.95

0.475

2

0

0.4

0.2

3

N/A

0.05

0.025
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Table 5.9 Three-bus model (Generation unit divide): Line data
From Bus

To Bus

Reactance

Loss

1

2

0.005

0

Capacity*
Uncongested: 95 MW
Congested: 75 MW

1

3

0.1

0

Unlimited

2

3

2

0

Unlimited

* The power flow over line 1-2 without virtual transaction is 86 MW
5.2

Welfare Impact of Virtual Transactions in an Electricity Network
The welfare impact of introducing optimal virtual bids in the electricity network will be

identified with the different network cases that are uncongested, congested, and congested with
loop flow. The uncongested case is imposing very large line capacity so there is no chance to
have congestion in the network. The congested case is, in the two-bus model, the power flow
(MW) binding to the line capacity. Congested with loop flow case is, in the thee-bus model,
having congestion as in the congested case while there is a loop flow in the network. The terms
generators, generation units, and producers are interchangeable. The term loads, load-serving
entities, and demands are interchangeable.
5.2.1

Welfare Changes due to Introduction of Optimal Virtual Bidding in an Uncongested
Network
The uncongested case can be regarded as a single-bus model. If the physical

characteristics of loads and generation units are identical in the uncongested network, the optimal
bidding strategy and its expected welfare impact on market participants are identical to the
single-bus model. Throughout identical numerical results, we can assure that the physical
settings of loads and generation units in two-bus and three-bus networks are identical.
As shown in the previous chapter, the uncongested network works as if it is a single bus
network. In the uncongested network, the qualitative relationship between virtual transaction and
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the expected welfare impact is not homogeneous between market participants at the network
level. The results of the expected welfare changes in the single-bus model are the same as the
analytical model, as expected. When the expected demand deviation is zero, the optimal bidding
strategy for the financial trader is a DEC and it makes negative expected welfare change in
consumer and a positive expected welfare change in the producer. Having demand uncertainty,
financial trader’s expected welfare gain is always positive with optimal bidding strategy.
Table 5.10 Expected welfare impact due to the introduction of optimal virtual bidding:
uncongested networks
Consumer
Welfare

Producer
Welfare

Total Social
Welfare

Virtual Trader
Welfare

Uncongested two-bus

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Uncongested three-bus

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

5.2.2

Welfare Changes due to Introduction of Optimal Virtual Bidding in a Congested
Network
In order to estimate the expected welfare impact of the virtual transaction and the

congested network, we need to compare the results between uncongested and congested
networks. As shown in the previous section, the uncongested network runs as if it is a single-bus
network where all the loads and generation units are located on the single bus.
Considering what are the generally expected welfare changes due to congestion without
virtual transaction may provide a good base to understand the effects of having congestion in the
network on market outcomes. The congested line can inhibit the power flow from the cheaper
generation to the load and the network generally has higher price relative to the uncongested
case. The higher price makes the consumer purchase power at a higher cost while make producer
sell at a higher price. Virtual traders can exploit the price differences more with the congested

92
network. Overall, society loses welfare when the network is congested relative to the
uncongested case.
Table 5.11 Expected welfare impact due to the introduction of optimal virtual bidding in the
congested network: two-bus network
Consumer
Welfare

Producer
Welfare

Total Social
Welfare

Virtual Trader
Welfare

Network-wise

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Source Bus

Increase

Decrease

Decrease

Increase

Sink Bus

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Two-bus Network

Note: Comparing the differential qualitative welfare changes due to the introduction of optimal
virtual bidding between uncongested and congested networks

In the two-bus model, when the network is congested, the qualitative nature of the
optimal bidding strategy and its expected welfare impact on consumer and producer at the
network level are the same as the uncongested network. However, the congested line in between
bus 1 and bus 2 amplifies the expected welfare impact of the virtual transaction on the market
participants.
The direction of power flow over the line 1-2 is from bus 1 to bus 2, because bus 1 has
generation fleet with lower generation cost relative to the generation fleet in bus 2. In the
congested network, the system operator cannot dispatch generation units in merit order. This
generation inefficiency creates greater arbitrage opportunities for the financial traders to exploit,
and brings greater price changes due to virtual bids relative to the uncongested case. This
phenomenon amplifies the expected welfare impact in the network. Having the line 1-2
congested, consumers and society lose more while producers and virtuals gain more profit
relative to the uncongested network.
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When the network has a congested line, a source and a sink are buses adjacent to (next to)
the congested line. The source is a bus located at the start point of the predominant power flow
adjacent to the congested line. The sink is a bus located at the end point of the predominant
power flow adjacent to the congested line. In the two-bus network with the power flow from bus
1 to bus 2, bus1 is the source bus and bus 2 is the sink bus.
The expected welfare impacts on market participants of the virtual transaction in the
congested network vary depending on where they are located in the network. The magnitudes of
expected welfare changes differ between the source and sink buses while qualitative expected
welfare changes are maintained. At the sink bus, virtual transactions decrease consumer welfare
and increase producer welfare while virtual trader gains more relative to the source bus in the
congested network.
This heterogeneous expected welfare impact between the source and sink bus is due to
the inability to dispatch the generation units at the source bus to meet the demand in the sink due
to the congested line. Consequently, the generation units at the source commit less MW of
energy while the generation units at the sink commit more MW of energy relative to the
uncongested case.
When more generation units are committed in DA, the more expensive subset of
generation units in RT is available to be online when the realized demand in RT is higher than
the forecasted demand in DA. This situation in the sink bus is more favorable for the financial
trader to arbitrage the price differences that bring further expected welfare changes to market
participants. Hence, MW of virtual bids at sink bus is greater than source bus.
In order to estimate the expected welfare impact of virtual transactions in a congested
network, we need to compare the results between uncongested and congested networks. To

94
compare the quantitative differences, we set the uncongested as a baseline. Relative to the
uncongested case, having a congested line in the network further decreases consumer and social
welfare while increases producer and financial welfare. At the source bus, consumer welfare
increases and producer welfare decreases because of virtual trading when the network is
congested relative to the uncongested network. At the sink bus, in contrast to the source bus,
expected welfare of consumers decrease and producers increase.
5.2.3

Welfare Changes due to Introduction of Optimal Virtual Bidding in a Congested
Network with Loop Flow
The two-bus and three bus models have differences in generation dispatch to deal with

congested network due to loop flow. In the two-bus case, when the line is congested, the buses
are disconnected and the generators at each bus must meet the demand in their local bus
independently. In the three-bus case, when the line is congested due to the parallel power flow
from bus one to bus two, the system operator can response differently. To dispatch more volume
from the generation units with lower marginal cost at bus one so they can be delivered to bus
two, the system operator can dispatch more generation at bus two so the parallel power flow
from bus two to bus one can lower the offset the line congestion.
The congested line can limit the power flow from source to sink in the three-bus network
models, as in the two-bus model. The differences in the power flow between the two-bus and
three-bus model are loop-flow. The power flow in the three-bus network are power flows not
only directly via line 1-2, but also through a parallel path along line 1-2 and line 1-3 to line 3-2
due to loop flow. The relative differences of line reactance determine the magnitude of power
flow on each parallel path.
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Table 5.12 Expected welfare impact due to the introduction of optimal virtual bidding in the
congested network: three-bus networks
Consumer
Welfare

Producer
Welfare

Total Social
Welfare

Virtual Trader
Welfare

Network-wise

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Source Bus

Increase

Decrease

Decrease

Increase

Sink Bus

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Other Bus

Decrease

N/A

Decrease

Increase

Network-wise

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Source Bus

Increase

Decrease

Decrease

Increase

Sink Bus

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Other Bus

N/A

Increase

Increase

Increase

Three: Load Divide

Three: Gen Divide

Note: Comparing the differential qualitative welfare changes due to the introduction of optimal
virtual bidding between uncongested and congested networks

In the electricity network, the system operator is not able to control the magnitude of
power flow on the transmission lines. When the system operator plans to dispatch generation unit
at bus 1, even though the capacity of line 1-2 is limited and line 1-3 is unlimited, they must
consider the MW of power flow on line 1-2 and 1-3 governed by loop-flow. In this context, the
congestion on the line 1-2 limits the power flow on the line 1-3. Having congestion in the threebus network limits the merit order dispatch and may increase the cost of electricity generation
and consequently, the cleared price. The qualitative expected welfare impacts of having
congestion in the three-bus network are not dissimilar from the two-bus model results.
The network-wise expected welfare impacts of virtual bids on market participants from
the congested three-bus load divide and the three-bus generation unit divide models are
qualitatively identical to the results from the two-bus model. The different physical
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characteristics between two- and three-bus models do not affect the qualitative expected welfare
impact.
As in the case of the two-bus model, having congestion in the three-bus networks also
limit the merit order dispatch and this inefficiency creates greater arbitrage opportunities for the
financial traders to exploit. The congested network also amplifies the expected welfare impact.
Having the line 1-2 congested, consumer and society lose more while producer gains and virtual
bids gain more profit relative to the uncongested network.
Similar to the two-bus model, the impact on market participants of the virtual transaction
in the congested network varies depending on where they are located in the network in the threebus models. While expected qualitative expected welfare changes are maintained, the
magnitudes of expected welfare change depend on whether they are located at the source or sink
buses.
The virtual trader uses the heterogeneous bidding behavior at the sink and the source
buses. More DECs are bid at the sink bus relative to the source bus to exploit the more profitable
opportunities at the sink bus where greater MW of generation units are committed in the DA
market.
Relative to the uncongested case, by the financial trader, having a congested line in the
network decreases consumer and total social welfare while increasing producer and financial
welfare. At the source bus, due to introducing virtual, consumer welfare increases and producer
welfare decreases when the network is congested relative to the uncongested case. At the sink
bus, relative to the sink bus, consumer welfare decreases, and producer and financial trader
welfare increases when there is a congestion due to the virtual transaction.
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The three-bus models, obviously, have one more bus than the two-bus model and it is not
the source or sink bus. The other bus (bus 3) can have load in the load divide model or
generation unit in the generation unit divide model. The expected welfare impact of the virtual
transaction at the other bus is defined by who are the market participants on that bus. If the load
is located on the other bus, the expected welfare of market participants at the other bus will be
decreased by virtual bids.
5.2.4

Welfare Changes due to Introduction of Optimal Virtual Bidding in an Occasionally
Congested Network
A network can have a different status such as always uncongested and occasionally

congested depending on the relative differences of magnitude between the MW of line capacity
and the MW of power flow on that line. When the line capacity is far greater than the power flow
in DA, the network will be certainly uncongested in DA and RT markets. When the line capacity
is far less than the power flow in DA, the network will be certainly congested in DA and RT
markets. However, when the line capacity is a little bit less than the DA power flow in the
absence of the line capacity limit, the DA market will experience congestion while the RT
market will have congestion occasionally, depending on the realized demand in RT. On the other
hand, when the line capacity is a little bit greater than the DA power flow, the DA market will
experience no congestion while the RT market may have congestion occasionally, similarly,
depending on the realized demand in the RT market.
In the case of the occasionally congested transmission line, its qualitative expected
welfare impact on market participants is similar to the always congested network. Hence,
describing estimated qualitative and quantitative changes in bidding strategy and welfare impact
in the occasionally congested case would be redundant. Instead, we focus on the trend of the
quantitative change as the line capacity increases from more to less tightly constrained. The trend
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can be divided into two regions, where line capacity is below DA power flow and where line
capacity is above DA power flow.
Table 5.13 Expected trend of welfare impact due to the introduction of optimal virtual bidding in
the occasionally congested two-bus network (Congested in DA and congested part of the time in
RT)
Consumer
Welfare

Producer
Welfare

Total Social
Welfare

Virtual
Trader
Welfare

Bid
Quantity
(MW)

Network-wise

Decreasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Less DECs

Source

Increasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Less DECs

Sink

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

Increasing

More DECs

Two-bus Network

Note: These are the trends of expected welfare changes as the line capacity is increasing while
the network is congested in the day ahead and only congested part of the time in real time.

When the line capacity is below the DA power flow and increasing from the point of the
line capacity that creates congestion all the time in DA and RT towards the point of the line
capacity that is MW of DA power flow, the network is always congested in DA and the chance
of having congestion in RT is decreasing relative to when the line capacity is well below the
MW of DA power flow, when the network is always congested in RT.
If the trend of the welfare impact is ‘Decreasing’, it represents that the welfare impact
due to the introduction of optimal virtual bidding is decreasing on the specific agent along with
the increasing line capacity. The start point of the trend is when the line capacity is well below
the MW of DA power flow so the network is always congested in DA and RT and the end point
of the trend is when the line capacity first achieves a zero shadow price, at which point the
network is occasionally congested in RT.
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In this case, the virtual trader’s profit is increasing with the line capacity. When the MW
of line capacity is getting closer to the MW of DA power flow, financial trader tends to bid more
DECs at the sink and the MW of power flow in DA becomes greater than without virtual bids.
The financial trader gradually bids fewer DECs at source bus and more DECs at sink bus,
and the overall volume of bids decreases. Decreasing volume of DECs at source bus shifts the
magnitude of expected welfare change of market participants. Consumer welfare is negative, and
the magnitude of expected welfare change increases as line capacity increases relative to the
uncongested case. The producer welfare change shows the opposite trend to the consumer
welfare. Relative to the uncongested case, the producer expected welfare impact of virtual
trading is positive, and decreases with the increasing line capacity. Social welfare changes due to
virtual trading are negative and decrease as line capacity increases.
Table 5.14 Expected trend of welfare impact due to the introduction of optimal virtual bidding in
the occasionally congested two-bus network (Uncongested in DA and congested part of the time
in RT)
Consumer
Welfare

Producer
Welfare

Total Social
Welfare

Virtual
Trader
Welfare

Bid
Quantity
(MW)

Two
Network-wise
Increasing Decreasing
Increasing
Decreasing
Less DECs
Source
Decreasing Increasing
Increasing
Decreasing
More INCs
Sink
Increasing Decreasing
Increasing
Increasing
More DECs
Note: These are the trends of expected welfare changes as the line capacity is increasing while
the network is uncongested in the day ahead and only congested part of the time in real time.

When the line capacity is increasing and above the DA power flow, the network is
uncongested in DA and the chance of having congestion in RT is further decreasing. In this case,
the optimal bidding strategy of virtual trader differs and profits are higher when the line capacity
is close to the DA power flow.
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If the trend of the welfare impact is ‘Increasing,’ it represents that the welfare impact due
to the introduction of optimal virtual bidding is increasing on the specific agent along the
increasing line capacity. The starting point of the trend is when the line capacity is active but
with zero shadow price in DA, which results in an occasionally congested line in RT, and the end
point of the trend is when the line capacity is sufficient so that the line is always uncongested in
DA and RT.
In the case that the MW of line capacity is getting greater than the MW of DA power
flow, the financial trader tends to bid more virtual products on the network. When the line
capacity is increasing and still close to the DA power flow, the profit-maximizing strategy of
financial trader becomes bidding virtual supply at the source and virtual demand at the sink in
order to increase the MW of power flow in DA. When the line capacity becomes far greater, the
bidding volume of INCs and DECs at the source and sink bus, respectively, drops.
As the chance of having congestion in the network is decreasing as line capacity
increases, the consumer, and social welfare are increasing while the producer welfare is
decreasing at the aggregate network level. The financial trader tends to bid more INCs at the
source bus and more DECs at the sink bus to incur congestion in DA market. At the source bus,
along with the increasing line capacity, the price difference between DA and RT markets is
enlarged due to the increased MW of committed and dispatched generation. Consumer welfare
drops while producer and social welfare increase due to the widened price spread. At the sink
bus, along with the increasing line capacity, the price differences between DA and RT become
smaller because more power is flowing from the source bus. Hence, consumer and total social
welfare at the sink bus are increasing while producer welfare is decreasing.
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In this regard, the change in line capacity, especially when it is near to the MW of power
flow without virtual bids, influences the bidding strategy and consequently the expected welfare
impact on market participants. When the line capacity is near the power flow in DA, the financial
trader’s bidding strategy causes congestion in DA, which would not be congested without
financial traders. This bidding strategy creates a distortion in the welfare of market participants
that decrease the consumer and social welfare while increasing the producer and financial trader
welfare.
Table 5.15 Expected trend of welfare impact due to the introduction of optimal virtual bidding in
the occasionally congested three-bus networks (Congested in DA and congested part of the time
in RT)
Consumer
Welfare

Producer
Welfare

Total Social
Welfare

Virtual
Trader
Welfare

Bid Quantity
(MW)

Network-wise

Decreasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Less bids

Source

Increasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Less DECs

Sink

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

Increasing

More DECs

Other

Decreasing

N/A

Decreasing

Decreasing

Less DECs

Network-wise

Decreasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Less bids

Source

Increasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Less DECs

Sink

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

Increasing

More DECs

Other

N/A

Decreasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Less DECs

Three: Load Divide

Three: Gen Divide

Note: These are the trends of expected welfare changes as the line capacity is increasing while
the network is congested in the day ahead and only congested part of the time in real time.

In the case of the occasionally congested transmission line in the three-bus models, the
bidding strategy and its expected welfare impact on market participants are generally similar to
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the congested network case. The virtual transactions increase producer welfare and decrease
consumer and social welfare while financial trader gains profit.
We can focus on the trend of a quantitative change as the line capacity increases. The
trend can be divided into two segments, when line capacity is below DA power flow and when
line capacity is above DA power flow.
As the line capacity gets closer to the DA power flow, financial trader tends to bid more
DECs on the sink and the MW of power flow in DA becomes greater than without virtual bids.
From this bidding strategy, the virtual trader is gaining more profit over the increasing MW of
line capacity than when the network is always congested in RT with the line capacity well below
MW of power flow in DA.
Table 5.16 Expected trend of welfare impact due to the introduction of optimal virtual bidding in
the occasionally congested three-bus network (Uncongested in DA and congested part of the
time in RT)
Consumer
Welfare

Producer
Welfare

Total Social
Welfare

Virtual
Trader
Welfare

Bid Quantity
(MW)

Network-wise

Increasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

More bids

Source

Decreasing

Increasing

Increasing

Decreasing

More INCs

Sink

Increasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

More DECs

Other

Increasing

N/A

Increasing

Decreasing

Less DECs

Network-wise

Increasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

More bids

Source

Decreasing

Increasing

Increasing

Decreasing

More INCs

Sink

Increasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

More DECs

Other

N/A

Decreasing

Increasing

Increasing

More INCs

Three: Load Divide

Three: Gen Divide

Note: These are the trends of expected welfare changes as the line capacity is increasing while
the network is uncongested in the day ahead and only congested part of the time in real time.
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In this case, the results from the three-bus models are similar to the ones from the twobus model. At the network level, the expected consumer and social welfare change is generally
negative and decreasing while the expected producer welfare change is positive however
decreasing by the virtual transaction. The virtual trader has increasing profit. As from the twobus model, at the sink bus, the consumer tends to lose more and the producer tends to gain more
relative to the market participants at the source bus.
Contrary to the above case, when the line capacity is above the DA power flow and
increasing, the network is uncongested in DA and the chance of having congestion in RT is
further decreasing. The virtual trader has increased profit while the line capacity is near the MW
of power flow in DA.
In this case, as shown from the two-bus model results, trends of expected welfare changes
differ. The qualitative changes are as before, however, consumer and society are gaining while
producer and financial trader are losing expected welfare in the network over the increasing MW
of line capacity. The heterogeneous impacts are generally opposite to the previous type of
occasional congestion, line capacity is increasing and below DA power flow. At the sink bus, the
consumer tends to gain more and the producer tends to lose more relative to the source bus.

5.3

Two- and Three-bus Models Simulation
We derive the results of expected welfare impacts from specific cases of the two- and

three-bus models and the results are consistent across the cases. Nonetheless, it is yet too early to
generalize the expected welfare impact by the virtual transaction in the congested network since
some other network specifications may show different results.
For this reason, we will run multiple simulations with different configurations of the twoand three-bus network and compare the expected welfare impact due to the introducing optimal
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virtual bids and without virtual in all the randomly generated cases. Then we will derive robust
expected welfare impacts on the simplified electricity network with congestion based on the
wide range of randomized parameters in the simulation.
5.3.1

Two- and Three-bus Models Simulation Configuration
In order to generate random cases to run the simulation, we use the two-bus network for

the base case to generate random parameters to create a diverse set of network configurations.
First, the random variables from the uniform distribution of [0.3, 3] will multiply the loads in the
bus 1 and bus 2, respectively (Load (‘1’) = 200 * Uniform[0.3 , 3], Load (‘2’) = 200 *
Uniform[0.3 , 3]). The MW of load at bus 1 can be greater or lesser than the MW of the load in
bus 2. After generating random load, we run the case without virtual trader and without line
capacity limits, which is an uncongested case and measure the power flow on the line from bus 1
to bus 2.
Based on the generated specification of the two-bus network, three versions of three-bus
models are generated: load divide, generation unit divide and load and generation unit divide.
The load divide version is generated by separating the load at bus 1. The load in bus 1 becomes
the loads in bus 1 multiplied by the random scaler from the uniform distribution of [0.1, 1]
(Load(‘1’)_LoadDivide = Load (‘1’) * uniform[0.1,1]). The load in bus 3 is generated by
subtracting the random scalar from 1 and multiply it to the load in bus 1 (Load(‘3’)_LoadDivide
= Load (‘1’) * (1-uniform[0.1,1])).
The generation divide version is based on the generated specification of the two-bus
network. The generation units in bus 1 are separated into bus 1 and bus 3. The supply function
slope in DA in bus 1 in the generation unit divide model becomes the supply function slope in
DA in bus 1 in the two-bus model multiply the random scaler from the uniform distribution of
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[0.1, 1] (b1(‘1’)_GenDivide = b1 (‘1’) * uniform[0.1,1]). The supply function slope in DA at bus
1 in the generation unit divide model is determined by subtracting the random scalar from 1 and
multiplying the supply function slope in DA in bus 1 in the two-bus model (b1(‘3’)_GenDivide =
b1 (‘1’) * (1-uniform[0.1,1])).
The load and generation divide three-bus version is generated by combining the load
divide and generation divide version. Hence, the one case from the two-bus model and three
cases from the three-bus model, become a set of network cases that are generated to be
compatible with each other. The market outcomes, such as price, the overall MW of virtual bids
in the network, and the expected welfare impacts are identical among the four compatible cases.
The magnitude of line reactance in the generated three-bus network cases is adjusted so
that they can have the same MW of power flow from bus 1 to bus 2 in the DA market without
virtual trader. The congested case is defined by setting the line capacity at 80% of power flow on
line from bus 1 to bus 2 in the DA market without virtual trader and congested in the RT market.
We measure the expected welfare impact in both the uncongested and the congested networks.
5.3.2

Two- and Three-bus Model Simulations Results: Welfare Impacts of Virtual and
Congested Network
The purpose of using a simulation approach is to check whether the results obtained from

the specific configurations of the two- and three-bus network models can be extended and
generalized by the randomly generated multiple cases. The previous models with a specific
network with zero expected demand deviations resulted that virtual transactions decrease the
expected welfare of the consumer and society, and increase producer welfare, while the virtual
trader always profits. Comparing the uncongested and congested network cases indicates that the
expected welfare impact of virtual transactions on market participants tend to be amplified by
line congestion.
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Table 5.17 Expected welfare impacts of virtual and congested networks in the Two- and Three
Bus simulation
Frequency of expected welfare increase due
to virtual transactions
Total
Virtual
Consumer
Producer
Social
Trader
Welfare
Welfare
Welfare Welfare

Magnitude of expected welfare change due
to virtual transactions
Total
Virtual
Consumer Producer
Social
Trader
Welfare
Welfare
Welfare Welfare

CV-C: Expected welfare impact due to virtual in a congested network
0.0%

100.0%

0.0%

100.0%

-2151

465

-1687

14

-747

5

UV-U: Expected welfare impact due to virtual in an uncongested network
0.0%
100.0%
Note: Iteration = 100

0.0%

100.0%

-1147

400

Table 5.17 summarizes the results of simulation at the network level. According to the
columns for the frequency of expected welfare increased due to virtual, the expected welfare
impacts in both uncongested and congested cases are consistent with the results from the
previous results of specified models. There is no case when virtual transactions in the network
increase consumer and total social welfare, and interestingly virtual transactions always increase
producer welfare. The virtual trader always makes profits.
The averaged magnitude of the expected welfare changes due to the virtual transaction
are displayed in the right section of Table 5.17 for four versions of networks: two-bus, three-bus
load divide, three-bus generation divide and three-bus generation and load divide. While the
qualitative impacts are consistent across the uncongested and congested cases, the magnitudes
differ. The congested line tends to magnify the expected welfare impacts that the consumer and
society lose more while the producer and virtual trader gain more.
Using a simulation approach enables us to obtain robust evidence of expected welfare
impacts on the different locations in the network. Among the number of buses in the network,
source and sink are buses adjacent to (next to) each congested line. The source bus located at the
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origin of the predominant power flow adjacent to the congested line. The sink bus is a bus
located at the destination of the predominant power flow adjacent to the congested line.
The results obtained from specific configurations from the two- and three-bus network
models suggest that having virtual transactions in the congested network have heterogeneous
expected welfare impact on the market participants adjacent to the congested line. A financial
trader in the network decreases consumer welfare more at the sink bus relative to the source bus
while increasing producer welfare more in the sink bus relative to the source bus.
Table 5.18 Heterogeneous expected welfare impacts of virtual in the congested network in the
Two- and Three Bus simulation
Frequency of expected welfare increase
due to virtual transactions

Magnitude of expected welfare change
due to virtual transactions

Consumer Producer Social

Consumer Producer Social Virtual

Virtual

CV-C: Expected welfare impact due to virtual in a congested network
Network

0.0%

100.0%

0.0%

100.0%

-2151

465

-1687

14

Source

2.3%

97.5%

11.8%

99.3%

-340

111

-230

2

Sink

0.0%

100.0%

3.0%

100.0%

-1622

310

-1312

10

Other
0.0%
99.5% 60.0% 100.0%
-378
88
-194
3
Note: Iteration = 100, Source and sink are buses adjacent to (next to) each congested line. The
source is a bus located at the start point of the predominant power flow adjacent to the congested
line. The sink is a bus located at the end point of the predominant power flow adjacent to the
congested line.

The simulation results also show that the expected welfare impact of the virtual
transaction is heterogeneous in the congested network, supporting the results from the specified
two- and three-bus models. The expected impacts for the consumer and the producer are clear.
Virtual transaction generally decreases the consumer welfare while increasing the expected
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producer welfare regardless of their locations in the network. At a sink bus, the producer and
financial trader tend to gain more while consumer and society tend to lose more relative to the
source bus.
For the other bus, in the three-bus networks, we randomly distribute the magnitude of
load, the slope of generation unit, or both to be located at that bus. Virtual transactions tend to
decrease expected consumer welfare, and increase the expected producer welfare. The social
welfare at that bus, the magnitude of the expected social welfare impact is negative and more
than half of the time it is decreased. The financial trader makes a profit on the other bus.
5.3.3

Two- and Three-bus Model Simulations Results: Welfare Impacts of Virtual and
Loop Flow
One of the benefits of the simulation approach is that it permits quantification of the

expected welfare impact. It allows comparison of the magnitude of welfare impact between
different types of models. In the deterministic case, the qualitative welfare impact of introducing
virtual trading in the two- and three-bus networks are identical to the market participants.
In the overall network, the welfare impact of introducing optimal virtual bidding on
market participants is not vastly different due to having loop flow in the network. The slightly
amplified welfare impacts on market participants may be explained by having an additional bus
to locate physical assets. In the three-bus network with generation divide, the producer has
reduced positive welfare since there are more generation assets that can be utilized in the
congested network. In the three-bus network with load divide, the consumer loses more due to
one more load node with stochastic demand in the real-time market.
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Table 5.19 Expected welfare impacts of virtual in the congested network in the Two-Bus (No
loop flow) and Three Bus (Loop flow) simulation
The magnitude of expected welfare change due to virtual
transaction at the network level
Expected
Expected
Expected
Expected
Total
Virtual
Consumer
Producer
Social
Trader
Welfare
Welfare
Welfare
Welfare
CV-C: Expected welfare impact due to virtual in a congested network
Two

-2103

439

-1664

15

Three: Gen divide

-2123

444

-1679

15

Three: Load divide

-2256

503

-1753

13

Three: Gen + Load divide

-2123

473

-1651

14

Note: Iteration = 100

5.4

Two- and Three-bus Models Result Summary
In the cases of the uncongested network, the expected welfare impacts of the optimal

virtual bids on market participants show consistent results with the results of algebraic analysis
of the single bus case. In all cases, the optimal virtual bids obtain surplus from its transactions.
With the zero expected demand deviation, the consumer loses and the producer gains.
In both two-bus and three-bus models the expected welfare impact is qualitatively
identical to the uncongested case. The impact of virtual bids in congested two-bus and three-bus
cases maintain the directional change in the expected welfare of market participants, yet
amplified, relative to the uncongested cases. In the case of congestion, the system operator has a
different strategy of dispatching generation in merit order to deal with line congestion in the twobus and three-bus cases.
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The congestion happens all the time when the line capacity is well below the expected
range of uncertain demand, while the congestion happens at no time when the line capacity is
well above the expected range of uncertain demand. Congestion happens occasionally when the
line capacity lies in the middle of the expected range of uncertain demand. In this case, the
qualitative welfare impact is maintained while the magnitude of the impact is changing over the
incremental line capacity change.
Table 5.20 Expected trend of welfare impact due to the introduction of optimal virtual bidding in
two-bus network
Consumer
Welfare

Producer
Welfare

Total Social
Welfare

Virtual
Trader
Welfare

Network-wise
Congested
Occasionally Congested:
Capacity < Power Flow in DA
Occasionally Congested:
Capacity > Power Flow in DA
Uncongested

More
Decrease

More
Increase

More
Decrease

More
Increase

Decreasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

Less
Decrease

Less
Increase

Less
Decrease

Less
Increase

More
Decrease

More
Increase

More
Decrease

More
Increase

Increasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Increasing

Decreasing

Less
Decrease

Less
Increase

Less
Decrease

Less
Increase

More
Decrease

More
Increase

More
Decrease

More
Increase

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Increasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Increasing

Less
Decrease

Less
Increase

Less
Decrease

Less
Increase

Source Bus
Congested
Occasionally Congested:
Capacity < Power Flow in DA
Occasionally Congested:
Capacity > Power Flow in DA
Uncongested
Sink Bus
Congested
Occasionally Congested:
Capacity < Power Flow in DA
Occasionally Congested:
Capacity > Power Flow in DA
Uncongested
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In the occasionally congested case when the line capacity is lower than power flow in the
day ahead market, the congestion happens more often than when the line capacity is greater than
the power flow in the day ahead market. If the line capacity is far greater than the power flow in
the day ahead market and large enough to not to constrain the power flow, the network is
uncongested all the time. The expected probability of congestion by demand uncertainty and line
capacity change the optimal bidding strategy for the financial traders, and it shows a certain trend
of welfare change in magnitude while the qualitative welfare impact is maintained.
Table 5.21 Welfare impacts of virtual in the congested network in the Two- and Three Bus
Simulation
Frequency of expected welfare increase
due to virtual transactions
Consumer

Producer

Social

Virtual

Magnitude of expected welfare change
due to virtual transactions
Consumer

Producer Social Virtual

CV-C: Expected welfare impact due to virtual in a congested network
Network

0.0%

100.0%

0.0%

100.0%

-2,151

465

-1,687

14

Source

2.3%

97.5%

11.8%

99.3%

-340

111

-230

2

Sink

0.0%

100.0%

3.0%

100.0%

-1,622

310

-1,312

10

Other

0.0%

99.5%

60.0%

100.0%

-378

88

-194

3

-747

5

UV-U: Expected welfare impact due to virtual in an uncongested network
Network

0.0%

100.0%

0.0%

100.0%

-1,147

400

Note: Iteration = 100, Source and sink are buses adjacent to (next to) each congested line. The
source is a bus located at the start point of the predominant power flow adjacent to the congested
line. The sink is a bus located at the start point of the predominant power flow adjacent to the
congested line.

We derive the estimation from specific cases of the two- and three-bus models and the
results of expected welfare impacts are consistent across the cases. However, they may not
support to obtain robust expected welfare impact by the virtual transaction in the congested
network since some other network specifications may show different results.
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For this reason, we implement multiple simulations with different configurations of the
two- and three-bus network and compare the expected welfare impact between the uncongested
and uncongested cases in all the randomly generated cases. Then we derive robust expected
welfare impacts on the simplified electricity network with congestion, which are consistent with
the results from the specific cases.
Overall, at the network level, having virtual transactions generally decreases expected
consumer and social welfare while increasing expected producer welfare. Having congestion in
the network amplifies the expected welfare impact of the virtual transaction, the consumer and
society lose more and the producer gain more. When the network is congested, the expected
welfare impact is heterogeneous and depending on where the market participants are located
relative to the congested line. At the sink bus, the consumer and society tend to lose more while
the producer tends to gain more relative to the source bus. At the other bus, in general, the
consumer loses and producer generally loses while the expected welfare impact on the society is
ambiguous.
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CHAPTER 6.

WELFARE ANALYSIS IN THE ISO-NE TEST
NETWORK

The previous chapter analyzed two- and three-bus networks using simulation to estimate
the welfare impacts of the introduction of virtual transactions in a congested network. The twobus network is the simplest network that includes transmission. The three-bus network is the
simplest network that can incorporate a loop, and hence where Kirchhoff’s Laws governing loop
flows in an electrical network apply.
Using these simple electricity networks provides a “sandbox” to facilitate understanding
the impact of the introduction of virtual transactions in an electricity network with the capacityconstrained transmission. Based on the simulation analysis, we estimated the welfare impacts of
the virtual transaction on the market participants both in aggregate and depending on their
location in the network relative to the congestion.
However, real electricity networks are far more complicated than our sandbox models,
with more buses and transmission lines and many possible patterns of congestion. The financial
trader needs to design an optimal bidding strategy for virtual products that account for the
complexities of the network and the potential for congestion from a holistic perspective.
The principal question at hand is whether the lessons regarding virtual trader behavior
and the impacts on market participants’ welfare extend from the simple networks to larger, more
complex networks. To facilitate addressing this question, we employ a stylized version of the
network of the ISO-NE in a simulation context under alternative loadings.
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6.1

ISO-NE Test System
The organization of this section is as follows. The first subsection addresses the network

test system configuration in terms of zonal, aggregate transmission lines; zonal aggregate supply
functions for both the cases when all generators are available (i.e. day ahead) and when only
peaking units are available (i.e. real-time); and independently observed of zonal demand.
6.1.1

ISO-NE Test System Configuration
We will use the ISO-NE Test System developed by Krishnamurthy, Li, and Tesfatsion

(2016) as the basis for our analysis. The test system models the ISO New England (ISO-NE)
wholesale electricity market spanning a mix of generating companies and load-serving entities
that operate in an eight-zone aggregated transmission grid. The generation, load, and
transmission line attributes in the test system are taken from ISO-NE data developed by
Krishnamurthy, Li, and Tesfatsion (2016).

to n
SE Mass
)

~

'
R hod e Is l and

Figure 6.1 The eight-zone ISO-NE Test System (Krishnamurthy, Li, and Tesfatsion, 2016)
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The ISO-NE Test System suits the purposes of this study, for several reasons. First, it is
substantially larger than our sandbox models. Second, it is relatively complex, incorporating a
number of loops, making loop flow a potentially important phenomenon. Third, while highly
aggregated it has a clear basis in the real world, and fourth, unlike many other ISO/RTO-scale
systems, the basic model is open source and readily accessible for replication purposes.
ISO-NE is part of the Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) reliability region.
The states covered by ISO-NE are aggregated into eight load zones: Connecticut (CT), Maine
(ME), New Hampshire (NH), Rhode Island (RI), Vermont (VT), Northeastern
Massachusetts/Boston (NEMA/BOST), Southeastern Massachusetts (SEMA) and
Western/Central Massachusetts (WCMA). Reflecting this configuration, the eight zones in the
ISO-NE Test System are connected by twelve transmission lines as indicated in Figure 6.1.
Table 6.1 Transmission line benchmark values for the ISO-NE Test System (Krishnamurthy, Li,
and Tesfatsion, 2016)
From Zone
ME
VT
VT
WCMA
NEMA/BOST
NEMA/BOST
NEMA/BOST
WCMA
WCMA
NEMA/BOST
CT
SEMA

To Zone
NH
NH
WCMA
NH
WCMA
NH
SEMA
CT
RI
RI
RI
RI

Resistance
(ohms)
19.09
16.6
24.9
14.28
13.28
10.46
4.98
4.98
10.79
6.64
10.62
3.32

Reactance
(per unit)
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.01
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The structural attributes, resistance, and reactance benchmark values for the 12-line test
system network are developed by Krishnamurthy, Li, and Tesfatsion (2016) and are set to
approximate the function of the aggregation of the actual lines between zones. The key factors
that determine these values include the length of each line, conductor type, conductor bundling
and transposition (Krishnamurthy, Li, and Tesfatsion 2016). The calculated benchmark values
for the transmission lines are represented in Table 6.1.
The load scenarios for our simulation analysis are based on ISO-NE March hourly load
data for 2004-2006 (Krishnamurthy, Li, and Tesfatsion, 2016). These data are reported
separately for each of ISO-NE’s eight load zones. Summary statistics for these 90 hourly load
scenarios are displayed in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Load data summary (Krishnamurthy, Li, and Tesfatsion, 2016)
Name

Avg

S.D

Min

Max

CT

1,343

87

1,172

1,521

WCMA

1,337

102

1,090

1,609

VT

683

42

598

786

SEMA

3,715

294

2,870

4,493

RI

923

74

707

1,107

NEMA/BOST

1,730

137

1,353

2,173

NH

2,068

174

1,576

2,535

ME

2,855

221

2,291

3,541

ISO-NE has a total installed capacity of 32,000MW with 151 thermal generation units
providing roughly 88% of the total capacity. In the study of Krishnamurthy, Li, and Tesfatsion,
(2016), all non-thermal generation units are excluded. In addition, 76 of the 151 thermal
generation units were selected in their study for inclusion in the benchmark generation mix with
each treated as an independent generator in there study. These 76 generators have a combined
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installed generation capacity of 23,100MW and account for 72% of the actual ISO-NE capacity.
In Krishnamurthy, Li, and Tesfatsion, (2016), the dispatch cost functions for each of the 76
generators are assumed to be quadratic and the parameters were derived from ISO-NE generation
block-offer schedule data by fuel type.
Table 6.3 Generator capacity by type and zone
Capacity (MW)
Zone

All

Baseload

Peaker

CT

5,694.6

2,860.4

2,834.2

WCMA

1,227.7

144.4

1,083.3

VT

620.2

620.2

0.0

SEMA

2,962.7

684.7

2,278.0

RI

5,026.1

1,099.5

3,926.6

NEMA/BOST

0.0

0.0

0.0

NH

2,247.6

1,339.4

908.2

ME
5,321.4
311.8
5,009.6
Note: VT does not have peaker generators and NEMA/BOST does not have generators in the
Test System.

We divide the benchmark generators into two groups, peakers and base (non-peakers).
The peakers are generators fueled by natural gas or oil. The base generators are fueled by nuclear
or coal. Using quadratic cost functions of each generator in each zone, we developed the zonal
stacked value of zonal generation cost to meet the fixed demand in that zone by solving cost
minimization (economic dispatch) problem for each zone. Then, we fit either the exponential or
the quadratic functional form for aggregated peakers and aggregated base (non-peakers), at the
zonal level. We fit a zonal curve to the aggregated cost function for all the generators located in
that specific zone.
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Supply curves for all generation units at the zonal level are fitted to this data to reflect the
supply response in the day ahead market. Additional supply curves only for peaking units at the
zonal level are fitted to the regional price/quantity data to reflect the supply response in the realtime market. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 represent the capacity and the fitted supply function for each
type of generator at the zonal level.
Table 6.4 Generator supply functions and estimated parameters by type and zone
All
Type

Peaker

parameter_a parameter_b

Type

parameter_a parameter_b

CT

Exp

5,715

0.0008

Quad

42

0.0454

WCMASS

Exp

13,061

0.0025

Exp

22,917

0.0024

VT

Quad

11

0.0002

N/A

N/A

N/A

SEMASS

Exp

13,174

0.0011

Quad

14

0.0474

RI
NEMA/
BOST
NH

Exp

5,274

0.0009

Exp

7,749

0.0010

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Exp

5,037

0.0010

Quad

14

0.0265

ME
Exp
18,294
0.0007
Exp
22,301
0.0007
Note: Exp is Exponential and Quad is Quadratic. VT does not have peaker generators and
NEMASSBOST does not have generators in the Test System. When the type is quadratic, the
fitted function with generation g (MW) is parameter_a + parameter_b*g2. When the type is
exponential, the fitted function is parameter_a*(exp(parameter_b*g)-1)

6.1.2

ISO-NE Test System Modeling
In order to assess the results of the welfare impacts of introducing optimal virtual bidding

obtained from the simpler electricity network models, we adapt the electricity network test case
based on the structural attributes and supply/demand data of ISO New England.
First, we need to incorporate DA and RT market models using the different functional
forms of supply function and different type of generators, particularly pasting Real-Time inverse
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supply function to the generated DA supply function. For each zone, the cleared MW of
generation in the DA market set the zonal DA inverse supply function. Fitting the parameters for
the DA inverse supply function uses all the generating units. Fitting the parameters for the
peaker-only inverse supply function in RT uses peaker generation units.
The inverse supply function for the Real-Time market is identical to the inverse supply
function in DA when the realized RT demand is less than forecasted DA demand. The RT
inverse supply function is vertically shifted so that at the cleared DA MW quantity the function
is continuous. To the left of the cleared DA quantity, the functional form is identical to the DA
inverse supply, while to the right of the DA cleared quantity, the functional form is identical to
the RT inverse supply that has been shifted vertically to get continuity. Note that this function,
while continuous, is not differentiable at the DA cleared quantity. The continuous inverse supply
function in RT is vertically shifted peaker-only inverse supply function on top of (right next to)
the DA inverse supply function when the realized RT demand is greater than forecasted DA
demand.
If RT demand lies below the DA cleared quantity, then the DA supply function defines
the change in price associated with the demand deviation. This is because the cleared DA units
can simply be dispatched downward in merit order. However, if RT demand is above DA cleared
demand, then additional units must be dispatched, and in RT only peaking units are available for
dispatch in addition to those dispatched in the DA market. Thus, if RT demand lies above DA
cleared quantity, then the pasted RT supply function defines the change in price associated with
the demand deviation.
For the case of demand deviation, we focus on the case of a zero expected demand
deviation case. We use empirical observation of demand from hour 19 in March over years from
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2004 to 2006 for the real-time demand with the mean of the observations defining the DA
demand. Each of these 90 observations was assigned an equal probability of 1/90 in the real-time
market.
The revised bilevel formulation and the KKT reformulation, based on the formulations
for two- and three-bus models, to incorporate the different functional forms of supply function
and different type of generators is presented in Appendix C.
6.1.3

ISO-NE Test System Example Case: Uncongested Network
The initial scenario for the test system is based on the situation where there is no

congestion. Setting the capacity of each line so large that the capacity constraints cannot be
binding results in an uncongested network, which functions the same as a single-bus network
where all the generation units and loads are located at the same place. 3 When the expected
demand deviation between DA and RT is zero, the optimal bidding strategy for the financial
trader is to bid virtual demands, or DECs.
Table 6.5 displays the results of the uncongested ISO-NE Test System. At the network
level, having a virtual transaction on the uncongested network decreases consumer welfare and
total social welfare while increasing producer welfare. These results also apply at the bus level,
although total social welfare at the bus level is heterogeneous, depending on the magnitude of the
zonal demand and generation supply function at that bus.

3

In order to make the network uncongested, we impose very large line capacity and the network has no chance to be
congested. We could lower the load in DA and RT, however that makes it hard to make a comparison of the welfare
impact between congested cases.
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Table 6.5 Quantitative welfare impact of introducing virtual bidding in the uncongested network

-87

Expected
Virtual
Trader
Welfare
26

Expected
Bid
Quantity
(MW)
-10

556

312

3

-1.2

-243

146

-98

3

-1.2

VT

-124

113

-11

3

-1.2

SEMA

-676

331

-345

3

-1.2

RI

-168

573

405

3

-1.2

NEMA/BOST

-315

N/A

-315

3

-1.2

NH

-376

410

34

3

-1.2

ME

-520

451

-68

3

-1.2

Expected
Consumer
Welfare

Expected
Producer
Welfare

Expected
Total Social
Welfare

-2,667

2,580

CT

-245

WCMA

Zone
Network Total

6.1.4

ISO-NE Test System Example Case: Congested Network
In this section, we compare the results between no congestion and with congestion where

the line from VT to NH is congested. Table 6.6 presents results parallel to those of Table 6.5 but
in the case where the network is congested. When this line is congested, the “source bus” and
“sink bus” are VT and NH, respectively. That is, the source bus for a particular congested line is
defined to be at the origin of the flow on the line, and the sink bus is defined to be at the
destination of the flow on the line.
At the aggregate network level, the consumer and society lose more due to the
introduction of virtual trading while the producer and virtual trader tend to gain more with
congestion in the network relative to the uncongested network. In addition, the total MWs of
virtual bids is greater in the congested case than in the uncongested case. These results are
consistent with the sandbox models.
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At the bus level, first, we can compare the welfare impacts of the introduction of virtual
trading on market participants and the bidding strategy between the source bus (VT) and the sink
bus (NH), relative to the uncongested case. In the congested case, the consumer and society tend
to lose more while the producer tends to gain more at the sink bus by introducing virtual
transactions, again relative to the uncongested case. This is also consistent with the previous
results from the simple network models where we found that the relative location in the
congested network results in that differences in the magnitude of welfare change of the market
participants.
Table 6.6 Quantitative welfare impact of having a virtual trader in the congested network relative
to no virtual case: Line from VT to NH is congested
Expected
Consumer
Welfare

Expected
Producer
Welfare

Expected
Total
Social
Welfare

Expected
Virtual
Trader
Welfare

Expected
Bid
Quantity
(MW)*

Network

-5,261

3,779

-1,482

82

-12

CT

250

-560

-310

1

0.6

WCMA

249

-148

101

1

0.6

VT (Source)

-562

511

-51

39

-4.2

-1,977

954

-1,023

19

-3.0

RI

-300

1,002

703

4

-1.3

NEMA/BOST

-771

N/A

-771

4

-1.3

NH (Sink)

-754

821

66

4

-1.3

-1,396

1,199

-197

11

-2.2

Zone

SEMA

ME

Positive MW: INC / Negative MW: DEC

The bidding strategy at the source and sink buses, however, differ from the sandbox
models. Recall that with the sandbox models, virtual trader bids greater MW of DECs at the sink
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relative to the source. In the ISO-NE Test Case, the virtual trader bids a greater MW quantity of
DECs at the source rather than sink. The differences in the optimal bidding strategy are a result
of asymmetries in the network due to the presence of congestion. As shown in Figure 6.1, nodes
are interconnected to other buses in an asymmetric way – that is, some buses are directly
connected via a transmission line, while others must wheel power through intervening zones. For
example, VT is connected to WCMA and NH while NH is connected to VT, WCMA, ME, and
NEMA/BOST. The fact that the VT and NH zones have a common connected bus, WCMA, and
the complexity of loop flow due to the secondary connections between WCMA, VT, WCMA,
ME impact the optimal profit-maximizing bidding strategy.

6.2

ISO-NE Test System Simulation
In the sandbox models, the congestion can only occur on a single line in the network and

having congestion in the network amplifies the welfare impacts of the virtual transactions for the
market participants. The consumer and society lose more while producers and virtual traders bid
more and gain more in order to exploit the network with congestion.
We derive the results of expected welfare impacts from specific cases using the ISO-NE
test system with a specified single line. Nonetheless, it is yet too early to generalize the expected
welfare impact by the virtual transaction in the congested network since some other network
specifications may show different results. Due to the complexity of the network with multiple
transmission lines connecting zones, multiple lines can be congested at the same time.
For this reason, we run multiple simulations with different configurations of demands and
transmission line capacities of the ISO-NE test system and compare the expected welfare impact
between the introducing optimal virtual bids and without virtual in all the randomly generated
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cases. Then we will derive robust expected welfare impacts on the simplified electricity network
with congestion.
6.2.1

ISO-NE Test System Simulation Configuration
In order to generate random cases to run the simulation, we use the ISO New England

aggregated network structure and parameters and load data developed by Krishnamurthy, Li, and
Tesfatsion, (2016). We use all 12 aggregate lines with benchmark reactance parameters given in
Table 6.1. By setting the line capacities so large that they cannot be constrained, the base case
reflects zero congestion. Each zone has fitted inverse supply functions for all generation units
and the peaker generation units using either an exponential or a quadratic form as specified in
Table 6.4.
As in the two- and three-bus simulation, we randomly generate parameters to adjust loads
and line capacities based on the base ISO-NE test network to create a diverse set of network
configuration. We generate multiplicative scale factors independently for each zone and
transmission capacity so they can be adjusted independently. First, the random scalars from a
uniform distribution on [0.8, 1.2] are generated independently and multiplied by the loads in the
8 zones. The multiplicative factors are applied to the entire empirical distribution of RT loads
and then the mean of the distribution is calculated to serve as the DA load. The MW of the load
distribution at any bus can be greater or less than the MW of the base case.
After generating random loads, we solve the DA and RT dispatch problems without
virtual trading and without line capacity limits. This gives results for an uncongested case, and
provides DA and RT generation and power flows as well as the expected welfare of the
consumer, producer, virtual and society taking into account the DA market and the RT market.
Using this information, the congested cases are generated by randomly generating line capacity.
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We generate the random multiplicative factors from the uniform distribution of [0.5, 2].
Then, multiply the generated factors independently to the base line capacities, MW of power
flows in DA with the virtual transaction in the uncongested case. If one or more lines are
congested in RT with virtual and the optimization problem is feasible, we measure the expected
welfare impacts for consumers and generators in both the uncongested and the congested cases
by comparing expected welfare between introducing optimal virtual bids and without virtual
bids. If the DA or any of the RT dispatch problems is infeasible or the network is not congested
in any of the RT dispatch problems with the adjusted line capacities, the case is omitted from the
simulation results.
6.2.2

ISO-NE Test System Simulation: Welfare Impacts of Virtual and Congested
Network

Table 6.7 Simulated expected welfare impacts of introducing virtual trading in congested and
uncongested networks in the ISO-NE Test Case
Frequency of welfare increase due to
introduction of virtual trading
Consumer

Producer

Society Virtual

Average magnitude of welfare change due
to the introduction of virtual trading
Consumer

Producer

Society Virtual

CV-C: Expected welfare impact due to virtual in a congested network
0%

100%

9%

100%

-6,121

5,108

-1,012

123

UV-U: Expected welfare impact due to virtual in an uncongested network
0%
100%
0%
100%
-2,730
2,637
-93
26
Note: Iteration = 1000. Feasible cases = 130, Infeasible cases = 865, Uncongested cases = 5,
Congested lines = 326. (Average congested lines per feasible case: 2.5)

The results from the sandbox models suggest that virtual transactions decrease the
welfare of consumers and society, while increasing producer welfare. Virtual traders always
profit, and hence their welfare increases relative to non-participation in the market. Comparing
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the uncongested network and congested network cases indicates that the welfare impacts of
virtual transactions on market participants tend to be amplified by the congestion in the network.
Table 6.7 summarizes the results of the ISO-NE Test System simulation at the network
level. The qualitative welfare impacts in both the uncongested and the congested cases are
consistent with the results observed from the sandbox models. There are no cases where
introducing virtual transactions in the network increases consumers’ expected welfare, and in
every case introducing virtual transactions increases producers’ expected welfare. In addition,
the virtual trader always achieves positive expected profits. The impact on social welfare at the
network level, however, is ambiguous in this more complicated network. While the average
magnitude of the expected welfare impact on society due to the introduction of virtual
transactions is negative, expected social welfare is increased in a modest number of congested
cases amounting to less than 10% of the instances.
6.2.3

ISO-NE Test System Simulations Results: Nodal Welfare Impacts Due to
Introducing Virtual Transactions in a Congested Network
The results obtained from the two- and three-bus network sandbox models suggest that

the welfare impact due to introducing virtual transactions in the congested network is different at
the nodal level.
Each congested line has source and sink buses defined by the dominant direction of flow,
and with multiple congested lines, some buses can be both a source and a sink. That is, a bus can
be a sink bus for one congested line and a source bus for another congested line.
When a bus is not directly adjacent to the congested line (call these “other” buses),
introducing virtual transactions tends to decrease consumer welfare and increase producer
welfare at that bus. Expected social welfare on these other buses decreases most of the time.
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Introducing virtual transactions generally decreases expected consumer welfare while
increasing expected producer welfare in most locations in the network. At a sink bus, due to the
introduction of the optimal virtual bidding, the producer, and financial trader tend to gain more
while the consumer and society tend to lose more relative to the source bus. The frequency of the
cases of increased expected welfare, however, suggests that the nodal welfare impacts in the
complicated network may be less clear than in the simpler sandbox networks.
Table 6.8 Nodal welfare impacts of virtual in congested network in the ISO-NE Test Case
simulation
Frequency of expected welfare increase
due to virtual transactions
Consumer

Producer

Social

Virtual

Magnitude of expected welfare change
due to virtual transactions
Consumer

Producer Social Virtual

CV-C: Expected welfare impact due to virtual in a congested network
Network

0%

100%

9%

100%

-6,121

5,108

-1,012

123

Source

19%

78%

45%

98%

-523

930

400

7

Sink

6%

97%

17%

100%

-2,229

1680

-668

67

Both

12%

83%

15%

98%

-888

346

-577

18

Other

0%

100%

9%

100%

-765

730

-127

15

Note: Iterations = 1000. Feasible cases = 130, Infeasible cases = 865, Uncongested cases = 5,
Congested lines = 326. (Average congested lines per case: 2.5) Source and sink are buses
adjacent to (next to) each congested line. The source is a bus located at the origin of the
predominant power flow adjacent to the congested line. The sink is a bus located at the
destination of the predominant power flow adjacent to the congested line. “Both” indicates a bus
located as sink and source both. Source buses = 190, Sink buses = 186, Both buses = 69.

While we can find differential welfare impacts of market participants between the source
and sink buses, there may be a confounding effect due to the complexity of the network and
simultaneous existence of multiple congested lines. Using the network structure where Maine
(ME) is isolated from the other network nodes except New Hampshire (NH), as represented in
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Figure 6.1, we can have a clearer view of the differential welfare impact depending on the
location of the network.
When there is a congestion between ME and NH, the power flows from ME to NH and
thus ME is the source bus and NH is the sink bus. To isolate potential confounding effects, we
focus only on the cases when there is congestion on the ME-NH line and ME is the source and
NH is the sink, thus excluding cases where NH is both a source and sink.
Table 6.9 Expected welfare impacts of introducing virtual transactions in the ISO-NE Test Case
simulation when the line between ME and NH is congested and ME is source bus and NH is sink
bus
Frequency of expected welfare increase
due to virtual transactions
Consumer

Producer

Social

Virtual

Magnitude of expected welfare change
due to virtual transactions
Consumer

Producer Social Virtual

CV-C: Expected welfare impact due to virtual in a congested network
Source

26%

74%

74%

92%

2

-91

-54

0.2

Sink

4%

94%

4%

100%

-681

426

-255

8.4

Note: # of cases: 23

The results from the ME and NH line congestion cases are generally consistent with the
sandbox models. At the sink bus, the consumer tends to lose more often and by a greater
expected magnitude, while the producer and virtual trader tend to gain more often and with a
greater expected magnitude, relative to the source bus. The virtual trader, while they usually get
an expected welfare gain at both source and sink, they occasionally make losing bids on the
source node. These are usually INCs (virtual supply), that increase the chance of congestion, thus
creating greater increases in welfare gains at the sink node.
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6.3

ISO-NE Test System Simulation Summary
In this chapter, we extend the form of the network from the sandbox models to a more

realistic one by adapting the ISO-NE Test System and run the simulation for the randomly
generated cases. Overall, the welfare impacts of the virtual transaction on the market participants
are consistent with the results of the sandbox models and the closed form solution for the single
bus case. On this eight bus and twelve line network based on an aggregation of the ISO-NE
network configuration and observed data, introducing virtual trading generally decreases
expected welfare for the consumer and society while increasing expected welfare for the
producer at the network level in both uncongested and congested networks.
Relative to the uncongested case, having congestion in the network generally amplifies
the expected welfare impacts due to the introduction of virtual transactions, with consumers and
society losing more expected welfare while the producers and virtual traders gaining more
expected welfare with congestion. In the congested network, the nodal welfare impact is
heterogeneous by location relative to the location(s) of the congested line(s) as well as the
network topology. At the sink buses, the consumer and society tend to lose more while the
producer tends to gain more relative to the source bus due to the introduction of the optimal
virtual bidding. Expected social welfare goes down the majority of time at the network level and
nodal level due to the introduction of the optimal virtual bidding.
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CHAPTER 7.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In the interest of improving the performance of wholesale electricity markets, virtual
financial products have been introduced. Virtual bids are purely financial instruments that are
used to hedge or speculate on the differences between forward and spot prices in a twosettlement electricity market. While there is evidence that virtual bidding can induce price
convergence across the day ahead and real-time markets, other research has shown that the
impacts of virtual bidding on the welfare of market participants are less clear.
The net revenue from the virtual transaction for the 2012-2015 planning years was $789
million in the PJM Interconnection. With such a large amount of money at stake, it is critical to
verify that virtual transactions bring benefits to the market from a societal perspective – that is
that social welfare is increased. Although price convergence is a convenient and commonly used
measure for electricity market efficiency, price convergence may not increase welfare for the
market participants in all cases.
The problem is that, while virtual bidding may narrow the expected price gap between
forward and spot markets, if it does so by inflating both prices, then electricity consumers may
not be better off. Although some work has analyzed the impacts of virtual transactions on
welfare for the electricity market participants, that work provides an incomplete assessment,
ignoring some important aspects of the electricity market system. In particular, Giraldo et al.
(2017) ignored the electricity network. This is an important omission because it ignores the
impacts of congestion and the physical laws governing electricity flows.
Hence, the objective of this research is to improve our understanding of the effects of
virtual transactions on electricity market performance using models that explicitly include the
network as well as relationships that reflect the physical properties of electricity flows through a
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network (i.e. loop flow). The core research question is: what impact does network congestion
have on the welfare shifts caused by the participation of financial virtual traders?
This study employs models having an explicit network to analyze the welfare changes of
electricity market participants in a network constrained multi-settlement electricity market.
Integrating the network in the model enables a comparison of welfare changes between the
simpler network-free models and a network-based model with the possibilities of line congestion
and an explicit treatment of loop flow.
Using an analytical approach in a stylized single bus case, we derived closed-form
solutions for the optimal virtual bidding strategy and the expected welfare impact on the market
participants due to the optimal virtual bids. The interesting market situation for the system
operator is having the zero expected demand deviation that the forecasted demand in DA market
is the same as the expected realized demand in RT market. In this case, the optimal strategy for
the financial trader is bidding virtual demand, DECs, and it increases expected producer welfare
while it decreases expected consumer welfare.
An essential component ignored in the electricity market literature concerning the impact
of the virtual transaction is transmission line congestion. The electricity market is a network with
bus and they are connected by the transmission line. Another important component is loop flow
governs the power flow through transmission lines.
When no transmission constraints are binding, power flow moves freely, and assuming
no line losses, only a single price is needed to value electricity throughout the entire network.
That is commonly not the case due to the limited transmission line capacity. When the MW of
power flow in the transmission line reaches the line capacity, the line cannot move additional
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power through that line, and we call it congested. The congested line cancels ideal merit-order
dispatch and limits additional power flow between buses.
Using stylized two- and three-bus models, we estimated and compared the differences in
welfare impact due to the introduction of virtual transactions between uncongested and
congested networks as well as its heterogonous impact on the different buses due to their
location within the network. At the network level, congested lines amplify the welfare change
due to introducing virtual transactions. When the network has a congested line, source and sink
are at opposite side of the congested line. The source is located at the origin and the sink is
located at the destination of the predominant power flow on the congested line. At the sink bus,
the consumer and society tend to lose more while the producer tends to gain more relative to the
source bus.
The results of welfare impacts of two- and three-bus models are consistent across the
different cases of expected demand deviation. Nonetheless, the results from a handful of
deterministic cases do not represent various forms of network configuration and it makes it hard
to generalize the results. For this reason, we implement simulation with different random
configurations of the two- and three-bus network and compare the welfare impact between the
uncongested and congested cases in all the randomly generated cases. Then we could derive
robust welfare impacts on the simplified electricity network with congestion, which are
consistent with the results from the specific cases.
However, real electricity networks governed by ISO and RTOs are more complicated
with more buses and transmission lines relative to the simple two- and three-bus network
models. In this regard, we adopt the simulation approach using ISO-NE test network and derive
consistent result with the simple network models.
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The sandbox and ISO-NE test case simulations results suggest that price convergence
occurs with optimal virtual bidding, which is consistent with existing literature. The prices
throughout the network in both forward and spot markets are affected, and there are welfare
transfers among producers, consumers, and virtual traders relative to the market equilibrium
without virtual bidding. Results indicate that optimal virtual bidding tends to decrease consumer
welfare when the expected demand is equal to the cleared demand in the forward market, and
congested lines in the network can magnify the welfare changes while virtual traders essentially
always benefit.
Furthermore, the welfare impacts on market participants are not homogenous throughout
the network. That is, some generators may benefit while others lose, and the same is true for
load-serving entities. The impacts are heterogeneous depending on where the agents are located
in the network relative to the congested line. The one constant is that virtual traders essentially
always benefit because the financial trader can always opt out. These implications should be
considered in the design of regulations governing virtual transactions in the electricity market.
With the overall results, we could reject the null hypothesis. Having congestion in the
network creates differences in optimal bidding strategy of the financial trader and its welfare
impact on market participants, and having optimal virtual bidding in the congested network
creates heterogeneous welfare impacts across the network.
This study contributes to the nexus of studies about the impact of virtual transactions on
the market efficiency in the wholesale electricity market, identifying welfare impact by
introducing optimal virtual bidding traders employing complicated power network governed by
physical laws. Most of the previous literature focused on the efficiency defined by the degree of
price convergence brought by having a virtual transaction in the electricity market (Borenstein et
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al. 2008; Hadsell 2011; Haugom and Ullrich 2012). There are few literature that studying the
welfare impact of a virtual transaction (Giraldo et al. 2017) using a stylized parsimonious twosettlement market model based on a single node.
However, it is important to note that the actual complexity of a wholesale power market
is far greater than the ones used in this study. For example, the aggregated zonal level ISO-NE
test case has 8 zones to bid, the financial traders in PJM market can make transactions at more
than 10,000 nodes. Hence, the complicated network with transmission constraints ruled by loop
flow would result in more complex bidding behavior, and the direct impact of virtual
transactions on market efficiency may be ambiguous. In addition, we only consider the riskneutral profit-maximizing virtual traders in the network in the study. They may have different
intention such as hedging and co-bidding with their underlying physical assets or congestion
products such as generation fleets, loads and financial transmission rights. While the majority of
the financial bidders in the markets are actually from purely speculative institutions, financial
products are often used as part of the physical asset and grid management.
In the future, this line of research can be further developed by using the more
complicated network. Securing higher resolution data that more nearly reflects the wholesale
electricity network may be very useful to understand the sophisticated bidding strategies possible
with complicated network constraints. In addition, besides using the virtual products only for
profit-maximizing speculative behavior, market participants may use them differently for their
business purposes, such as hedging the real-time price volatility of load-serving entity with
different risk preferences. It may reveal different welfare impacts on market participants.
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APPENDIX A. Notation

Indices and sets
b,i,j

Set of buses in the electricity network

b(ae)

Subset of buses having exponential inverse supply function for all generators

b(aq)

Subset of buses having quadratic inverse supply function for all generators

b(pe)

Subset of buses having exponential inverse supply function for peakers

b(pq)

Subset of buses having quadratic inverse supply function for peakers

ij

Set of connected arc lines in the electricity network
(i: injection bus on arc line, j: withdrawal bus on arc line)

s

Set of positive mass points in the empirical distribution of real-time demand

Parameters
d1b

Demand in Day-Ahead (DA) market at bus b

d2bs

Demand in Real-Time (RT) market at bus b in scenario s

𝛥𝛥 bs

Demand deviation in RT market at bus b in scenario s

Prob(s)

Probability of scenario s

a1b

Supply function parameter of aggregated generators in DA market at bus b

b1b

Supply function slope of aggregated generators in DA market at bus b

a2b

Supply function parameter of aggregated generators in RT market at bus b

b2b

Supply function slope of aggregated generators in RT market at bus b

PTDFijb

Power transfer distribution factor matrix
It defines how much increased power flowing on line ij with extra unit of power
injection (withdrawal) at bus b and withdrawal (injection) at reference bus

Gbmax, Gbmin

Maximum and minimum capacity of aggregated generators located at bus b

Fijmax

Maximum capacity on line ij

RP

Reservation price of consumer demand

LMP1b

Locational marginal price in DA market at bus b

LMP2bs

Locational marginal price in RT market at bus b in scenario s
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Variables
Vb

Cleared virtual bids on bus b

f1ij

Power flowing in DA market on line ij

f2ijs

Power flowing in RT market on line ij in scenario s

g1b

Power generated in DA market at bus b

g2bs

Power generated in DA market at bus b in scenario s

λ1

Lagrange multiplier of system balance equation in DA

λ1b

Lagrange multiplier of bus balance equation in DA at bus b

λ2s

Lagrange multiplier of system balance equation in RT in scenario s

λ2bs

Lagrange multiplier of bus balance equation in RT at bus b in scenario s

π1ij+ , π1ij−

+
−
π2ijs
, π2ijs
−
µ+
𝑏𝑏 , µ𝑏𝑏

−
µ+
𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 , µ𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠

S_λ1

S_λ2s

S_λ1b

S_λ2bs
S_π1ij+
S_π1−
ij

S_π2+
ijs
S_π2−
ijs
S_µ1𝑏𝑏+
S_µ1−
𝑏𝑏

S_µ2+
𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
S_µ2−
𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠

Lagrange multiplier of line capacity equation in DA on line ij
Lagrange multiplier of line capacity equation in RT on line ij in scenario s
Lagrange multiplier of generation limit equation in DA at bus b
Lagrange multiplier of generation limit equation in DA at bus b in scenario s
Slack variable for λ1

Slack variable for λ2s

Slack variable for λ1b

Slack variable for λ2bs
Slack variable for π1ij+
Slack variable for π1−
ij

Slack variable for π2+
ijs
Slack variable for π2−
ijs
Slack variable for µ1𝑏𝑏+
Slack variable for µ1−
𝑏𝑏

Slack variable for µ2+
𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
Slack variable for µ2−
𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
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APPENDIX B. Sandbox Model

B.1 Formulation of the Virtual Trader’s Profit Maximization Problem Subject to Day
Ahead and Real Time Market Equilibrium

Upper-level: Virtual trader
max

∑s ∑b Prob(s) ∙ Vb (LMP1b − LMP2bs )

−
LMP1b = λ1 − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π1+
ij − π1ij �

∀b

−
LMP2bs = λ2s − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π2+
ijs − π2ijs �

∀bs

s.t

Lower-level: Day-Ahead market
−

a1b

b1b

g1

−
+ b1b − λ1+ π1+
ij ∑i ∑j PTDFijb − π1ij ∑i ∑j PTDFijb =0
b

− ∑b(g1b − (d1b − Vb )) + S_λ1 = 0

∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) – Fijmax +S_π1ij+ = 0

− ∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) – Fijmax +S_π1−
ij = 0
0 ≤ S_λ1 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0

0 ≤ S_π1ij+ ⊥ π1+
ij ≥ 0

Lower-level: Real-Time market
a1

b

g2bs
b1b

a2

∀ij
∀ij
∀ij

0 ≤ S_π1ij− ⊥ π1−
ij ≥ 0
max(− b1b +

∀b

, − b2b +
b

g2bs
b2b

∀ij

)

+
−
∑i ∑j PTDFijb − πijs
∑i ∑j PTDFijb = 0
−λ2s + π2ijs

∀bs

+
∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) – Fijmax +S_π2ijs
=0

∀ijs

− ∑b(g2bs − d2bs ) + S_λ2s = 0

∀s
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−
− ∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) – Fijmax +S_π2ijs
=0

∀ijs

+
0 ≤ S_π2ijs
⊥ π2+
ijs ≥ 0

∀ijs

0 ≤ S_λ2s ⊥ λ2s ≥ 0

−
0 ≤ S_π2ijs
⊥ π2−
ijs ≥ 0

∀s

∀ijs
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APPENDIX C. ISO-NE Test Case Model

C.1 Bilevel Formulation of the Virtual Trader’s Profit Maximization Problem Subject to
Day Ahead and Real Time Market Equilibrium

Upper-level: Virtual trader
∑s ∑b Prob(s) ∙ Vb (LMP1b − LMP2bs )

max

−
LMP1b = λ1 − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π1+
ij − π1ij �

∀b

−
LMP2bs = λ2s − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π2+
ijs − π2ijs �

∀bs

s.t

Lower-level: Day-Ahead market
g1b(aq)

max ∑b RPb · d1b − ∑b(aq) ∫0
g1b(ae)

∑b(ae) ∫0
s.t

a1b(aq) ∙ g + b1b(aq) ∙ g 2 dg −

a1b(ae) �eg∙b1b(ae) − 1� dg

∑b(g1b − (d1b − Vb )) ≥ 0

λ1 ≥ 0

− ∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) ≤Fijmax

π1ij− ≥ 0

∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) ≤ Fijmax
g1b ≤ Gbmax

π1ij+ ≥ 0

∀ij

µ1+
𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0

∀𝑏𝑏

µ1−
𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0

−g1b ≤ −Gbmin

∀ij
∀𝑏𝑏

Lower-level: Real-Time market
max ∑s ∑b Prob(s) · RPb · d1b

min(g1b(aq) ,g2b(aq)s )

− ∑s Prob(s) · ( + ∑b(aq) ∫0

min(g1b(ae) ,g2b(ae)s )

+ ∑b(ae) ∫0

a1b(aq) ∙ g + b1b(aq) ∙ g 2 dg

a1b(ae) �eg∙b1b(ae) − 1� dg

max(g2b(pq)s −g1b(pq) ,0)+max(g1b(pq) −Baseb(pq) ,0)

+ ∑b(pq) ∫0

max(g1b(pq) −Baseb(pq) ,0)

− ∑b(pq) ∫0

a2b(ae) �eg∙b2b(ae) − 1� dg

max(g2b(pe)s −g1b(pe) ,0)+max(g1b(pe) −Baseb(pe) ,0)

+ ∑b(pe) ∫0

a2b(aq) ∙ g + b2b(aq) ∙ g 2 dg

a2b(ae) �eg∙b2b(ae) − 1� dg

144
max(g1b(pe) −Baseb(pe) ,0)

− ∑b(pe) ∫0
s.t

a2b(ae) �eg∙b2b(ae) − 1� dg

∑b(g2bs − d2bs ) ≥ 0

λ2s ≥ 0

∀s

− ∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) ≤Fijmax

−
π2ijs
≥0

∀ijs

∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) ≤ Fijmax
g2bs ≤ Gbmax

−g2bs ≤ −Gbmin

+
π2ijs
≥0

µ2+
𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0
µ2−
𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0

∀ijs
∀𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
∀𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
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C.2 KKT Reformulation of the Virtual Trader’s Profit Maximization Problem Subject to
Day Ahead and Real Time Market Equilibrium

Upper-level: Virtual trader
max

∑s ∑b Prob(s) ∙ Vb (LMP1b − LMP2bs )

−
LMP1b = λ1 − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π1+
ij − π1ij �

∀b

−
LMP2bs = λ2s − ∑i ∑j PTDFijb �π2+
ijs − π2ijs �

∀bs

s.t

Lower-level: Day-Ahead market
a1𝑏𝑏(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ∙ g1b + β1b(aq) ∙ g1b(aq) 2 + a1𝑏𝑏(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) �eg1b(ae)∙b1𝑏𝑏(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 1�

−
−λ1+ π1ij+ ∑i ∑j PTDFijb − π1ij− ∑i ∑j PTDFijb + µ1+
𝑏𝑏 − µ1𝑏𝑏 = 0

∀b

− ∑b(g1b − (d1b − Vb )) + S_λ1 = 0

∀b

− ∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) – Fijmax +S_π1−
ij = 0

∀ij

∑b PTDFijb (g1b − (d1b − Vb )) – Fijmax +S_π1ij+ = 0

∀ij

g1b − Gbmax +𝑆𝑆_µ1+
𝑏𝑏 = 0

∀𝑏𝑏

−g1b + Gbmin +𝑆𝑆_µ1−
𝑏𝑏 = 0

∀𝑏𝑏

0 ≤ S_λ1 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0

0 ≤ S_π1ij+ ⊥ π1+
ij ≥ 0

∀ij

+
0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆_µ1+
𝑏𝑏 ⊥ µ1𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0

∀𝑏𝑏

0 ≤ S_π1ij− ⊥ π1−
ij ≥ 0

∀ij

−
0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆_µ1−
𝑏𝑏 ⊥ µ1𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0

∀𝑏𝑏

Lower-level: Real-Time market
2

(a1b(aq) ∙ min(g1b(aq) , g2b(aq)s ) + b1b(aq) ∙ min�g1b(aq) , g2b(aq)s � )
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+a1b(ae) �emin(g1b(ae),g2b(ae)s )∙b1b(ae) − 1�

+(a2b(pq) ∙ (max�g2b(pq)s − g1b(pq) , 0� + max�g1b(pq) − Baseb(pq) , 0�) + β2b(pq) ∙
2

�max�g2b(pq)s − g1b(pq) , 0� + max�g1b(pq) − Baseb(pq) , 0�� )

2

−(a2b(pq) ∙ max�g1b(pq) − Baseb(pq) , 0� + β2b(pq) ∙ max�g1b(pq) − Baseb(pq) , 0� )
+a2b(pe) �e(max�g2b(pq)s −g1b(pq) ,0�+max�g1b(pq) −Baseb(pq) ,0�)∙b2b(pe) − 1�
−a2b(pe) �emax�g1b(pq) −Baseb(pq) ,0�∙β2b(pe) − 1�

+
−
−
∑i ∑j PTDFijb − πijs
∑i ∑j PTDFijb + µ1+
−λ2s + π2ijs
𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − µ1𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 = 0

∀bs

+
∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) – Fijmax +S_π2ijs
=0

∀ijs

− ∑b(g2bs − d2bs ) + S_λ2s = 0

−
− ∑b PTDFijb (g2bs − d2bs ) – Fijmax +S_π2ijs
=0

g1bs − Gbsmax +𝑆𝑆_µ1+
𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 = 0

−
−g1bs + Gbsmin +𝑆𝑆_µ1𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
=0

0 ≤ S_λ2s ⊥ λ2s ≥ 0

+
0 ≤ S_π2ijs
⊥ π2+
ijs ≥ 0
−
0 ≤ S_π2ijs
⊥ π2−
ijs ≥ 0

+
0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆_µ1+
𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 ⊥ µ1𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0
−
0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆_µ1−
𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 ⊥ µ1𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0

∀s

∀ijs
∀𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
∀𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
∀s

∀ijs
∀ijs

∀𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
∀𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
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C.3 Pasting RT inverse supply function

Let
g_DA

= DA generation

g_RT

= RT generation

P_RT(g_RT) = the pasted inverse supply function
P_DA(g)

= the DA inverse supply function (P_DA(0) = 0)

P_P(g)

= the peaker only inverse supply function (P_P(0) = 0)

P_RT(g_RT) = P_DA[min(g_RT,g_DA)]
+ P_P[max(g_RT-g_DA,0) + max(g_DA-C_B,0)]
- P_P[max(g_DA-C_B,0)]

If g_RT < g_DA then P_RT = P_DA.
If g_RT > g_DA < C_B then P_RT = P_DA(g_DA) + P_P[g_RT-g_DA].
If g_RT > g_DA > C_B then P_RT = P_DA(g_DA) + P_P[g_RT-C_B] - P_P[[g_DA-C_B].

Note that as g_RT approaches g_DA, P_RT is continuous in every case.
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APPENDIX D. ISO-NE Test Case Data

D.1 Generator Quadratic Supply Functions (Krishnamurthy, Li, and Tesfatsion, 2016)

Generator

Zone

Capacity

Parameter_a

Parameter_b

Fuel

Generator_1

NH

1,244

10

0.00020

NUC

Generator_2

CT

1,235

10

0.00023

NUC

Generator_3

CT

881

5

0.00015

NUC

Generator_4

SEMASS

685

7

0.00021

NUC

Generator_5

VT

620

11

0.00022

NUC

Generator_6

RI

612

18

0.00012

BIT

Generator_7

CT

372

20

0.00167

SUB

Generator_8

CT

372

20

0.00167

SUB

Generator_9

RI

244

18

0.00012

BIT

Generator_10

RI

244

18

0.00012

BIT

Generator_11

ME

150

18

0.00012

BIT

Generator_12

WCMASS

144

18

0.00012

BIT

Generator_13

ME

82

18

0.00012

BIT

Generator_14

ME

80

18

0.00012

BIT

Generator_15

NH

48

20

0.00167

BIT

Generator_16

NH

48

20

0.00167

BIT

Generator_17

ME

600

161

0.02367

RFO

Generator_18

SEMASS

559

153

0.03460

RFO

Generator_19

SEMASS

553

192

0.03463

RFO

Generator_20

CT

448

160

0.02360

RFO

Generator_21

RI

435

192

0.03450

RFO

Generator_22

ME

431

233

0.03120

RFO

Generator_23

CT

407

233

0.00598

RFO

Generator_24

NH

400

55

0.00140

RFO
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Table continued
Generator_25

CT

400

200

0.02184

RFO

Generator_26

CT

236

192

0.03463

RFO

Generator_27

CT

168

151

0.03470

RFO

Generator_28

CT

131

152

0.03450

RFO

Generator_29

CT

117

192

0.03463

RFO

Generator_30

ME

116

154

0.03460

RFO

Generator_31

CT

81

54

0.00200

RFO

Generator_32

ME

694

23

0.00294

NGLN

Generator_33

ME

685

25

0.00292

NGLN

Generator_34

SEMASS

676

57

0.00292

NGA4

Generator_35

ME

555

90

0.00292

NGA1

Generator_36

RI

516

28

0.00292

NGTN

Generator_37

NH

508

23

0.00292

NGMN

Generator_38

ME

490

23

0.00292

NGMN

Generator_39

CT

448

50

0.00292

NGIR

Generator_40

RI

271

28

0.02290

NGTN

Generator_41

RI

265

57

0.00300

NGA4

Generator_42

RI

249

22

0.00002

NGA4

Generator_43

RI

248

22

0.00002

NGA4

Generator_44

RI

248

22

0.00002

NGA4

Generator_45

ME

245

52

0.00300

NGPN

Generator_46

SEMASS

245

58

0.00400

NGA4

Generator_47

RI

239

58

0.00350

NGA4

Generator_48

WCMASS

238

25

0.00375

NGT2

Generator_49

RI

236

57

0.00372

NGA4

Generator_50

ME

154

90

0.00410

NGA1

Generator_51

RI

149

57

0.00800

NGT4

Generator_52

RI

149

57

0.01300

NGA4
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Generator_53

RI

149

57

0.01750

NGA4

Generator_54

RI

149

57

0.02200

NGA4

Generator_55

SEMASS

141

57

0.01500

NGA4

Generator_56

WCMASS

141

95

0.00350

NGT1

Generator_57

SEMASS

105

58

0.00500

NGA4

Generator_58

WCMASS

104

100

0.00750

NGT2

Generator_59

CT

44

57

0.02133

NGA4

Generator_60

CT

44

57

0.02133

NGA4

Generator_61

CT

44

57

0.02133

NGA4

Generator_62

CT

43

57

0.02133

NGA4

Generator_63

WCMASS

275

375

0.00420

NGTN

Generator_64

RI

300

400

0.00350

NGTN

Generator_65

RI

325

350

0.00360

NGTN

Generator_66

CT

225

325

0.03420

RFO

Generator_67

WCMASS

150

375

0.00800

NGT2

Generator_68

WCMASS

175

350

0.00900

NGT2

Generator_69

ME

175

300

0.00900

NGPN

Generator_70

ME

85

290

0.00900

NGPN

Generator_71

ME

55

310

0.00900

NGPN

Generator_72

ME

150

325

0.00900

NGTN

Generator_73

ME

200

350

0.00800

NGTN

Generator_74

ME

150

340

0.00750

NGTN

Generator_75

ME

100

375

0.00850

NGTN

Generator_76

ME

125

310

0.00950

NGTN

Note: The quadratic function with generation g (MW) is parameter_a + parameter_b*g2. NUC:
Nuclear, BIT: Coal, NGIR, NGA1, NGA4, NGLN, NGMN, NGPN, NGT1, NGT2, NGT4,
NGTN: Natural Gas, RFO: Fuel Oil

